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Editorial 
Joachim Duyndam & Renée van Riessen 
By exception, the present issue of the Journal of the Dutch-
Flemish Levinas Society (Mededelingen van de Levinas Stud-
iekring), volume 16, 2011, is published in English. Covered 
by the theme ‘Interreligious Dialogue’, the volume at hand 
includes contributions to the International Memorial Con-
ference in Honour of Nasr Abu Zayd, organized by the Uni-
versity of Humanistic Studies in Utrecht, The Netherlands, 
on April 14-15, 2011. Although only a few of the conference 
papers are explicitly related to Levinas’ thought, the central 
theme of the memorial conference – How Can a Humanistic 
Approach to Islam Be Realized? – is in the spirit of Levinas’ 
philosophy as it can be articulated as a ‘humanism of the 
other’ and ‘intercultural / interreligious dialogue’. There-
fore, the editors have considered it justifiable to share the 
present variety of interesting papers with the Levinas-
minded scholarly audience of this Journal. Despite their 
different cultural and religious roots, Nasr Abu Zayd (1943-
2010) and Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) have their hu-
manism of the other – or should we say: humanism to the 
other – in common, including their striving for peaceful dia-
logue and careful interpretation.  
The editors are indebted to Coby van Pagée and Annelot de 
Wit for their assistance in editing this volume. 
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Introduction:  
Why Nasr Abu Zayd Fascinates Me 
Joachim Duyndam  
Chair of the conference 
Having pointed at the parallels between Nasr Abu Zayd and 
Levinas in the editorial (see above), I will briefly introduce 
Abu Zayd’s thought and spirit by testifying personally to my 
threefold fascination with him.  
Nasr Abu Zayd fascinates me in the first place because he 
genuinely embodies the hermeneutic nature of life stance 
and religion. As a devout Muslim, he found that the source 
texts of his faith do not have a fixed and immovable mean-
ing, but that their meaning should permanently be con-
quered in a careful process of interpretation. A text only 
becomes meaningful in a context – and these contexts are 
historically and culturally variable. This applies not only to 
Islam but also to Christianity and other religions and phi-
losophies of life. If for example the Bible says, ‘love thy 
neighbour’, the truth and the meaning of such a command 
depend on its application to a specific context, for instance 
to my own life. Therefore, I must first understand what it 
really means to love and what love requires from me, and 
moreover I should know who actually is my neighbour. So I 
have to translate and to apply, in order that the general de-
mand ‘love thy neighbour’ can mean anything at all. I con-
sider the appeal, defended by some orthodox believers, to 
read the texts ‘literally’ as a warning to take the text serious-
ly, not as an admonition to stick to one unchanging sense. 
This is the way Nasr worked. It made him collide with or-
thodoxy, who want to hold to a standard explanation. Final-
ly they didn’t even consider Nasr to be a true Muslim any-
more, and as a result a court dissolved his marriage (since 
his wife wasn’t allowed to be married with a ‘non-Muslim’). 
Nasr and his wife left their native Egypt, and came to the 
Netherlands. First to Leyden, and later to the University of 
Humanistic Studies in Utrecht, where he held the Ibn Rushd 
Chair of Humanism and Islam until his untimely death in on 
July 5th, 2010. 
This brings me to my second fascination with Nasr. He em-
bodies the interreligious dialogue. On the one hand, and he 
was faithful Muslim, who undoubtedly assumed that the 
Qur’an is the word of God, but on the other hand, he found 
that it is the right and even the duty of human beings to in-
terpret and to apply the word of God. In this respect he was 
also a humanist. He is a Muslim and a humanist likewise: as  
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a Muslim he is humanist, as a humanist he is Muslim. But 
not in a watery compromise attitude: as if they all have a 
little bit right. No, convinced Muslim, with knowledge of the 
sources, and rooted in it. And a genuine humanist, precisely 
because of his hermeneutical dealing with the sources, 
based on his knowledge of the Western humanistic tradi-
tion. 
My third fascination concerns Nasr as a teacher. I very much 
appreciate his knowledge, his patience, his dislike of fast 
one-liners, of fashionable opinions and easy conclusions. I 
will always remember his erudition and at the same time his 
enormous dedication to his students. Nasr is an exemplary 
scholar, an exemplary teacher, and an exemplary human 
being. I express my deep gratitude for what he has taught 
us.  
On July 5th, 2010, the world famous Islam scholar Nasr Abu 
Zayd passed away. He had held the Ibn Rushd chair for Islam 
and Humanism at the University of Humanistic Studies in the 
Netherlands since 2002. During his working life, professor 
Abu Zayd has laid bare a non-dogmatic, contextualised, so-
called ‘humanistic’ interpretation of the Qur’an. Rereading 
and reinterpreting the sources Islam is founded upon from the 
perspective of modern values such as human rights, equality, 
and democracy, is a task of vital importance. In the present-
day global situation, tension between disparate worldviews 
and cultural traditions holds sway. Through exploring and 
studying humanistic principles and predilections in Islam, 
Nasr Abu Zayd has supported the development of self-critical, 
liberal portrayals of Islam in Western culture. 
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Nasr Abu Zayd: A Humanistic Face of Islam. 
Ebtehal Younes 
My starting point is the title of the original seminar that was 
supposed to take place last July as a farewell to Nasr on the 
occasion of his retirement. The title was raising the ques-
tion: Is a humanistic Islam possible? This question leads to 
another one: was it a coincidence for the University of Hu-
manistics to appoint him for the Ibn Rushd Chair or was this 
choice pertinent? To answer these questions, it is necessary 
to approach Nasr Abu Zayd as a scholar as well as a human 
being. First of all because it’s impossible to dissociate be-
tween the two levels, considering that his life and behavior 
were in accordance with his ideas. Secondly, because as 
author of this paper, I am his wife as well as a fellow scholar. 
The basic concept in Nasr’s life and work is that the role of 
the religion, any religion, is to improve human condition, 
towards human welfare; in the sense that religion is in ser-
vice of Man and not vice versa. That is why the main focus 
must be the search of human values. Let us not forget that, 
as a boy and a teenager, Nasr’s attraction towards the Mus-
lim Brotherhood was only based on their concept of social 
justice, not any theological issues. As a scholar, all his stud-
ies are focusing on human values and condition, emphasiz-
ing the human dimension in Islam and Quran. In this hu-
manistic perspective, the accent was put on what he called 
“The First receiver”, i.e. Prophet Mohamed as a Man: his 
personality, his culture, his emotions, his aspirations… as 
essential factors in transmitting the divine message. In “Man 
and God in communication”, communication is presented as 
negotiations between the human and the divine through the 
multiplicity of discourses and dialogues in the Quran to-
wards human welfare, opening the meanings to all mankind. 
The starting point of “The Perfect Man in Islam” is the no-
tion of man as the unique and most respected creature of 
God (as a reflection of His image), based on the two con-
cepts of freedom and reason, taking into consideration the 
social developments and the historical changes. The univer-
sal dimension of this notion is clearly mentioned by Nasr in 
the conclusion of this study: “a lot of efforts has to be done 
in order to find out what Islam can present to the modern 
situation not only for the societies in which the majority of 
population confess Islam but for all the societies of the 
world as well.” 
Since those early studies, Nasr’s humanistic and universal 
perspective led him to focus on the Others, i.e. the non-
Muslim, in the Quran, as well as the non-Muslim view of the 
Quran. This notion was so important for him that he  
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achieved several studies based upon this theme like: “Hu-
manistic Islam”, “The Quran concept of the others”, “The 
Quran from non-Muslim perspective”, “The diversity of the 
Quranic view towards the Other” etc… 
In Nasr’s scientific research, we can realize the rational 
trend inherited from Ibn Rushd, in addition to the essential 
human values of freedom and justice inherited from the 
Mutazilites. But we have also to take into consideration the 
encounter and the combination between this rational trend 
and the sufi trend that deeply affected both his thoughts and 
his life. Let us not forget that his PHD was about the great 
andalusian sufi Ibn Arabi who was the greatest love of his 
life and my concurrent in Nasr’s heart. As a symbol of the 
sufi trend, the poetry of Ibn Arabi became Nasr’s slogan: the 
religion of love in which the heart is the sanctuary of a 
mosque, a church, a synagogue, a pagan temple…, and in 
which love is the religion and the religious believe, worship-
ing the hidden God behind and beyond the dogmas. 
This encounter and combination between the rational trend 
and the sufi trend guided the humanistic perspective in his 
scientific research and formed the link between his thoughts 
and studies on one hand, and his life and behavior on the 
other hand. As I said in the beginning, it is impossible to 
dissociate between Nasr as a scholar and Nasr as a human 
being because the two levels are in perfect accordance and 
harmony. On the personal level, Nasr is open to all, without 
any prejudgments. He never rejects what he doesn’t know. 
On the contrary, he has this lovely curiosity to discover new 
worlds, new cultures, new food… and above all, to discover 
and understand other religions. When he was in Japan, he 
spend time in a Shinto temple and in a Buddhist temple to 
learn profoundly about those religions, not only through 
reading books, but most of all, through living experience on 
a human level and direct contact with the people believing 
in those religions. For him, all the cultures and religions of 
the world are parts of a whole called humanity.  
Going back to the question raised by the title of the original 
seminar: Is a humanistic Islam possible?, I think, not only 
through his thoughts and studies, but above all, just by be-
ing himself, Nasr proved that the answer is yes. 
At the end, the best tribute to Nasr Abu Zayd is to carry on 
his views, his research line and his efforts towards a human-
istic Islam. 
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Relationships between Humanism and Is-
lam 
Abdelilah Ljamai 
Introduction 
Humanism is an ethical philosophy which insists that man 
alone is responsible for what he is. The fundamental differ-
ence between Islam en Humanism is that religion has a ver-
tical relation with God above men. While within humanism 
there is a horizontal relation from men to men. In the inter-
religious dialogue this causes ethical and methodological 
issues. At first glance it seems that Humanism and Islam 
have little to do with each other. Yet the traditions have 
more in common than we think. Based on a study of Classi-
cal Islamic texts, we will discuss how ‘humanization’ ap-
pears within Islamic thought. For instance within the 
Mu’tazilite school (end of 8th Century) in which there was a 
great focus on key humanist principles, including freedom 
of expression; freedom of interpretation of text; and the 
idea of Ratio first - Holy Script second. We see similar ideas 
in the work of Islamic philosophers from the East, such as 
al-Farabi (d. 950) and Ibn Sina (d. 1037) and in texts from 
Ibn Baja (d. 1138) and Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), who came from 
Andalucia. All of them encouraged critical thought and a 
rational reinterpretation of the Holy Script. After an intro-
duction, we will focus on ethical and methodological ques-
tions that emerge when Islam and humanism meet: both in 
theory and how they appear in practices for example prac-
tices of gender equality as a foundation of human rights. I 
will deal with de following aspects. Firstly, the humaniza-
tion in the works of the Mu'tazilite school. Secondly the hu-
manization in the works of Muslim philosophers. Finally, the 
ethical and methodological questions regarding the rela-
tionship between contemporary Islam and humanism in the 
West.  
 
1. Humanization in the works of the Mu'tazilite school  
The Mu’tazilite school is originated in the eighth century. 
The genesis was related to a debate on a theological issue as 
follows: if a Muslim has committed a sin (adultery) does he 
stays in hell forever or not? According to the founder of the 
Mu’tazilite school, Wasil Ibn Ata’ (d. 748), the person who 
has committed this sin will not be sent to heaven or hell. But 
he stays in the ‘between two degrees’ (between heaven and 
hell). This interpretation is based on his (Wasil) ratio to 
answer these complex religious issues. Wasil’s teacher (al-
Hasan al-Basri) was very angry with his student, accusing 
him of using his ratio (not the religious text). Wasil and his 
supporters have taken distance from the crowd and got the  
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5 Compare Ljamai, A., Inleiding to de studie 
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name Mu’tazili (derived from the verb i’tazal: take dis-
tance)1.  
 
Adherents of this school plead a rational interpretation of 
the Quran and have developed several theories about hu-
manizing. This could include al-Jubba’i (d. 915) who has 
developed a theory about “The individual freedom of choice 
of humans”. He said: “God created humans as free. The one 
who can make good decisions about his faith is the person 
himself. Nobody is allowed to decide for you how to think. It 
depends on your human beliefs...”2. This statement clearly 
shows that Muslims in the history of Islam were actively 
involved with the applications of the notion ”individual free 
choice of the man”. 
 
Al-Qadi Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1025), the author of al-Mughni 
emphasized in his works the interests of justice in society. 
His message was more focused on the socio-political context 
of the Muslims under the Abbasid Dynasty. Abd al-Jabbar 
makes a distinction between two types of justice: divine 
justice and human justice. According to al-Qadi-Abd al-
Jabbar, justice means giving rights to others while retaining 
one's own rights. This law applies to God and to humans3. 
Especially the human justice had received much attention in 
the works of such scholars. It clearly indicates that the con-
tinuity of humanity on earth is related to all forms of justice. 
Justice must not philosophize, but also see in practice, both 
in private and in public spaces, said Abd al-Jabbar. He em-
phasizes that social and political justice is the responsibility 
of the Muslim caliphs.  
The eleventh century Ash‘arite scholar Al-Mawardi (d.1058) 
has focused on the role of political and social justice in the 
realization of stability and harmony in the Islamic capital 
Baghdad4. Besides the notions of ‘individual free choice of 
man’ and ‘justice’ al-Zamakhshari (d. 1144), the famous ex-
egete in the Mu’tazilite school, also defends in his book Al-
Kashshaf the right ‘of freedom of speech’ mainly in the rein-
terpretation of the religious text. The application of this 
principle is evident in the tafsir of Al-Zamakhshari based on 
making use of reason to clarify the Quranic verses. He usual-
ly chooses for the metaphorical aspects of a verse and does 
not remain clinging to the literal meaning of the text5.  
 
The Mu’tazilite scholar Al-Jahiz (d. 869) emphasizes in his 
Epistle al-masa’il wa-’l-jawabat fi-al-ma‘rifa (Questions and 
answers in the knowledge) that the individual is free in his 
actions. In his analyses about the eight categories of 
knowledge he indicates that the freedom of choice is the 
major category. According to al-Jahiz, freedom of choice 
means the knowledge of God and his messenger and the  
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ability to interpret the Holy Books. In another chapter of his 
Epistle he creates a connection between this description 
and awareness of committing mistakes. He said: “there is no 
one on earth that committed mistakes without the 
knowledge of his own mistakes”6.  
 
This quote indicates that each individual is responsible for 
his actions according to al-Jahiz. The value of equality is also 
addressed in the works of al-Jahiz. Politically, he was active 
in spreading the values of justice and equality between Mus-
lims, Jews and Christians. He believes that every individual 
should have the right to choose their own faith, because in 
the Islam there is no compulsion in religion. With this re-
mark al-Jahiz clarifies that “religious freedom” is central in 
the Islam. 
 
In summary, in Islamic thinking, particularly among the 
Mmu'tazilite school, humanization takes a crucial role. The 
universal values of Humanism, including individual free 
choice, justice, equality, freedom of speech and freedom of 
religion are found in the classical works of the Muslim ra-
tionalists or the Mu'tazilites. But what is the position of the 
Muslim philosophers towards humanization? 
 
2. Humanization in the works of Muslim philosophers 
The publication of Muslim philosophers in the Middle Ages, 
shows that they have paid great attention to the develop-
ment of humanization in Islamic societies, both in the East 
and in Andalucia. The scope of this article is limited to two 
philosophers from the East: al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. 
 
Al-Farabi (d. 950) 
In his book Risala fi al-‘aql (Epistle on the Intellect), he clari-
fies his ideas about human cognition. He emphasizes the 
question of what kind of thing the intellect, or even ethical 
and political issues such as how happiness (sa‘ada) in the 
individual and society can be known and realized. But what 
is happiness according to al-Farabi? "Happiness is that the 
human soul attains a degree of perfection in its existence in 
which it no longer has to rely on the matter, because it be-
comes one of the intangible things and substances, and for-
ever remains in that state”. In the theory of happiness 
(sa‘ada) he treated the key concepts of humanistic including 
equality, justice and freedom, because without those con-
cepts you cannot achieve happiness in practice. In his book 
The Virtuous City (al-Madina al-fadila) he emphasized that 
political justice is the basis for the ideal city. Al-Farabi 
shares his vision of human freedom, and his expression of 
“free choice” (ikhtiyar) with the Mu'tazilites. Unlike al-Kindi  
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(d. 873), however, he is not explicitly concerned with theo-
logical issues. He refers explicitly to his own time (political  
context) and he mentions his dynasty as an example of vir-
tuous city.  
 
Ibn Sina (d. 1037) 
In his philosophical works, including his allegory of Hayy Ibn 
Yaqzan, Ibn Sina emphasizes the importance of freedom and 
justice as universal values. Ibn Sina's attention focuses on 
translating the dimensions of both concepts to the practice 
of Muslims. Injustice creates an unhealthy society. Freedom 
of thought is the basis for the development of all civiliza-
tions. Without freedom of religion or freedom of expression 
it is impossible for one nation to further develop. The civili-
zation of mankind cannot be considered apart from these 
universal values, according to Ibn Sina. 
 
We can conclude that humanization is central in the classi-
cal works of Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Both philosophers were 
looking for happiness (sa‘ada) and the application of social 
and political skills. These ideal descriptions should be seen 
within the context of Islamic Caliphate at that time. The 
School of rationalists (Mu’tazilites and philosophers) was 
still highly criticized by Muslim theologians who do not 
abandon the literal interpretation of the Quran. The battle 
between theologians and rationalists about the degree of 
freedom and the use of ratio in the reading of the holy text, 
undoubtedly rise to heated discussions among Muslims in 
the modern world about the following questions: Is a hu-
manistic reinterpretation of the Quran possible? What is the 
position Muslim intellectuals take towards modernity? 
The historian Iftikhar Malik7 distinguishes the following 
three positions among Muslim intellectuals regarding their 
attitudes towards modernity: 
1. Those who believe that Islam and modernity are incom-
patible. According to them are Muslims only by actually 
choosing secularism capable of integration, democracy, plu-
ralism and human rights. Therefore Muslims must totally 
abandon their Islamic heritage. 
2. Those who believe that a return to pure Islam of Mu-
hammad and the four rightly guided caliphs, is the only pos-
sibility to face and solve the contemporary problems and 
malaise of Muslims. 
3. Those who note that a synthesising strategy is needed so 
the Islam can enjoy the varieties of modernity.  
For Muslim intellectuals who subscribe to the third position 
the claim: “that Islam and modernity are incompatible” is 
untenable. They are convinced of the compatibility of Islam  
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and modernity and substantiate their views with the Qur'an, 
which the Muslim fundamentalists also do. 
But how do Muslims think about humanization? 
In answering the question of how Muslims relate to moder-
nity the recognition that a considerable variation exists in 
the way in which being a Muslim is articulated by Muslims is 
very significant. An example is Muslim Sayyid Qutb (1906-
1966) who is considered one of the ideologists of Islamic 
fundamentalism. It was partly due to his stay of several 
years (1948-1951) in the United States that he came to real-
ize that the West and Islam were incompatible. He rejected 
modernity and everything that was connected to as defined 
by and a product of Western culture. It seems that the claim 
"Islam and modernity are incompatible "is echoed in Islamic 
fundamentalist circles, especially because of the feeling that 
the acceptance of modernity automatically leads to western-
ization8. 
  
3. Ethical and methodological questions regarding the rela-
tionship between Islam and humanism in the West 
How do Humanism and Islam relate to each other? What 
kind of ethical and methodological questions emerge when 
they meet? The studies of modern intellectuals, such as Nasr 
Abu Zayd suggests that the relationship between Islam and 
humanization in the West is characterized by methodologi-
cal and ethical dilemmas9.  
With regard to ethical issues in this context often referred to 
the position of women in Islam, equality between men and 
women. The mixed marriage is usually mentioned as an 
example when it comes to ethical issues. Why are Muslim 
men allowed to marry a non-Muslim woman, while it is not 
permissible for a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim 
man? On this point there are two distinct views:  
- The first is the opinion of jurists and exegetes. They clearly 
show that Islam wants to protect the religious identity of 
Muslim women, because after the marriage of a Muslim 
woman with non-Muslim man is feared that the man can 
influence the religious identity of the woman. Exegetes and 
jurists refer in their works to various examples of Muslim 
women in the history of Islam who were influenced by the 
faith of their husbands10.  
- The second opinion is that of modernists who look at 
things within the framework of human rights: equality and 
individual choice in life are central to this approach.  
If we take the example of the ethical dilemmas in Islam, and 
humanization proportions we see that each party wanted to 
give shape to the meaning of free choice in life and equality. 
The similarities between the two sides appear most often in 
terms of possible interpretation. Each group tries to re-
interpret this ethical issue in its own way but they disagree  
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about the consequences. According to modernists, Islam is 
incompatible with humanizing, while another group (jurists 
and exegetes) believes that preserving the religious identity 
of Muslim women get priority in Islam. The transcendental 
aspect of religion should provide a moral framework for the 
actual experiences of believers, and can only be understood 
in the concrete historical context of each religious communi-
ty. 
 
Concerning the methodological issues in the relationship 
between Islam and humanization it is important to reflect 
on the following: The way Muslim scholars want to shape 
this ratio can be right in theory. Most conventional wisdom 
says that in Islam there is no compulsion in religion as a 
very relevant value in humanistics. But in practice, Muslim 
scholars cannot answer the various Qur’anic texts which 
clearly state that non-Muslims are under the category of 
disbelievers! For a humanist, it is unclear how to handle this 
question. This conclusion raises a number of methodological 
issues in the relationship between Islam and humanism. A 
revolutionary attempt is that of Taha Abderrahman11 that 
clearly indicated that in all religions, the religious identity 
has a central position. The way people speak about religion, 
influences, in generally, the debate about religion and hu-
manism, because if you look to religion from an anthropo-
logical perspective, you see religion as part of culture. In this 
case, the hermeneutics have a very important role in the 
interpretation of the relationship between Islam and hu-
manism. The levels of interpretation in this context offer 
more opportunities to resolve this methodological issue by 
linking theoretical framework in all religions with the prac-
tice of people who have chosen certain interpretations.  
But the insistence on the equality of all believers, the em-
phasis on individual responsibility, and the tolerance to-
ward other faiths (particularly the revealed religions) are all 
strongly indicative of substantive democracy.  
 
Conclusion 
Based on these analyses it is clearly shown that humaniza-
tion was present in the classical works of Muslim scholars. 
The named ethical and methodological issues in the rela-
tionship between Islam and humanism can be interpreted in 
different ways. That is basically the basis of the develop-
ment of mechanisms within scientific research (for example 
social interaction model, self-confrontation method, psycho-
logical and anthropological methods) that can help students 
to understand the relationship between Islam and humani-
zation in wide context and to participate  
 Levinas Society 
Journal of the Dutch-Flemish Levinas Society 16 (2011) 
 
13 
in ethical and philosophical discussions on basic values of 
critical Humanism and Humanistics. 
In my view, Humanism and Islam should be seen from the 
present cultural, political and ideological context of the 
Netherlands with an orientation to the future. The openness 
for other ideas and cultures is a very important feature for 
the relationship between Islam and humanism. This implies 
de willingness to self criticism. The discussion about Hu-
manism and Islam offers the opportunity to reinterpret the 
Quran Text within de new context of Muslims. This requests 
a critical attitude against the Holy Script.  
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Gender Equality: Rereading the Legal 
Sources 
Mona Zulficar 
The three constitutions that have so far been adopted by 
Egypt (in 1923, 1956 and finally 1971) as well as the Consti-
tutional Declaration issued on 30 March, 2011 after the 
Revolution of 25 January, confirm the principle of equality 
before the law and equal opportunity between all citizens, 
without any discrimination based on sex, race, language, 
religion or creed. 
It should be noted that the vast majority of the laws in 
Egypt provide women with equal opportunities, free of dis-
crimination, in compliance with the successive Egyptian 
constitutions. However, Egyptian personal status and family 
laws, which are generally based on Shari’a, discriminate 
against women and have attempted to justify such discrim-
ination through tradition, customs or unfair exploitation of 
religious texts. This reflects the dichotomy in which Muslim 
women live and the contradictions which exist between 
their public and private lives. While modern secular laws 
govern employment, education, property, economic activi-
ties, politics, crime and punishment, laws derived from or 
based on Shari’a govern their family relations. This dichot-
omy is illustrated by one commentator who said: “Nothing 
exemplifies more the contradictions of modern state patriar-
chy than the fact that Muslim women can aspire to becoming 
the heads of governments, yet they face other insurmountable 
difficulties in divorcing their husbands.” (El Azhary Sonbol, 
1996). 
The 1981 amendment of the 1971 Constitution making the 
principles of Shari’a the principal source of legislation, is an 
attempt to legitimize this dichotomy. Egypt’s reservations 
on Article 2 (State’s obligation to take the necessary proce-
dures to eliminate discrimination against women at law and 
in practice) and Article 16 (Marriage and Family Relations) 
of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women (CEDAW) specifically barring 
any “prejudice to the principles of Shari’a” provide further 
proof and reinforcement of this dichotomy.  
In this connection, attention should be given to the meaning 
of the “principles of Shari’a”, which is used to qualify any 
commitment by the State provided under CEDAW to ensure 
gender equality under family laws. There is no agreed defi-
nition in the Constitution or Egyptian law on the meaning of 
this term. However the explanatory memorandum issued in 
connection with the 1981 amendment of the 1971 Constitu- 
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tion defined the term as “the general principles of Shari’a 
consistently agreed upon by Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh or 
legal doctrine).” Reference to “principles” rather than “pro-
visions” of Shari’a is of critical importance, in that it only 
refers to the fundamental and conclusive principles of Sha-
ri’a, in terms of meaning and significance, which are con-
stant and not disputed, as the principal source of legislation. 
This applies to principles of justice, equality, freedom, soli-
darity and human dignity among other human rights gener-
ally recognized by all religions and international treaties. 
The Supreme Constitutional Court confirmed the foregoing 
and emphasized that Article 2 of the Constitution, which by 
the way is still Article 2 of the present Constitutional Decla-
ration, is addressed to the legislator and is not addressed to 
the judiciary for direct application by the courts. 
The Need to Reread the Legal Texts 
It is therefore not possible for liberal men and women to 
advocate gender equality only on the basis of the Constitu-
tion, CEDAW or other international human rights treaties. 
This could work in all fields but would not suffice in the field 
of family laws and relations, relating to matters such as 
marriage, divorce, polygamy or inheritance. It is necessary 
to be involved in the religious discourse, to challenge patri-
archal control, religious misinterpretations and discrimina-
tory family laws. We have to claim ownership of our cultural 
and religious heritage and the right to reread the religious 
texts and identify those that support our cause and those 
which are being used or rather abused to discriminate 
against women. By religious texts, I mean the Quran and the 
authentic traditions of the Prophet. Relevant interpretations 
of Islamic schools of thought found primarily in the four 
major disciplines of Islamic discourse as well as more mod-
ern scholars like Mohamed Abdu, the Grand Imam of Al 
Azhar in the late 19th early 20th century, became important 
tools in our advocacy campaigns during the last two dec-
ades for matters like restricting polygamy, admitting moral 
damages as basis for divorce, the right to Khul or repudia-
tion and the right to include substantive conditions in the 
marriage contract as a method of protecting women’s rights 
which are not protected by prevailing family laws in Egypt. 
Professor Nasr Abu Zayd provided me with great support as 
a scholar and a close friend. In the matter of rereading the 
texts, he said in an article on Academic Freedom: 
It will always be necessary, however, to analyse and 
interpret the Quran and the authentic Traditions of 
the Prophet within the contextual background from 
which they originated. In other words: the message of  
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Islam could not have had any effect if the people who 
received it first could not have understood it; they 
must have understood it within their socio-cultural 
context; and by their understanding and application of 
it their society changed. The understanding of the first 
Muslim generation and the generations that followed 
should not by any means be considered as final or 
absolute. The specific linguistic encoding dynamics of 
the text of the Quran always allows for an endless 
process of decoding. In this process the contextual 
socio-cultural meaning should not be ignored or 
simplified, because this ‘meaning’ is ever so vital as an 
indication of the direction of the ‘new’ message of the 
text. Having identified the direction of the text will 
facilitate moving from its ‘meaning’ to its ‘significance’ 
for the present socio-cultural context. It will also 
enable the interpreter to correctly and efficiently 
extract the ‘historical’ and ‘temporal’ aspects of the 
text that no longer carry any significance for the 
present context. As interpretation is an inseparable 
side of the text, the Quran, being decoded in the light 
of its historical, cultural, and linguistic context, has to 
be re-encoded into the code of the cultural and 
linguistic context of the interpreter. In other words, 
the deeper structure of the Quran must be 
reconstructed from the surface structure. 
Subsequently, the deep structure must be rewritten in 
another surface structure, which is that of today. 
This entails an interpretative diversity, because the 
endless process of interpretation and re-
interpretation cannot but differ in time. This is also 
necessary, because otherwise the message will inevi-
tably degenerate and the Quran will always remain as 
it is now, namely subject to political and pragmatic 
manipulation. Since the message of Islam is believed 
to be valid for all mankind regardless of time and 
space, diversity of interpretation is inevitable.”  
In application of the above, the following examples of cam-
paigns for gender equality have been launched during the 
last 25 years and succeeded in achieving significant pro-
gress for the cause of gender equality in general and in fami-
ly laws in particular: 
 
1. Marriage  
Analysts may argue with merit that the marriage institution 
legitimized by Islam has created a hierarchical structure 
which discriminates against women and paves the ground  
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for male control and women’s seclusion. Its patriarchal and 
polygynous features seem to have a negative impact on the 
position of women. On the other hand, feminists engaged in 
Islamic religious discourse may argue that: (i) Marriage in 
pre-Islamic Arabia took a variety of forms, including poly-
androus, temporary, polygynous, slave-marriage and mar-
riage by inheritance (where the wife would be inherited by 
her deceased husband’s next of kin without a new mahr 
(dower) and the children conceived during that second un-
ion would carry the deceased husband’s name). All those 
forms were vastly regulated by custom and affected the un-
derstanding and implementation of the Quranic texts relat-
ing to marriage, which provided for polygamy, only as a 
condoned exception, and directed towards a single wife as 
the rule; and (ii) The Quranic texts , including explicit texts 
related to marriage, provide a strong basis for equality be-
tween the sexes in general, as well as equality and reciproci-
ty within the marriage institution in particular. For example, 
the Quran states that God has created all mankind “from a 
single soul and created its mate from the same soul and 
spread from both of them too many men and women” (4:1) 
and that “Wives have rights corresponding to those which 
husbands have, in equitable reciprocity.” (2:229). Further, 
Islamic legal provisions of equal rights and obligations with 
respect to religious duties, crime and punishment, economic 
and financial independence, equal rights to contract and 
own and dispose of property challenge the assumption that 
patriarchal control is inherent in the original sacred book.  
1. Polygamy  
Discriminatory practices such as polygamy may be inter-
preted as a condoned exception which may be restricted or 
regulated by law. The relevant provision of Surat Al Nissa’a 
allowing polygamy should also be understood in the histori-
cal and social context when revealed in the 4th year Hijri 
after defeat in a war and loss of lives, leaving many orphans 
and widows unattended, and attempting to secure their fair 
treatment. “And if you fear that you cannot do justice to or-
phans, marry such women as deemed good to you, two, or 
three, or four, but if you fear that you will not do justice, then 
only one or that which your right hands possess. This is more 
proper that you may not do injustice.” Further, it should also 
be understood in the context of the preceding provision 
strongly reflecting equality through the creation of man 
andhis mate, the woman, from a single soul. The Grand 
Imam Mohamed Abdu issued a fatwa towards the end of the 
19th century authorizing the restriction of polygamy based 
on: (i) the impossibility of satisfying the condition of justice 
between the wives; (ii) the adverse impact it has on the  
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wives which are most likely to be mistreated; and (iii) the 
animosity and hatred which arises between the children of 
different mothers as a result of polygamy. On that basis, 
Tunisia barred polygamy, Morocco, Syria, Iraq, Libya and 
Yemen restricted polygamy and made it subject to prior 
court permission. As for Egypt, taking a second wife must be 
notified officially to the first and second  wife by the hus-
band and the marriage registrar and breach is subject to a 
penalty of imprisonment for six months. Moreover, the law 
allows inclusion of a condition in the marriage contract pro-
hibiting the husband from taking a second wife without the 
first wife’s prior permission. Finally the first wife my claim 
divorce for moral or material damage. 
2. Divorce 
Similarly, the husband’s unilateral right of divorce is con-
demned by the Quran as most abhorrent to God, and Islamic 
law allows it to be balanced by a similar right retained by 
the wife in the marriage contract. The New Marriage Con-
tract, introduced in 2000 in Egypt, after a 10 year campaign, 
explicitly provides the wife with the right to retain the isma, 
i.e. the right to retain an equal right of divorce in her mar-
riage contract. Although jurists construe such a condition as 
a delegation of authority by the husband, they unanimously 
recognize it as irrevocable, treating it like a contractual 
term. The wife’s retention of isma is allowed and exercised 
in Egypt today and is immediately enforceable before the 
maazoun, i.e. the marriage registrar, without recourse to the 
court. However, prevailing patriarchal culture and tradition 
discourage the inclusion of such a term in the contract, as it 
is socially perceived as sign of mistrust in the husband and 
his family.  
In the year 2000, Law 1 was issued giving the wife a unilat-
eral right to terminate her marriage contract in exchange 
for a waiver of her financial rights to deferred dower (mahr) 
and her financial maintenance under the law. Such waiver 
does not affect the children’s rights in any manner. As such, 
the Egyptian women succeeded in achieving equal rights to 
unilateral termination of the marriage contract, based on 
texts provided for in the Quran and the authentic traditions 
of the Prophet. It was a challenging struggle which was op-
posed by the promoters of patriarchal culture using reli-
gious, social and cultural arguments. The right to Khul was 
also challenged as unconstitutional 60 times within three 
months from issuance of the law, but the Supreme Constitu-
tional Court upheld it as constitutional. Experience shows 
that the right to Khul represented a social revolution that 
restored balance and equilibrium into the marriage rela-
tionship and saved many marriages much more than those  
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terminated by women through Khul, as claimed by the op-
position. Finally, the majority of women who sought Khul 
proved to be poor women with husbands who failed to fi-
nancially maintain their families and mistreated their wives 
and children, while making divorce for their wives difficult. 
A New Marriage Contract 
The movement for the New Marriage Contract started in 
1985 in response to a set-back resulting from a judgment by 
the Supreme Constitutional Court based on an action filed 
by a group of religious extremists against a 1979 amend-
ment to the family law which provided limited progress in 
favor of gender equality. The women’s movement struggled 
to reinstate the repealed law and succeeded with conces-
sions. It was therefore necessary to adopt a strategy of en-
gagement in the religious discourse based on women’s read-
ing of their rights under the principles of Shari’a. We could 
not afford to shy away from the challenge and continue us-
ing a strategy based solely on constitutional and human 
rights. We had to prove that the standard religious dis-
course could also be used by women to defend their cause. 
During distressed times, the religious extremist groups con-
sistently place women’s issues at the forefront of their pub-
lished agenda to implement Shari’a principles, with the tar-
get of restricting women’s rights. They therefore accuse any 
secular feminist opposition of being anti-Islamic, an agent of 
either the “non-religious” Eastern bloc or the “corrupt” 
Western bloc. It was therefore essential for the women’s 
movement to diversify its approach and adopt a credible 
strategy that could reach out and win the support of simple, 
ordinary religious men and women. The New Marriage Con-
tract, an Islamic concept deep rooted in indigenous culture, 
represented a new vision of cultural and social realities of 
women in their everyday lives which reconciled issues 
common to both the religious discourse and the secular 
feminist discourse. 
Ibn Hanbal (eponym of the Hanbali school of Islamic law) 
and Ibn Taymiyyah (a famous Hanbali jurist) approved the 
inclusion of substantive conditions in the marriage contract, 
provided such conditions did not violate the imperative 
rules of Islam. The other three major schools of Islamic 
thought did not prohibit the inclusion of conditions in the 
marriage contract, but required that such conditions should 
be compatible with the object of the contract, a test they 
interpreted much more restrictively than the Hanbalis. Un-
der Egyptian law, the personal status laws are not based on 
the teachings of a single school of thought. Although the 
Hanafi school is predominant, the legislator has often 
adopted the opinions or solutions of one or several schools  
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on any one issue, as deemed in the best interest of society. 
For example, divorce for prejudice is based on the Maliki 
school of thought while on proof of prejudice to obtain di-
vorce is based on the Hanafi school of thought. Hence, it 
would be legitimate and consistent with common Egyptian 
legislative practice to adopt the Hanbali theory on stipula-
tions in marriage contracts. With the issue of Law 1 of 2000, 
these arguments were adopted by the Drafting Committee 
formed by the Minister of Justice, and a new form of the 
marriage contract allowing the inclusion of substantive 
conditions was issued as the new standard form.The New 
Marriage Contract, as currently applicable, has been drafted in a 
manner that respects the human right of informed choice by 
women and men, in that it does not impose any conditions. All 
the conditions currently suggested, such as retaining the right to 
Isma, prohibiting taking a second wife without the first wife’s 
permission, asserting certain agreed financial rights in case of 
divorce against the wife’s will, etc.. are merely stated as options 
to be freely selected by the parties to the contract. There was 
only one mandatory condition in the standard form advocated 
by both the women’s movement and the Ministry of Justice 
which was the medical examination prior to marriage. This 
condition only became mandatory recently under the Child Pro-
tection Law. In respecting the human right to informed choice, 
the Egyptian women’s movement for the New Marriage Con-
tract demonstrated that its engagement in the religious discourse 
was not inconsistent with the mainstream human rights and 
secular feminist movements. 
Conclusion 
Women have been traditionally the first victims of religious 
extremism movements and have therefore to be part of the first 
line of defence against such movements. So long as the family 
laws in Egypt are based on Sharia, using a human rights strate-
gy based on CEDAW will not be enough to address the prevail-
ing patriarchal culture abusing religion to perpetuate discrimi-
nation against women. Rereading the text of the Quran and the 
authentic traditions of the Prophet as they relate to gender 
equality in the present socio-cultural context, rather than their 
historical context, will therefore continue to be instrumental for 
the struggle to eliminate discrimination against women under 
family laws. In fact women in Egypt have achieved significant 
reforms to the family laws and asserted equality in the right to 
terminate marriage and the right of informed choice in the mar-
riage contract, among others, through engagement in the reli-
gious discourse and the dynamic process of reinterpretation. 
The scholarly work of Professor Abu Zayd provides strong 
support to the women’s movement in Egypt in their struggle for 
equality under family laws. 
  
 Levinas Society 
Journal of the Dutch-Flemish Levinas Society 16 (2011) 
 
21 
Journal of the Dutch- 
Flemish Levinas Society 
Mededelingen van de  
Levinas Studiekring 
 
XVI, december 2011 
 
ISSN 1385-4739 
Rereading the Qur’an: A Muslim’s Woman 
Perspective● 
Elham Manea
1
  
 
‘It is the Qur’an that we have to deal with, if we are to succeed 
in paving the path for a humanistic Islam. Qur’an has been 
treated as synonyms to God. It is as if we dared to question the 
nature of Qur’an, we are questioning our faith in God, and at 
the same time we declare our rejection of Islam itself. Qur’an 
in this sense is the Church of Islam. Separating this church of 
Islam from state’s laws and jurisprudence is imperative; not 
only for the future of a humanistic Islam, but also for institut-
ing legal gender equality.  
If there is one sphere that illustrates this statement in no 
compromising manner, it would be the private sphere of the 
family in Arab societies. The reason is straightforward; fami-
ly laws, with the one exception of Tunisia, are justified and 
based on religious provisions! All of them!  
Perhaps this fact can clarify to a great extent the confusion 
that many here in Europe feel when approaching cosmopoli-
tan Arab societies such as Egypt, Lebanon, or Syria. On the 
one hand, these states took drastic steps to modernize their 
legal structures after their independence; on the other hand, 
they left the religious provisions governing the family 
sphere untouched. They tried to codify some of these provi-
sions; making them more ‘friendly’ to women; but the basis 
remained religious, and thus inherently biased towards 
women.  
Notice that I did not use the word Islamic provisions here. I 
said religious provisions. The reason is also surprising. Arab 
women are left to the laws of their respective religions to 
govern their family relations. A Syrian Orthodox, a Lebanese 
Maronite, or an Egyptian Copt who would like to divorce her 
husband will be subject to the religious laws set by their 
respective churches. And these, just like their Islamic coun-
terparts, are not exactly gender friendly. This clarifies the 
joke told to me by Syrian women’ activists in a dinner I at-
tended in Damascus in mid summer 2007. The activists, 
representing a wide spectrum of NGOs of different ideologi-
cal backgrounds (Islamic, Christian, and secular) said while 
laughing: “The Vatican and Arab countries disagree on every-
thing. But when it comes to our rights (in international con-
ferences), they miraculously agree!” Why have Arab societies 
refrained from modernizing their family laws and steering 
them from their religious basis is the question I pose in a  
● This paper is adapted from a chapter 
from Manea, Elham, Ich will nicht mehr 
schweigen: Der Islam, der Westen und die 
Menschenrechte, Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 
2009.  
1 Elham Manea is an Associate Professor at 
the Political Science Institute, Zürich Uni-
versity. She is author of several books and 
novels. Her latest academic book will be 
published by Routledge, London, in Sum-
mer 2011 under the title: The Arab State 
and Women’s Rights: the Trap of the Author-
itarian Governance. 
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book that is due to be published this summer by Routledge 
in London. Answering it goes beyond the scope of this note.  
But how Qur’anic verses are interpreted and how religious 
provisions are being applied, contribute greatly to the prob-
lem of women in Arab societies. No reformation of Islam is 
possible, in my opinion, without dealing with the gender 
question. And a real reformation has to acknowledge the 
shortcomings and limits of Islamic stipulations regarding 
women. Acknowledging that will pave the way for adopting 
positive and civil laws, that best protect the woman as a 
human equal to man in dignity and rights.  
 In the next part, I will present how the issue of women’s 
rights has been constantly discussed in a ‘safe boundary of 
thinking’. Two examples of discourses will be presented, the 
first acknowledge that there is a problem and tries to find a 
solution through new interpretation of Qur’anic verses, and 
the second denies that there is a problem to deal with, and 
instead urges women to accept God’s orders and submit to 
their natural duty. In a second phase I will then try to step 
out of that safe boundary and set the mode for a counter 
humanistic argument.  
Women’s rights: Talking from a Safe Boundary of Thinking 
Two discoursed can be discerned in discussing the issue of 
women’s rights in Islamic societies from a ‘safe boundary of 
thinking’. Both argue that ‘Islam respects women’s rights and 
has always guaranteed them; the problem has mainly to do 
with the society that is interpreting or implementing these 
rights. The problem has to do with the people themselves’. 
A Reformist Argument  
The first discourse is espoused by Muslim reformers and 
scholars, who recognize that women are discriminated 
against within Islamic legal tradition and seek to find an en-
lightened interpretation of Qur’anic verses. In this endeavor 
they use modern interpretations techniques and activate the 
Islamic principle of Igtihad.  
Muslims, according to this paradigm have to re-read their 
Qur’anic text and separate its message from their traditions 
and patriarchal structures. That was the argument of some 
of the early reformers of the 19th and early 20th Century and 
it is still the argument of some enlightened reformers today. 
The discourse is featured with heterogeneity especially in 
the type of approaches used and the scope of reforms they 
call for. Baring this heterogeneity in mind, I will use the 
scholar Amina Wadud as an example to illustrate her  
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2 Wadud, Amina,, Qur’an and Woman: Re-
reading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s 
Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999, pp. 8-9. 
3 Ibid, p. 102 
argument,. 
Amina Wadud is a modern scholar who seeks to reform Is-
lam from a feministic perspective. Her arguments, im-
portant as they are, were made from a safe boundary of 
thinking, which did not question the nature of Qur’an as 
God’s literal word.  
Amina argues that the “Qur’an acknowledges that men and 
women function as individuals in society. However there is no 
detailed prescription set on how to function, culturally. Such a 
specification would be an imposition that would reduce the 
Qur’an from a universal text to a culturally specific text – a 
claim that many have erroneously made. What Qur’an pro-
poses is transcendental in time and space.”2 
Using hermeneutical techniques, Wadud tried in her book 
entitled ‘Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Scared Text from 
a Woman’s Perspective’, to prove that the Qur’an has indeed 
provided a universal message, treating man and woman as 
different but equal individuals. And she came to the conclu-
sion that “they have the same rights and obligations on the 
ethico-religious level, and have equally significant responsibil-
ities on the social-functional level”.3  
Wadud does have a point in arguing that the Qur’an treated 
man and woman as equal in front of God in their religious 
responsibilities and treatment in the afterlife. There are 
several Qur’anic verses that corroborate this argument. 
Nevertheless it is very difficult to draw the same conclusion 
when we talk about the social functional level. Often, when 
it concerns this level, when it involves rights in family and 
society, the Qur’an does not provide a universal message, 
certainly not for a woman living in the 21st century. I will 
come back to this point later.  
An Islamist Argument  
The second discourse argues that the problem with women 
has to do with the Muslims themselves, who are not Muslims 
enough. This has been the argument of the early Islamists 
like Hasan al Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brothers 
movement, and it is the argument that has been used in the 
re-islamization process that is taking place in Arab societies. 
Islam, according to this line of argument, is in no need for 
reformation. The religion is there, pure and solid, and it is 
the duty of Muslims to return to its puritanical provisions 
and doctrines, and stick to its rituals to the letter. Accord-
ingly, there is no need to seek a ‘solution’ to the problem; for 
there is no problem to start with.  
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Arabic. 
This discourse insists too that Islam is not the problem. But 
unlike the reformers who, while reiterating the statement, 
try to come up with different interpretations to what they 
clearly see as problematic religious provisions; Islamists 
consider what Islam offers a woman an idealistic system 
that guarantees her dignity and protection and ‘perfectly 
suits’ her ‘natural duty’ and “biological nature”. So instead of 
seeking a new reading of Islamic text, they focus on convinc-
ing Muslim women to accept the ‘Islamic social order’ as 
they see it.  
The writing of Hasan Al Banna, the founder of the Muslim 
Brothers movement, on women is a very good example in 
this regard, for he set the tone for the discussion of women’s 
rights from an Islamist perspective in his famous tract enti-
tled “The Muslim Woman”. He argued that knowing the opin-
ion of Islam towards woman and man, their relationship 
and duties, “is not important”! “What is important, and i am 
quoting him here, is to ask ourselves are we prepared to ac-
cept the judgment of Islam”.4  
The question is vital because al Banna sees a danger loom-
ing, coming from the West: “In reality, this country and other 
Islamic countries are swamped by a cruel unruly wave of in-
fatuation with the imitation of European (way)”. And he in-
sists that Muslims have to prepare themselves “to accept 
God’s orders and prohibitions”.  
Writing the sentence “to accept God’s orders and prohibi-
tions” was necessary in my opinion. For Al Banna is very 
aware that, while Islam “elevates the status (value) of woman 
and makes her a partner to man in rights and duties”, Islamic 
provisions do discriminate between man and woman. He 
said: “But on the other hand, it should be noticed that when 
Islam took away something from the right of woman, it called 
for something better in another side; or this detracting is 
done for her benefit and well-being before anything else’.  
He justifies this discrimination by saying that it“comes from 
their natural differences, which are unavoidable (inevitable), 
compatible with the difference in the task each is conducting, 
and for the protection of the rights given to each”.  
Women’s Rights - Stepping out of the Safe Boundary of Think-
ing  
So far we have been discussing discourses that were either 
trying to provide an enlightened and a different interpreta-
tion to religious texts dealing with woman’s  
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5 This opinion has been emphasized by 
thinkers who are seeking a reformation 
from within Islam such as Abullahi Ahmed 
An-Na’im in his book “Toward an Islamic 
Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, 
and International Law, Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1990; 
position while insisting that Islam by itself is not the prob-
lem; or arguments that do not see a problem to solve and 
rather implore the Muslim woman to accept her position in 
the social hierarchy of an Islamic order. Both however never 
questioned the nature of Qur’an as God’s literal words. A 
humanistic reading of Islam seeks to approach this issue by 
stepping out of the safe boundary of thinking. It argues that 
insisting that ‘Islam is not the problem’ is counterproductive 
and rather complicates the matter, for it sets the argument 
on a defensive level. Trying to defend an ‘idea’ will reflect on 
the outcome, makes it hard to provide a rational reading of 
the problem, call it by its name, and then deal with it.  
A humanistic reading of Islam insists that a real reformation 
of Islam has to acknowledge the limits of the religious texts in 
providing solutions to the women’s problem and maintain 
that these religious texts must be seen within its historical 
context and should therefore cease to be relevant when regu-
lating the social reality of family and state in the 21st century. 
In other words, it argues for the separation of state and reli-
gion. Again, it insists that it is the Qur’an that we have to deal  
with, if we are to succeed in separating religion from state’. 
The Qur’an is the church of Islam.  
The limits of the religious texts in providing solutions are 
clear regarding the issue of women’s rights. Qur’anic verses 
did treat women as equal to men in their judgment in front 
of God in the afterlife. Verse 40:40 states: “whoso does evil 
will be requited only with the like of it; but whoso does good, 
whether male or female, and is a believer – these will be pro-
vided therein without measure”.  
”يس لِمَع نم نمؤم وهو ىثنأ وأ ٍركذ نم ًاحلاص لمع نمو اهلثم لاإ ىزُجيلاف ً ةئ
باسح ريغب اهيف نوقزري ةنجلا نولخدي كئلوأف“   
My interest, however, pertains to the verses that concern a 
woman’s status in this life. Put simple, on the social level 
Qur’anic verses discriminated against women to the ad-
vantage of man. This discrepancy is obvious in verses regu-
lating family relations, sexual relations within marriage, 
inheritance, and testimony - the culmination of which points 
to the end that, indeed, there are clear inconsistencies be-
tween Qur’anic provisions and the 1948 Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) of 
1987 in relation to the status of women.5  
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6 The Holy Qur’an: Arabic Text with Eng-
lish Translation & Short Commentary, 
Edited by Farid, Malik Ghulam, London: 
Islamic International Publications Lim-
ited, 2002, p. 196; The Holy Qur’an, 
Tafsier Al Imamien al Jalalien, in Arabic, p. 
84; Ghalib, Hanna, Thesaurus of Arabic: 
An Encyclopedic Reference of Synonyms, 
Antonyms & Espressions, BeirutÖ 
Librairie du Liban Publishers, 2003,p.486  
7 Mernissin, Fatima, The Political Hareem: 
Mohammad and the Women, in Arabic, 
Second edition, Damascus: Dar 
Hasad,1993, pp.196-203; Wadud, Amina, 
Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred 
Text from a Woman’s Perspective, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.74-78. 
These inconsistencies are not theoretical when it concerns 
women’s daily lives. Qur’anic verses have been translated into 
family laws that sanction the inferior rol of women in family 
and society. They are very much anchored in the most basic 
unit of society – the family - and its relations, perpetuating a 
system of inequality between husband and wife. A serious 
reformation will have to address this inequality. The ques-
tion is therefore how do we address this inequality?  
One way of addressing the problem is to resort to a selective 
reading of Qur’an trying to come up with an argument sup-
porting gender equality in family relations. The problem 
with this method is that once it makes Qur’an its point of ref-
erence it is bound to be confronted with the passages that do 
not corroborate the equality argument.  
Let me use Qur’anic verse 34 of Sura 4 as an example of 
what I just stated above. Verse 34 is a long verse, but I want 
to focus on one part of it which says: “(…) Ermahnt diejeni-
gen, von denen ihr Widerspenstigkeit befürchtet, und entfernt 
euch von ihnen in den Schlafgemächern und schlagt sie. Wenn 
sie euch gehorchen, dann wendet nichts Weiteres gegen sie 
an. Gott ist erhaben und groß“  
 ” حجاضملا يف نهورجهاو نهوظُعف َنهَزوُشن نوفاخت يتلالاو
 ..نهوبرضاو”   
This part of verse 34 provides the ‘disciplinary’ steps in 
which a husband can follow in the case of his wife’s noshouz 
- disobedience. The word Noshouz has generally been de-
fined as rising against the husband, deserting him, or resist-
ing him.6 Fatima Mernissi emphasized her opinion that this 
type of noshouz covers also a woman’s rejection of her hus-
band sexual demands, while Amina Wadud was of the opin-
ion that the word means disruption of marital harmony.7  
Whether the word means rising against the husband or dis-
ruption of martial harmony, the question that many Mus-
lims have been struggling with has been ‘how to deal with 
the fact that this verse allows the man to beat his wife as a 
last disciplinary measure?’  
While the reactions differ, two approaches are discernable. 
The first is more common and tries to justify it; the second is 
scholarly and attempts to explain it using a hermetical ap-
proach, but often falls in a denial syndrome. Both are miss-
ing the point!  
The first has been propagated by male Muslim preachers 
and scholars alike who would argue along the following line: 
beating a wife is the husband’s last resort that he can use if 
his wife insists on disobeying him. Women are irrational, and  
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8 Wadud, Amina, ibid; Zentrum für Islami-
sche Frauenforschung und Frauenförde-
rung (Hrsg.), Ein einziges Wort und seine 
große Wirkung, Cologne, 2005. 
9 Wadud, Amina, ibid, p. 76.  
sometimes they do not see where their interests are. They can 
jeopardize the wellbeing of their family. A man, being rational 
as he is, has sometimes no resort to this method to bring her 
to reason! But if he did that, there are conditions as to how he 
beats her. He should not slap her on her face! No, he should 
not. He should not leave any marks on her body. No, he should 
not. Other than that, he can of course beat her!  
Every time I hear this line of argument, my blood pressure 
raises. But this type of discourse is common in Saudi, Ku-
waiti, Yemeni, or even Egyptian TVs. In many religious pro-
grams the issue will be discussed within the above parame-
ters to justify the Qur’anic verse. And of course part of the  
argument is to make sure to mention that Mohammad the 
Prophet never used force against his wives and that he re-
peatedly called on Muslim men not to beat their wives! Logic 
is not the basis on which this type of justification is founded.  
The second reaction is scholarly, conducted mainly by femi-
nists Muslim Scholars, and is meant to find an explanation 
for the verse from a hermeneutic perspective. The work of 
Amina Wadud in her book “Qur’an and Woman” and that of 
a group of scholars in their book “Ein einziges Wort und 
seine grosse Wirkung” falls within this category.8  
The two books mentioned above tried to shed doubts on the 
word “daraba” – beating- saying that it may have a different 
meaning than, well, beating. Amina Wadud, for instance, 
argued that in some references this word ‘does not neces-
sarily indicate force or violence’, rather it has been used to 
indicate setting an example or leaving.9  
Although this type of academic research deserves to be 
highly commended for seeking a different feministic ap-
proach to understanding the Qur’an, there are limits as to 
how far one can go with this approach.  
Try hard as you may, the meaning of the word ‘beating’ will 
not change, especially if read within the context of the whole 
verse itself. A man trying to get his wife to stop disobeying 
him may use several methods, the last of which is the hard-
est - beating her. If the woman ‘obeyed’ him, then he should 
stop these measures.  
Try hard as you may, the meaning of the verse can not be 
separated from its historical context which provided the 
reason why this verse was issued and formulated in the first 
place. It came after a woman, hit by her husband,  
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10 Mernissi, Fatima, pp. 179-203. 
11 Abu Zaid, Nasr Hamid, Mohammed und 
die Zeichen Gottes: Der Koran und die 
Zukunft des Islam, Freiburg: Herder Ver-
lag, 2008, p.160. 
complained to the Prophet. The latter decided to punish 
him, but the verse then came setting the course as to how to 
deal with this case.  
Fatima Mernissi provided an excellent account of the diffi-
cult political situation the Prophet was facing, even within 
his own Muslim community. His rejection of using violence 
against women only complicated his position and caused 
much resentment against him. The verse was necessary to 
calm down the angry Muslim men.10 
Our Egyptian thinker Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid was a matter of 
fact about this issue when he said that: “Daraba is correctly 
translated as beating; it is allowed according to this verse if 
only in a certain context. One sees that this verse is quite 
obviously directed to a male audience. The Koran is a text 
that is principally aimed to men, simply because it arose in a 
male dominated surroundings." 11 
In other words, because the discourse used in the verse was 
directed to men, it reflected the social context of the period 
when Mohammad lived. A context which could be described 
as male dominated, tribal and patriarchal by nature. Can one 
expect from such a social and historical context equality 
between sexes that corresponds to our current understand-
ing of gender equality? It is too much to ask for.  
Trying to find a linguistic ‘way out’ of this dilemma of 
‘daraba’ is, therefore, not convincing, not to me at least. The 
conclusion it came to, reflects rather the assumption that 
‘Qur’an can not sanction beating a wife. Hence the word beat-
ing may not have meant beating’. Denial is not a good course 
of action.  
A humanistic Islam approaches this issue differently. It does 
seek situating the verse within its historical and political 
context and provides an explanation to it. But it acknowl-
edges at the same time the limits of such an approach in our 
daily conduct. For the question that one should pose is: if we 
did indeed situate this verse within its historical and social 
contexts, what should we do next? Leave it, and say, yes 
Qur’an does contain a verse that sanction beating the wife, 
but that was a different historical period?  
That is one step in the right direction, but in itself it will not 
do. It is not enough; not when you have those who are using 
this very verse to justify domestic violence, it is necessary to 
set the lines straight. Hence, the rationality upon which a 
humanistic Islam is based on will empathize that under-
standing the historical context of this verse is one step in the 
right direction. Makingit clear at the same time that this verse  
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is not the point of reference when it comes to family relations 
is the logical step that should follow. Saying it clear and loud 
that this verse ceases to be relevant to society is the logical 
step that should follow. It ceases to be relevant to society be-
cause, quite frankly, using today’s standards; to act on this 
verse will constitute a violation of human rights. For Today, 
we consider the woman an individual, a human, equal to 
man. Today we do not expect women to obey their hus-
bands. We expect man and woman to be partners when they 
decide to establish a family. And today, we call the act of a 
man or a husband beating his partner or wife, we call it do-
mestic violence. It is considered an offence, a crime.  
To be able to argue along this line, a humanistic approach to 
Islam requires that we distinguish between two levels of the 
Islamic religion: a) a spiritual side which seeks to establish a 
connection between the individual and God; and b) a legalis-
tic and Sharia side whose provisions should cease to be a 
point of reference to our legislation.  
Often, it is this legalistic and Sharia side of religion that we 
seem to be stuck with. It is as if we are kept paralyzed and 
frozen inside a certain historical period, a bubble of time- 
unable to break away of it to the 21 century. And we are 
frozen in time for good reasons. For we seem to keep using 
the same paradigm of thinking and lines of arguments in 
approaching the most critical question that should have 
been addressed long time ago: What is the nature of Qur’an?  
Posing this question in this form will force us to step into the 
forbidden Areas of Thinking and face the church of Islam. 
Without acknowledging the human nature of Qur’an we will 
remain stuck, posing the same questions about women’s role 
in society that were asked more than one hundred years ago, 
and coming with answers that do not guarantee full gender 
equality.   
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A humanistic Islam is an ambiguous concept. Humanism 
knows of strong anti-religious currents. It is not sure that 
these currents succeed in a prophetic appeal to religion to 
appreciate human values, while respecting traditional reli-
gious values. A humanistic Islam could as well be under-
stood as a ethical orientation completely stripped of its reli-
gious dimensions. It is not in this sense that Nasr Abu Zayd 
advocated a humanistic Islam, as he considered Islam as a 
religion fully valid for modern man. The hermeneutics of the 
Quran as communication should free Islam from obsolete 
ideas and of an anti-scientific attitude. It reminds of a simi-
lar process within Christianity one century ago, when his-
toric-critical exegesis claimed a scientific approach to the 
Bible. Again it is not sure that the historic critical approach 
as such is able to lay bare the humane message of religion. I 
choose another approach: to demonstrate how the figure of 
Abraham/Ibrahim as understood in monotheistic traditions: 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam, may pose central questions 
to modernity, questions that are vital both for humanists 
and believers.  
Bible, Midrash, Quran and post Quranic motifs of Abra-
ham/Ibrahim  
The Biblical account of Abraham is quite different from the 
Quranic references to Ibrahim. To account for those widely 
divergent pictures, one should not just compare Bible and 
Quran. One has to delve into the post-Biblical Jewish and 
Christian developments of Abraham, bridging the gap of the 
millennia that separate Bible from Quran. In addition, post-
Quranic literature on Ibrahim, as preserved in the Qisas al-
Anbiyā, the tales of the prophets, and the tafsir, the exegesis 
of the Quran, is important as well for understanding the 
Islamic view of Ibrahim. The wide range of sources, com-
monly referred to as Isra’iliyyāt, displays a thorough 
knowledge of pre-Quranic traditions, without however slav-
ishly imitating them. Such historical research does not need 
to infringe upon Islamic convictions of revelation, as even 
the Quran itself describes Ibrahim as a person already wide-
ly known among Jews, Christians and others, such as the 
mysterious group of the Hanifiyya. Oral traditions about 
Abraham may have circulated widely, transcending existing 
denominational frontiers. Apparently, the Quran treats Bib-
lical persons as adhortative models to corroborate Moham-
med’s own mission, using all kinds of narrative  
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motifs from post-Biblical provenance, but without the aim 
to relate the whole story in all details. The major intention 
of the Quranic use of Biblical figures is to view Mohammed’s 
mission and his rejection in the light of these great prede-
cessors. Especially Abraham’s struggle against the idols is 
presented as strongly applicable to Mohammed’s own mis-
sion. In Mohammed’s biography, the Sira, the Biblical heroes 
are explicitly portrayed as introduction to the life of Mo-
hammed, Abraham in particular.1 Again, the story of Abra-
ham smashing the idols precedes Mohammed’s mission as it 
is without any doubt pre-Quranic. The transformation of the 
Biblical Abraham leaving his country without further ado 
into a prophet in debate with those eventually left behind 
after being persecuted by them, can be traced already in the 
Jewish Book of Jubilees, (2th century BCE). This book is 
partly preserved in Hebrew in the Dead Sea Scrolls, and 
virtually complete in Ethiopian by the Ethiopian Church and 
in some other languages. 
In the past, scholars sometimes referred to pre-Islamic Jew-
ish (and sometimes Christian) sources in order to reduce 
Islam to its predecessors, as if it had brought nothing new 
and as if islam had half misunderstood what it took over. 
However, this reductive approach is possible with all histor-
ical religions, Judaism and Christianity not excepted. Tracing 
developments to its sources rather allows us to point to 
transformations and shifts of meaning in which Islam dis-
plays its authenticity; hence such a search for sources 
should always be combined with an assessment of what is 
essentially Islamic.  
It is not my intention, however, to deal here with these 
complicated historical and philological issues, which proba-
bly require an interdisciplinary effort. I want to explore the 
significance of the stories of Abraham/Ibrahim for present-
day reflection. I claim that it is possible to detect important 
common elements in both Judaism, Christianity and Islam, 
connected to one and the same figure of Abraham. These 
common elements may offer food for contemporary reflec-
tion upon autonomy, ethnic belonging and its limits, and 
also upon freedom and the use of reason as ways to God. 
The differences between Islamic and Jewish traditions de-
serve to be studied as well, but that is not my focus present-
ly.2 My approach will be synthetic.  
In a way, modern culture itself cannot be fully understood 
without the towering figure of Abraham, who may, in that 
respect, be compared with Socrates, Buddha and others.  
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3 Possibly a wordplay on ’ebnei, stones, and 
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4 See Clement, Letter to the Corinthians 10 
(2d century), in which Abraham’s hospital-
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5 See the elaborate discussion by Sj. van 
Koningsveld in: R. Haleber, Islam. De 
wereld van Mohammed Arkoun, Amsterdam 
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6 Note, however, that the Quran knows of 
extra-Biblical messengers to extra-Biblical 
peoples, like Hud to the people of `Ad and 
Salih to the people of Thamud (Sura 7:65 
ff.). 
Abraham as father of the faith in monotheistic traditions 
Abraham is referred to in the New Testament quite often as 
a paragon of faith and as such transcending ethnic belong-
ing. John the Baptist emphasizes that his Jewish audience 
should not, as it were, count upon their Abrahamic ancestry, 
but should amend their ways of behavior, “for God can make 
out of these stones children of Abraham” (Matthew 3:9; 
Luke 3:8).3 Likewise the Gospel of John maintains that genu-
ine children of Abraham would perform the works of Abra-
ham, whereas the Jews do not do that, according to this gos-
pel (John 8: 39). Paul argues in his Letter to the Romans 
(4:10) that Abraham was called righteous already before he 
was circumcised. Of course one can explain all this as an 
argument between two denominations, Jewish and Chris-
tian. It is also possible however, to view Abraham as a ex-
emplary person, not because he belongs to a specific reli-
gious or ethnic group, Christianity not excepted, but because 
of his trust in God and because of his deeds testifying to that 
faithful trust. As such he contains a message not only to the 
adherents of an established religion, but even more to those 
outside that religion. In this perspective, not only his faith, 
but also his hospitality should at least be mentioned as a 
proof of his philanthropic attitude and open mindedness to 
foreigners.4  
The Quran states: “Ibrahim was neither a Jew, not a Chris-
tian. He was an adherent of the pure faith, submissive to 
God (hanifan musliman)” (3:69). Some translations simply 
render: “Ibrahim was a muslim”, assuming without further 
ado Islam as the only genuine heir of the patriarch. Howev-
er, when we interpret ‘muslim’ not as ‘belonging to the reli-
gion of Islam’, which may well be anachronistic, but as: 
‘submissive to God’, and as adherent of the pure religion5, 
we may trace a meaning similar to that in the New Testa-
ment: Abraham defies ethnic and institutional claims. His 
religious identity cannot be understood merely as rooted in 
an ethnic group or in a tradition.  
This becomes clear when we return to the story of Abraham 
as told in the Bible. Without any previous announcement 
and all of a sudden, the mysterious voice of an unknown God 
commands him to leave his country and his family. His fa-
ther Terach, in the Quran Azar, belongs to the generations 
after the Tower of Babel, during which no revelation of God 
has occurred.6 Hence tradition has it that Terach served 
idols (cp. Josua 24:2). Although Terach leaves Ur of the 
Chaldees together with Abraham, he dies in Haran. Later 
Jewish interpretations conclude that a major rift had oc-
curred between Abraham and his father. In addition, the 
place of Ur of the Chaldees, Ur Kasdim, is interpreted as the  
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7 See the Aramaic Bible translation: Tar-
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tion of how things went with the building 
of the Tower, but serve to underline the 
idolatrous nature of the project, compara-
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Egypt, the Biblical model par excellence of 
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fire (Ur) of the Chaldees.7 The name is supposed to refer to 
religious persecution perpetrated by the megalomanic ty-
rant Nimrod, who had already built the tower to glorify 
himself as a god. He is the one to throw Abraham into the 
fire oven (Ur Kasdim), to punish him for his refusal to wor-
ship Nimrod or the gods, as we will see presently. 
How should we define idolatry? The term is normative ra-
ther than descriptive. The answer that idolatry is everything 
outside one’s own religion does not clarify much and is a 
dangerous simplification. I propose to understand idolatry 
first and foremost as an integral element of monotheism, 
rather than an adequate description of what constitutes 
other religions.  
The Jewish humanist philosopher and member of the Frank-
furter Schule, Erich Fromm, defines the abandonment of 
idolatry as the cutting through of the incestuous ties of 
blood and soil. By identifying with the hand- made gods , i.e. 
one’s own ambitions as religious projections by granting 
them a divine status, such as the peoplehood, the flag, the 
soil, possessions and personal ambitions, one is kept in 
slavery and submission. Liberation means not only being 
freed from a tyrant outside, but even more from an internal-
ized oppression. Idolatry can be defined both from a theo-
centric and from an anthropocentric perspective, i.e. from 
an ethical perspective. Commentaries like to point out how 
harsh human beings were treated during the building of the 
Tower: when someone fell down, nobody cared, but when a 
stone fell, everybody weeped, for its loss jeopardized the 
building.8 Hence, where human beings are treated as a 
means and not as a goal, this seems an apt definition of idol-
atry. We should note that Abraham does not only abandon 
his past and his ancestors, but even gives up his future, as is 
told in the story of Abraham being told to sacrifice his son. 
Of course by receiving the boy back, his son is no longer the 
prolongation of his own ambitions, but henceforth his child 
is a real gift from God, not merely the father’s possession. 
Abraham then breaks with his past and even with his own 
father. We are far remote from the idea that family and the 
authority of the parents are the cornerstones for a religion! 
On the contrary, Abraham’s identity can only take shape by 
cutting through his family ties. 
There are several episodes told both in Jewish, Christian 
and Islamic sources that account for this rupture between 
father Terach and son Abraham.  
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1. Nimrod’s quasi-divine power 
The first episode relates how Ibrahim’s father was a visir at 
Nimrod’s court. Nimrod got a dream in which he saw an 
omen in the stars.9 His magicians explained that a child 
would be born who would overthrow his throne and would 
turn the people away from worshipping Nimrod. Nimrod 
decides to kill all male babies, but Ibrahim hides together 
with his mother in a cave, under the protection of the angel 
Gabriel.  
The young Abraham contemplating nature 
The young Ibrahim contemplates sun, moon and stars. I 
quote from Sura 6: 74-83. Although the Quran does not 
specify the location of the story, later Islamic writes such as 
al-Tabari (839-923) and al-Thalabi (11th century) describe 
how at that moment the young Ibrahim leaves the cave for 
the first time. These sources harmonize the different ac-
counts into a continuing story, similar to the Jewish mid-
rash.10 Abraham contemplating sun, moon and stars turns 
out to be a boy who, for the first time in his life, leaves the 
cave in order to shake of ignorance and darkness. Platonic 
overtones are perhaps not lacking either here.  
Lo! Ibrahim said to his father Azar: "Takest thou idols for 
gods? For I see thee and thy people in manifest error."  
So also did We show Abraham the power and the laws of the 
heavens and the earth, that he might (with understanding) 
have certitude.  
When the night covered him over, He saw a star: He said: 
"This is my Lord." But when it set, He said: "I love not those 
that set."  
When he saw the moon rising in splendour, he said: "This is 
my Lord." But when the moon set, He said: "Unless my Lord 
guide me, I shall surely be among those who go astray."  
When he saw the sun rising in splendour, he said: "This is my 
Lord; this is the greatest (of all)." But when the sun set, he 
said: "O my people! I am indeed free from your (guilt) of giv-
ing partners to God.  
"For me, I have set my face, firmly and truly, towards Him 
Who created the heavens and the earth, and never shall I give 
partners to God."  
Abraham destroys the myths of the gods. A well-known slo-
gan of the Humanistic Union is: “Without humanism, man  
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11 The Christian scholastic idea of the rusti-
cus in silva, children raised by wolves, 
stems from the same background. Of 
course, this high appreciation of rational 
reasoning as a way to knowledge of God is 
only one of the possible positions. 
would be delivered to the gods”. With more historical justi-
fication, one might say: “without Ibrahim, mankind would 
be delivered to the gods”. Of course, the issue of tolerance 
becomes essential here. This holds good both for the con-
cept of idolatry and for the atheistic rejection of religion. 
What is remarkable is that Ibrahim is depicted as a searcher 
for truth even before God has revealed himself to him. It 
suggest that one is only capable of receiving God’s revela-
tion only after one has searched autonomously, denying all 
so-called gods. It even conveys the suggestion that denying 
the gods is tantamount to believing in the one true God.  
I point out the curious fact that Abraham in his location out-
side the cave does not reject the gods because he has re-
ceived a revelation from God, on the contrary: the rejection 
is the result of his own reasoning. Only after that, God mani-
fests himself, as if whoever is steeped in idolatry is not ca-
pable of receiving God’s revelation. It may even seem that 
Abraham’s rational reasoning brings him on the brink of 
understanding the true God, as if revelation is not from out-
side but coincides with his own insight and, as such, is near-
ly superfluous. Undoubtedly, the autonomous reasoning of 
Abraham is strongly emphasized here. One is reminded of 
the famous story of Yaqzan by Ibn Tufail, where this Yaqzan, 
alone on an island, starts to contemplate the universe and 
out of himself reconstructs all of religious belief. It is the 
logical outcome of a philosophical position that claims that 
reason as such is sufficient to discover God.11 Not upon the 
authority of tradition but by personal contemplation and by 
observation of nature, Abraham discovers how he is sur-
rounded in ignorance and superstition. No doubt, Abraham 
is presented here as a searcher for truth with a philosophi-
cal attitude of observing, doubting and even of revolting 
against popular opinion. Although in a literal sense, nothing 
of such a philosophical attitude in Abraham can be found in 
the Bible, this is how post-Biblical Jewish and Christian tra-
dition as well as Quranic revelation and post-Quranic stories 
have portrayed Abraham.  
The concept of idolatry is multilayered. Erich Fromm plays 
with the idea that the empty place of divinity is never emp-
ty, not even when the gods have disappeared, but are al-
ways filled with surrogate gods. Hence the only means to 
turn the people away from idolatry is by replacing their 
idolatry with the veneration of the one and unique God. The 
risk of turning this veneration into the most serious form of 
idolatry is of course obvious. Hence negative theology states 
that it is stated that about God we only know better and  
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12 E. Fromm, You Shall Be as Gods. A Radical 
Humanist Interpretation of the Old Testa-
ment and its Tradition, Ned. vert. Gij zult 
zijn als goden, Utrecht 1966, p. 37-38. 
better who He is not. This negative theology is the flip side 
of the rejection of idolatry.  
Fromm points out that according to psalm 115:  
Idols have a mouth but do not speak, 
Eyes but do not see. 
And those who make them become as them (Psalm 
115:5-8).  
Hence, idolatry should not be regarded as something exter-
nal but as the radical alienation of man from his freedom 
and responsibility.12 The alienation of man is symbolized in 
that he himself becomes an idol. 
According to Fromm then, even the acceptance of the one 
God constitutes only an intermediary stage, mystical athe-
ism being for him the highest level. Other thinkers such as 
the French-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas rather 
view atheism as an intermediate but necessary stage in the 
process of abandoning idolatry, hereby denying any conti-
nuity between the gods of surrounding cultures and the 
invisible unknown God of the Bible. Before dealing with 
that, we will relate the story of Abraham smashing the idols.  
Ibrahim smashing the idols 
The second episode story relates how young Abraham 
smashes the idols except for the biggest one, whom he gives 
an axe.  
So he broke them to pieces, (all) but the biggest of them, that 
they might turn (and address themselves) to it. (Sura 21:58). 
The people object to Ibrahim that these idols cannot speak, 
whereupon Ibrahim says: Why do you worship them? 
Then were they confounded with shame: (they said), "Thou 
knowest full well that these (idols) do not speak!"  
(Ibrahim) said, "Do ye then worship, besides God, things that 
can neither be of any good to you nor do you harm?  
The essential point seems to be that the people themselves 
acknowledge the powerlessness of the idols, without being 
aware of it. 
In other lines, it becomes clear that Ibrahim directly con-
fronts his father, who, for that purpose, deals in idols:  
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 “My father, why do you worship that what can neither hear 
nor see, nor even profit you in the least?” (Sura 19:42). Here 
the conflict over religion is interwoven into the break be-
tween Ibrahim and his father. Again, in this respect, Ibrahim 
is the lonely man of faith.  
“I will separate myself from you and from what you invoke 
instead of God” (Sura 19:48). 
In more elaborate versions of this story, Abraham’s father 
Terach owns the shop himself, so that there can be no mis-
understanding about Terach’s personal interest.  
We should note that the story of Abraham deals with three 
different forms of idolatry: veneration of everything belong-
ing to nature (sun, moon, stars, fire); veneration of man-
made things (the idols in the shop) and self-idolization 
(Nimrod). Regarding the first: veneration of things belong-
ing to nature, the Talmud records an interesting debate be-
tween a Greek philosopher and a rabbi. “If your God abhors 
idolatry, why doesn’t he destroy them?”, the philosopher 
teases. The answer: “should God destroy the whole of crea-
tion? For idolatry is not limited, but sun, moon, stars, every-
thing can serve as an idol”. Apparently, idolatry is not de-
termined by the object but by the attitude of man towards 
the object.  
In the second form, veneration of man made objects, it is 
clear that idolatry here constitutes veneration for human 
proprieties and creations as if they are not human.  
The third manifestation of idolatry dispenses even with 
human manifestations of creativity and declares a human 
being as such divine.13 
It is worth while to delve a bit further into the meaning of 
idolatry, as conveyed in the story of Abraham. For the phi-
losopher Emmanuel Levinas, the figure of Abraham consti-
tutes the essence of monotheism. For him, the rupture with 
the past indicates a discontinuity between monotheism and 
all other forms of religion. 
Levinas states:  
When Terah came back he could not accept this incredible 
version, knowing that there is no idol in the world which can 
destroy the other idols. Monotheism marks a break with a 
certain conception of the Sacred. I t neither unifies nor hier-
archizes the numerous and numinous gods; instead it denies 
them. As regards the divine, which they incarnate, it is merely 
atheism. Here Judaism is very close to the West, by  
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177-194). Delft: Eburon 2005, pp. 177-194. 
which I mean philosophy. Intellectual excellence is internal 
and the ‘miracles’ it makes possible do not all wound, like 
thaumaturgy, the dignity of responsible being.14 
For Levinas, monotheism is essentially in line with philoso-
phy, even in its atheistic manifestations.  
Monotheism surpasses and incorporates atheism, but it is 
impossible unless you attain the age of doubt, solitude and 
revolt. The difficult path of monotheism rejoins the path of the 
West. One wonders, in fact, whether the Western spirit, phi-
losophy is not in the last analysis the position of a humanity 
that accepts the risk of atheism, if it must be held to ransom 
by its majority, but overcome it.15  
Atheism then is not the end of the journey towards freedom, 
but an intermediary stage towards the relationship with the 
one invisible God, in which man is called to freedom and to 
responsibility. Here, however, a warning is appropriate, for 
here lurks a danger of which both Erich Fromm and Em-
manuel Levinas are not sufficiently aware. The identifica-
tion of idolatry with existing religions outside monotheism 
seems to me too hastily done. This cannot but lead to new 
forms of violence, of which the Taliban smashing the statues 
of Buddha is only one telling example. I would propose to 
regard the prohibition of idolatry as indispensible to mono-
theist religion, but mainly as an internal-self-criticism. 
Hence it cannot serve as a wholesale condemnation of other 
religions, even when their expression of faith is beyond the 
understanding of the monotheistic believer.  
Of course the distinctive mark of the difference between 
monotheism and idolatry cannot be the fact that God is one: 
an idol does not become less an idol when there is only one 
of them left, as is proven by Abraham’s story. The oneness of 
God implies a uniqueness beyond compare. The prohibition 
of making an image of God holds good for all realms of life, 
including one’s imagination. The Jewish-Christian formula 
would be that because man himself is made in the image of 
God, man should not make an image of God. Although this 
formula is foreign to Islam because of anthropomorphic 
overtones, the idea behind it can be found in man being 
God’s calif, God’s representative on earth.  
I allow myself a small re-interpretation of the story of Abra-
ham smashing the idols. This re-interpretation seems im-
portant to me in order to avoid a wholesale apologetics of 
monotheist religion, which would lead to a too easy trium-
phalism. The story goes that Abraham left the biggest idol of 
them, in order to explain to the people that that one  
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had smashed the others. Still, one may wonder what hap-
pened to that biggest idol afterwards? One might consider 
the possibility that together with the journey with the invis-
ible unknown God, this idol travels along. In other words, 
the risk of idolatry at hand, even or especially when ortho-
doxy 
comes to the fore. To give an example, fundamentalism is 
nothing else than idolatry of the divine word, in which hu-
man thoughts are considered identical with God’s thought. 
In that respect, fundamentalism is no return to traditional-
ism, but may be viewed as a modern phenomenon. Funda-
mentalism secularizes God’s revelation into mere man made 
opinions, while denying the essential role of interpretation. 
Abrahams’ confrontation with the tyrant Nimrod 
In some versions, the smashing of the idols is in itself 
enough reason to throw Abraham in the fiery oven. Other 
accounts relate of a additional confrontation, between 
Abraham and the tyrant Nimrod.  
Ibrahim said: My Lord gives life and death, but Nimrod 
claimed: “I give life and death”. Ibrahim said: “God lets the sun 
rise in the East, you, raise the sun in the West!” (Sura 2:260). 
Ibrahim demythologizes the divine prerogatives of the ty-
rant Nimrod en reduces him to the human being he is. This 
attitude is similar to the attitude of the Greek philosophers 
who demythologize the gods, by assuming them to be an-
cient heroes. The later Midrash ha-Gadol XI, 28 (10th centu-
ry?) is more elaborate here. Abraham admits that if Nimrod 
would succeed, he would really be divine:  
“Then I will declare that you are God and that no one is 
comparable to you on earth. But don’t be surprised that I 
consider you not a god, but the son of Kush”.  
Nimrod is here addressed as an ordinary human being with 
his family ancestry, which is enough to make any tyrant 
angry. The end of the debate is that Nimrod throws Abra-
ham into the oven.16 The angels ask permission from God to 
rescue Abraham, but God announces that He will do that 
personally.  
After that, Abraham leaves the country. Not all of his family 
follows him wholeheartedly. 
Conclusions 
We have detected in Abraham some traits that we may con-
sider dangerous: violence against other persuasions, smash-
ing of the idols, unwillingness to accept this practice next to  
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his own convictions. Perhaps Abrahams biggest and remain-
ing idol constitutes a constant warning against monotheist 
religion not to turn to idolatry under the pretext of ortho-
doxy. The atheistic and iconoclastic element of Abraham 
may serve as a warning that this father of all religions is first  
and foremost a critical voice from within the religions. 
Abraham cannot easily be claimed as “one of us”, he is ra-
ther the constant warning not to identify the division be-
tween believer and non-believer with the division good and 
bad. Humanists may consider Abraham as their father as 
well. By doubting, contemplating and observing reality, he 
brushes aside convention and unproven tradition. He pleads 
for freedom of conviction, perhaps for the first time in hu-
man history. Whereas Abraham does not impose his convic-
tions by force, he protests when the tyrant Nimrod does so 
and eventually decides to leave the country as a refugee. 
Abraham considers idolatry as beneath human dignity, so 
indeed without Abraham, “man would be delivered to the 
gods”. Still, his eventual discovery of the transcendent and 
invisible God may cause some unrest among humanists. 
This divine transcendence, however, does not detract from 
human dignity but establishes it. The prohibition of idolatry 
is not based upon aggression against other convictions but 
should serve as a safeguard for human dignity. It seems that 
here humanism itself is a divided house. Atheist humanism 
rejects all religion as an infringement upon human dignity. 
Religious humanists consider religion as an indispensible 
means to create community between people and to over-
come mere self-interest. Present-day humanism seems to 
regard religion as an attractive spirituality as long as it has 
not become institutionalized and does not demand full en-
gagement, a quite Romantic attitude, which overestimates 
one’s own spiritual level. Be is as it may, all these directions 
within humanism may detect in Abraham much to ponder 
over. 
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I Introduction 
Freedom of religion and freedom of thought are themes 
which were of crucial importance to Nasr Abu Zayd. The 
present essay will deal with these themes, but not, as the 
case in most of Nasr’s publications and teaching, in the 
framework of the Eurasian world, but of debates on Islam 
and freedom of religion and thought in European History 
and the different modes of Enlightened thought in Europe 
that have been discussed in the recent scholarly literature. I 
am referring to the Radical and Moderate Enlightenment in 
which different attitudes to and ideas about the relation 
between reason and religion can be distinguished. Accord-
ing to the European Radicals (among whom the most im-
portant place was occupied by Spinoza and his circle) only 
reason counted, whereas the moderates accepted modes of 
reconciliation between reason and religion. This range of 
positions with regard to religion and reason can be found in 
the Muslim world as well, albeit in different modes and pos-
er configurations. I will not attempt to position Nasr Abu 
Zayd’s work in this connection, but let me say that it seems 
to me that he saw himself as a moderate enlightened thinker 
with sympathy for radical ideas.  
 
II 
During the last years a scholarly discussion has taken place 
on the use of Islamic sources by seventeenth and eighteenth 
European representatives of the Radical Enlightenment, viz. 
defenders of free-thought and of materialist, democratic, 
egalitarian, and anti-theological ideas. An important recent 
study dealing with the subject of the relations between Is-
lam and Radical Enlightenment is undoubtedly Jonathan’s 
Israel’s Enlightenment Contested, published in 2006, in 
which he devoted considerable attention to the experience 
of Radical Thinkers with the Islamic World and Islam.1 Isra-
el shows that in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
century, unlike the moderate enlightened thinkers, these 
radical philosophers held complex ideas about Islam as a 
pure monotheism of a high moral caliber which was also a 
very revolutionary force for positive change and far more 
rational than Christianity and Judaism.2 But in his book he 
devotes most of his attention to the interest in Islam of radi-
cal enlightened philosophers in the eighteenth century. The 
general conclusion Israel seems to reach is that the Radicals 
were especially focusing on ideas that were philosophically 
1 Israel, Enlightenment Contested, chapter 
24, “Rethinking Islam: Philosophy and the 
other”; the topic is also addressed in the 
same author’s Radical Enlightenment, 751-
753, on the basis of Henri de Boulainvilliers’ 
(1658-1722) openly subversive Vie de Ma-
homet (published in 1731). 
2 Israel, Enlightenment Contested, 616-7. 
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5The Dutch text was published anony-
mously by Jan Rieuwertsz, who had pub-
lished all of Spinoza’s works, and it was 
signed S.D.B, see Israel, Enlightenment 
Contested, 630. 
6Published in Amsterdam in 1657; see 
Leezenberg, “How Comparative should a 
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7 Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 571-3; 
Mulsow, “Socinianism,” 550. 
8 Champion, “I Remember”, 455. 
9 Champion, “I Remember”, 455. 
10Toland, Nazarenus. 
11 Champion, ”I remember”, 487; Wiegers, 
“Muhammad as the Messiah,” passim. 
 
and theologically marginal, viz.-heterodox in the Islamic 
World. We may think here of currents such as the philo-
sophical ideas of Ibn Rushd (1126- 1198 CE) and the surviv-
al of his ideas in Christian Spain, for example among the 
Jews living there, and thinkers such as Ibn al-Rawandi (be-
ginning 9th c.-end of the 10th c.), the author of Kitab al-
Zumurrudh, the book of the Emerald, and the Andalusian 
philosopher Ibn Tufayl (early 12th c.-1185 CE), the author of 
Hayy ibn Yaqzan.3 Hayy b. Yaqzan had been translated into 
Latin in England (in 1670, by Edward Pococke)4 and Israel 
shows that the circle around Baruch Spinoza was interested 
in it and that very likely Johannes Bouwmeester (1630-
1680), a friend of Spinoza, translated it into Dutch at the 
request of Nil Volentibus Arduum, the literary and crypto-
philosophical circle in Amsterdam.5 J.H. Glazemaker (1620-
1680), another thinker close to this circle, had translated Du 
Ryer’s French translation of the Qur’an into Dutch, as well as 
the Sa’di’s Gulistan6.  
The general conclusion that one might draw from this ev-
idence is on the one hand that, according to the European 
radicals, these movements within the Islamic world, debat-
ed and contested themselves, demonstrated that their radi-
cal ideas had a counterpart in the Muslim World (close to 
the origins of Christianity) and that on the other hand the 
earlier image of Islam in general, and the Prophet in particu-
lar, that had been influenced heavily by the hostile, ortho-
dox Christian receptions, had to be corrected. Hence, these 
thinkers saw Muhammad as a rational, pragmatic and just 
leader.7 And in doing so, they relied on the fruits of Islamic, 
Hebrew and Arabic studies that had been pursued between 
the sixteenth century (Guillaume Postel and others) and the 
first half of the seventeenth century. Thus, around 1700 a 
relatively large number of Islamic sources had already been 
made available by European scholars of Arabic and Islam, 
while recent travel accounts gave a first-hand insight into 
life in Islamic lands.8 In addition, people in Islamic lands 
were aware of the discussions going on in Europe. Mulsow 
quotes one Lady Montague, who, during a visit to Belgrade 
had met with a learned Muslim scholar, Ahmet-Beg Effendi, 
who inquired with here about the ongoing religious dis-
putes in England and asked her “how Mr. John Toland did.”9 
John Toland was a well known deist and the author of a vig-
orous defense of Unitarianism. Toland’s Nazarenus, in which 
he set out his ideas, was published in 1718 (but circulating 
among heterodox circles already in 1709).10 The Nazarenus 
is a very early European reference to the so-called Gospel of 
Barnabas, which had become available to Toland through a 
manuscript in the possession of Prince Eugene of Savoy.11 
This text written in the form of a Gospel is an Islamic  
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13 Champion, “I remember”, Mulsow, “So-
cinianism”; Feingold, “Not quite a Radical 
Enlightenment: Islam and Erudite Culture 
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14 Marcos Andreu, “Servetus and Islam”; 
Mulsow, “Socinianism,” 556-7. 
15Mulsow, “Socinianism,” 554. 
 
apologetic instrument, which pictures Jesus as a prophet, 
not as son of God, announcing the future coming of another 
prophet, Muhammad. Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), another 
well- known representative of the Radical Enlightenment, 
mentions in his Pensées a certain Mohamet Effendi in Istan-
bul who had been executed because of atheism.12 We may  
consider the eighteenth century, then, as a period in which 
Enlightenment thinkers had a considerable number of Mus-
lim sources at their disposal which they used in the way 
described above. Thus the general picture arising from the 
discussions is that these radical ideas about Islam were 
largely the fruit of a late- seventeenth and eighteenth-
century European phenomenon. What has remained far 
less-known so far and unknown to Israel is that this earlier 
phase of the development of Radical Enlightened thinking 
was imbedded not only in Arabic and Oriental Studies in 
Europe but had also strong connections to the Islamic 
world: the actors were not only European thinkers, but 
Muslim agency played a role as well.13 It is on these aspects, 
which are emerging from recent scholarship in the field, 
that I will focus below.  
 
III 
Champion and Mulsow point out in their recent contribu-
tion that in the said first phase of nascent Arabic and He-
brew scholarship, Islamic sources and personal experiences 
with the Muslim world were used by those who can be qual-
ified as Radicals. A very important place among them is oc-
cupied by the English physician Henry Stubbe (1632-1676), 
who clandestinely wrote a very positive account of the his-
tory of Islam, entitled An Account of the Rise and Progress of 
Mahometism, which was edited only in 1916, but we may 
also think of Spinoza and his circle and groups of Socinians, 
i.e. Unitarian anti-Trinitarian Christians, such as Noël Au-
bert de Versé, whom we will meet below and –even earlier- 
the Spaniard Miguel Serveto Conesa (Michel Serve, 1511?-
1553), who was executed in Calvin’s Geneva because of his 
anti-Trinitarian ideas14. Why were they interested in Islam? 
According to Mulsow one of the main reasons they were 
interested in it was because of their anti-Trinitarian ideas, 
which served as a matrix for anti-Christian polemics of vari-
ous kinds to be read and studied, not only of Islamic but also  
of Jewish and Pagan background15. Hence, there was close 
connection in it with anti-Christian polemics written by Jew-
ish authors. We are talking about a process that has been 
termed transfer of heresy (parallel to cultural transfer), viz. 
the orthodoxy of Islam became the heresy of Christianity 
and could hence be used to criticize dominant forms of reli-
gion, which were seen to be oppressive at the time. What 
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these thinkers were trying to construct then, in order to to 
legitimize their criticism, was a theory which could explains  
the sequence (Paganism) Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Socin-
ianism, ending in the Enlightenment. According to dominant 
orthodox forms of Christianity there was a discontinuity 
between these religious traditions. The Radicals, however 
tried to show that this was not the case. They turned to ei-
ther Judaism, being in their view the oldest form of mono-
theism, or, if they considered themselves atheists rather 
than Deists or Socinians, to pagan criticism on monotheism. 
As us well-known, Socinianism is a Christian current which 
is associated with the name of Fausto Sozzini (1539-1604), 
a thinker who denied the truth of the Trinity and founded a 
form of Christianity in which rationalism was the guiding 
principle. It saw Jesus and a simple human being and his 
teachings as some kind of moral philosophy. It can be seen 
as an antecedent of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.16  
 
Why follow this difficult and hard road to focus on Islam and 
not on ancient Latin sources? The answer to this question 
given in the contributions I discuss here is that there existed 
in this period a strong tendency to seek “cultural innova-
tion”, in which the use of “alien sources” to criticize the le-
gitimacy of domestic practice “became a literary device.17 
The existence or reconstruction of pagan, Jewish and Islamic 
criticism results in what Champion qualifies as an enter-
prise with an eclectic character -in some sense at random 
but also a strong tendency to consider the use of Islamic 
materials as largely instrumental, i.e. mainly as a tool to 
fight religious oppression and promote freedom of thought. 
This suggests that the criticism was based on chance, viz. on 
those texts that by chance were within reach, and in which 
Muslim agency hardly played a role. This however, needs 
more careful study, of which I can only present a few pre-
liminary ideas here. In it, I will survey the evidence of Mus-
lim agency. Where do we detect it? I will mention two ex-
amples: 
 
(1) Spinoza’s Circle 
Baruch de Spinoza did not develop his ideas detached from 
connections with the Muslim world. One of his grandfathers, 
a man called Henrique Garcés had been born in Oporto in 
1567. He became an inhabitant of the city of Antwerp in 
1610, where he was denounced by a Moroccan Jew, Isaac 
Pallache, to the Spanish authorities in Antwerp for being a 
Jew, accusing him of dealing with Moroccan Jews for the 
King of Barbary, and therefore stating that he was a traitor 
to the cause of the King of Spain.18 Garcés had married Ma-
ria Nuñez in Amsterdam on 17 June 1605. Among their  
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three children was a daughter called Hana (Deborah), who 
married Michael, Baruch’s father. Later in his life Garcés 
lived in Amsterdam. He remained outside synagogue life  
had to be circumcised after he had died before he was al-
lowed to be buried in the Jewish cemetery at Ouderkerk aan 
de Amstel.19 He had a brother called Paulo (whose Jewish 
name in Amsterdam was Abraham), who had accompanied 
as a translator to Samuel Pallache, an uncle of Isaac Pal-
lache, the same man who had denunciated him to the Span-
ish authorities in Antwerp, on the latter’s commercial and 
diplomatic travels as the agent of the Moroccan sultan in the 
Dutch Republic.20 It was in the context of the diplomatic 
relations between Morocco and the Dutch in which Samuel 
Pallache played a role that a Muslim diplomat, Ahmad b. 
Abdallah handed over an anti-Christian polemical treatise to 
the Dutch stadholder, Maurice, which was later used by An-
ti-Trinitarians in their polemics, and which circulated in The 
Netherlands as well.21 Through the contacts between Jews 
in Amsterdam and Muslim envoys and merchants Baruch de 
Spinoza may very have been acquainted with Muslim ideas 
on Christianity and Judaism. 
 
(2) As the previous subject has indicated an important place 
was played by Islamic polemical texts, which were avidly 
studied, as well as by polemical exchanges between Muslims 
and Christians in person. Champion shows how a polemical 
text which originally written in Arabic by the well-known 
thirteenth-century polemicist, Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi (d. 
1285) was used in Christian anti-Trinitarian polemics.22 
Moreover, al-Qarafi’s polemic was but one of the polemical 
texts used by the Anti-Trinitarians. What a number of num-
ber of them, among which a polemical work by a fourteenth-
century polemicist and the author of the aforesaid Gospel of 
Barnabas, had in common was that they argued that Islam 
built on a form of Christianity that was had been continued 
to exist in spite of the apostle Paul. These texts explain that 
the early Christians had originally followed teachings that 
were identical to the teachings of Islam viz. that Jesus was a 
Prophet, not the son of God, and they had practiced circum-
cision and had followed dietary rules. It was Paul, who had 
incited them to deviate from this path, and made them ven-
erate Jesus as God’s son and had abolished circumcision and 
dietary rules. Thus, several currents within Christianity 
came into being. However, one individual remained faithful, 
called the Believing man (Ar. al-Mu’min). His followers and 
their descendants, a small group, lived a withdrawn exist-
ence, and centuries later lived to see the prophet Muham-
mad and converted to Islam. The story is based on an early 
Islamic narrative source, the work of Sayf Ibn Umar, which  
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23 Van Koningsveld and Wiegers, The Po-
lemical Works of Muhammad Al-Qaysi, 
169. Wiegers, Muhammad as the Messiah. 
24 Mulsow, “Socinianism,”, 568, cf. Wiegers, 
“Muhammad as the Messiah”; idem, “Henry 
Corbin.” 
25 Cf. Mulsow, “Socinianism,”, 572. 
26 Mulsow, “Socinianism,”, 572ff, who 
makes it clear that the Jews are to be 
blamed for corrupting the text of the 
Qur’an; Champion, “I remember,” 445, note 
5 and the sources referred to there. 
27 Houtsma, “Uit de Oostersche correspon-
dentie”; Schmidt, “An Ostrich Egg”. 
 
Was transmitted to al-Qarafi and later to Islamic polemi-
cistsliving in Christian Iberia and North Africa, from which it 
reached Europe.23  
 
Socinians thought that the aforesaid Muslim texts pointed to 
Ebionite and Arian Christianity, known from the Christian 
historiography. Thus Henry Stubbe wrote that “the religion 
of Mahomet is chiefly founded on the Doctrines of the Naza-
rene Christians and the Arrians”.24 Aubert de Versé and 
other Socinians saw Muslims as a sort of Christians, who 
suffered from one problem only: their veneration for Mu-
hammad and doctrinal ideas associated with him, for which 
they advocated as a solution the introduction of historical 
criticism of the Qur’an! We are dealing here with the recon-
struction of a genealogy with religious and political implica-
tions, an alliance between Western Trinitarians and West-
ern Islam sought by Anti-Trinitarians with Muslims.25 
 
An attempt to come to an agreement occurred in 1682, 
when a Moroccan ambassador visited England on a mission 
to discuss the position of Tangiers. At a certain moment, and 
with further talks about an association between Socinians 
and Muslims in mind, Aubert de Versé apparently wished to 
hand over a number of texts, among which, so it appeared, 
was a polemical Muslim anti-Christian text written by one 
Ahmad b. Abdallah and a letter by himself in which he ex-
plained the motives for seeking contact.26 
 
The ambassador was indeed approached, but refused to 
accept the bundle, when he heard that the subject was reli-
gion, for he was there for political purposes and probably 
did not to become involved. The attempt went wrong and 
the plot was discovered. On further study, it appears that 
the polemical text in question was identical with the text 
mentioned above written by the Moroccan ambassador to 
the Dutch Republic in about 1610, Ahmad b. Abdallah al-
Hayti al-Maruni. It was this polemic, which, as I discovered 
some years ago, reached England and was translated into 
Latin, edited several times, and, as Mulsow discovered, was 
read and studied among Socinians and other anti-
Trinitarians as well. These two examples can be extended 
with others. As the correspondences between European 
Arabists and Muslims discussed by among many others 
Houtsma and Schmidt have shown, networks between Eu-
ropean scholars and Muslim commercial and scholar part-
ners in the Middle east existed from the first half of the sev-
enteenth century onwards.27  
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28 Pailin, Attitudes to other Religions; Wie-
gers, “De Nederlanden en de islam in de 
zeventiende eeuw. Wisselwerking tussen 
beeldvorming en cultuurcontact?”, and the 
sources referred to there; Smith, “Religion, 
Religions, Religious.” 
29 Klever, “Angst voor de islam?” 
 
IV 
By way of a brief conclusion, we may say that the Muslim 
world and the West were far more intertwined than was  
hitherto known. Radical Enlightened thinkers not only used 
Islamic texts, but this was not a mere eclectic process nor 
was Muslims devoid of agency in it. In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries Muslims played an active role. Dis 
cussions among early radicals were influenced by this agen-
cy in various forms. At its earliest phase, Radical enlight-
ened thinkers not only used philosophical and heretical 
texts and authors, but orthodox Sunni polemical traditions 
as well to reconstruct a counter history: what was orthodox 
in one tradition was heterodox in the other. A task for ther 
researchers will be to determine the nature of interaction 
between the Muslims and others.  
 
Can these discussions among European Radical thinkers be 
considered as a search for a humanistic Islam, the theme of 
our conference? To a certain extent, I think so. We are deal-
ing with a real engagement with Muslim thought and prac-
tice, not from the outside, in an exclusivist, rejecting mode, 
but truly involved as part of an ongoing “monotheist” 
movement. The radical nature of this thought can also, and 
not coincidently, be connected to the beginnings of the 
comparative Study of Religions in its modern meaning. As 
has been shown by such scholars as David Pailin and Jona-
than Smith, this scholarly discipline, which came into being 
in the same period, marked the beginnings of the study of 
religions as human phenomena in an anthropological way.28 
It is very interesting to observe that Socinians attempted to 
ally with Muslims, urging them to apply a historical critical 
approach to the Qur’an. This is also interesting news for 
present-day politicians and intellectuals who criticize Islam 
as incompatible with Western views.29  
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Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd and the Tradition of 
Religious Humanism 
P.S. van Koningsveld  
One of the major methodological principles of the human-
istic tradition of the study of texts, is often quoted in Latin 
as “e mente auctoris”. This principle underlines the necessity 
to understand texts “from the mind of the author”. Re-
searchers are supposed not only to identify the author of a 
text, but also to study his/her biography, the society he or 
she was living in, in short his/her biography in order to 
grasp the text as fully as possible. This principle was also 
applied to the study of Biblical texts which for a long time, 
were regarded to be of Divine origin, a belief which is still 
shared by millions of people today. The de-sacralisation of 
the Divine Revelation formed an essential part of the pro-
cess of secularization resulting in various forms of separa-
tion between State and Religion. This was a painful process 
marked by many conflicts and even wars. In view of the ex-
isting Christian fundamentalist movements and the political 
power they are able to mobilize until this very day, we can-
not claim that this process has come to a full completion, 
even today. A Biblical scholar denying the resurrection of 
Jesus Christ, for instance, may still meet serious opposition. 
In their endeavor of studying Islam, orientalists, from the 
19th century onwards, many of whom had been educated 
initially in the tradition of Semitic and Biblical scholarship, 
have been trying to apply the principle of “e mente auctoris” 
and the instruments of historical criticism coming with it, 
also to the study of Islamic texts, including the Koran. As 
they used to be non-Muslims, while their society, including 
their students and readers, used to consist (with very rare 
exceptions) of non-Muslims, as well, they hardly experi-
enced any religious or social problem in applying this prin-
ciple, quite contrary to the experiences of many Biblical 
scholars. Accordingly, orientalists like Theodor Nöldeke 
who founded the scientific study of the Koran in the West 
during the 19th century, interpreted the Koran and other 
sacred Islamic texts, like the prophetic Hadîth, as the prod-
uct of the society and culture, as well as of the human minds 
of their respective authors, including Muhammad. This does 
not mean that they did not understand and did not recog-
nize the importance as well as the complexity of the concept 
of Revelation, especially in direct relation to Muhammad’s 
own understanding of it, as well as that of his followers. But 
also the concept of Revelation includint the way it was un-
derstood by those who believed to be involved in it, was  
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studied as part and parcel of the society and culture in 
which it functioned and made sense. This is the tradition 
that is still followed by many today. According to this ap-
proach, to mention just one example, the old versions of the 
Koran which were in existence before Caliph Uthman intro-
duced his standard edition may reflect some other (earlier 
or even later) stages of development in the message of the 
Koran and may therefore be highly relevant to understand 
the early meaning or meanings of the text, even of the 
standard Uthmanic edition.  
In a broader sense, we may say that the humanistic study of 
religious texts forms part of the comparative historical 
study of religion, a discipline that works on the basis of the 
assumption that religion is an aspect of human civilization, 
not only Christianity or Islam, but all the religions of man-
kind. Historians of Religion who follow this assumption are 
not per se atheists. Historians of Religion often stipulate 
that they make a separation between their scholarly work 
and their personal beliefs, using for this separation the term 
of “methodological agnosticism”. This position implies that a 
researcher of religion rejects the scientific relevance of 
eventual claims to the Divine origin of the objects of his re-
search, as it is only the human nature of the Bible, the Ko-
ran, the Veda’s, the Book of Mormon, etcetera, which is ac-
cessible to the instruments of this type of scholarship. This 
does not mean, however, that this same researcher would 
reject the religious claim to a Divine origin of any text or 
rule in an existential sense. It only means that personal be-
liefs are considered to fall outside the scope of scientific 
research. 
Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, a profoundly creative and original 
scholar in the field of Arabic and Islamic Studies and an or-
nament of various universities, including the University of 
Leiden and now also the University for Humanistics in 
Utrecht, became the object of accusations of atheism and 
unbelief, and even of official proclamations and verdicts to 
that same effect. I should like to point out that, from the 
perspective of a historian of religion, everything written to 
prove or disprove these claims and accusations is of no rel-
evance whatsoever for an impartial judgment of the work of 
professor Abu Zayd as a scholar.  
In fact, quite apart from the profound social, cultural and 
even political relevance of his works, especially in relation 
to Islam and its believers all over the world, in his scholarly 
works he is drawing attention to a series of important 
points that have been neglected or at least remained in the 
shadow, also in the studies of orientalists. Let me illustrate 
this by discussing one of his viewpoints on the Koran.  
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I am referring to Abu Zayd’s view of the oral nature of the 
Koran, because the Koran, in the understanding of Muham-
mad and of Muslims in general, was originally transmitted 
to him in an oral form and was then recited by him to his 
Companions orally, as well. Although these orally transmit-
ted passages were finally crystallized in written form in 
order to protect its integrity, the Koran continued to be an 
orally transmitted and orally recited and reproduced text in 
the first place. “Even now”, says Abu Zayd, “with the Koran 
being a printed text, what is important for every Muslim is 
the memorization of the Koran by heart and the capability of 
reciting it according to the classical principles of recitation”. 
Together with the aspect of the aesthetic characteristics of 
the Koran, especially in view of its poetic language, this ele-
mentary view of the oral nature of the Revelation, enables 
us to grasp the spiritual meaning of the Koran for Muslims, 
both individually and collectively. The Islamic practice of 
the recitation of the Koran was historically based, as is ar-
gued by Abu Zayd, on the first five verses of Sura 96, where 
Muhammad was ordered to recite, the act of recitation hav-
ing been indicated to him as the channel through which 
God’s message would have to be transmitted to mankind, or, 
in other words, the Word of God was to be humanized. The 
process of revelation understood by Muhammad to include 
recitation preceded by “listening” (“not merely a passive 
action, but rather representing the internal, intimate and 
heart-felt act of comprehension”) became the historical pro-
totype for the genuinely Islamic pattern of communication 
between man and God. It is only on the basis of this under-
standing of the oral nature of the Koran and of the prototyp-
ical role of the revelation process, as is demonstrated elo-
quently by Abu Zayd, that one can really proceed towards a 
correct interpretation of the nature and meaning of some of 
the most basic rituals of the Islamic religion, viz. as commu-
nication channels. Recitation of the Koran became the very 
heart of all kinds of prayers including the salat, as well as of 
the practice of dhikr, the repeating of God’s name and of 
tasbîh, glorification.  
These are views that can rarely be found in the writings of 
orientalists, who are usually unable to grasp the full mean-
ing of the spiritual dimension of the Koran, while dealing 
with it as a written source for the history of early Islam, of 
Islamic theology and law, in the first place. The Western, 
non-Muslim understanding of the Koran and of Islam in 
general continues to depend, to a large extent at least, on 
the writings of scholars who as a rule made their first ac-
quaintance with the Mushaf in the lecture hall of a universi-
ty, trying to struggle with the Arabic grammar and dictio-
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nary to decipher the contents of the text at least to some 
extent. Abu Zayd’s work contains essential additions and 
indeed corrections that deserve to be taken into account to 
their fullest: they show Islam as a spiritual heritage in the 
first place, even before being a set of doctrines and rules. 
The second point I should like to mention here is about Pro-
fessor Abu Zayd’s role as a modern theologian. I am refer-
ring, as an example, to his discussion, at many different oc-
casions, of the notion of the Koran as the “the Word of God” 
(kalâm Allâh). One of the questions to be answered here, as 
Abu Zayd sees it, is: Are the “Word of God” and the Koran 
identical concepts? Abu Zayd draws the attention to various 
passages in the Koran where it is emphasized that the 
Words of Allah are infinite and non-exhaustible (18:109 and 
31:27). Even if all the trees on earth were pens, and all the 
oceans were ink, with seven oceans to add to its supply, the 
Word of God could not possibly be exhausted. “Therefore”, 
he concludes, “if the Word of God is impossible to be con-
fined whereas the Koran as a text is limited in space, the 
Koran should only represent a specific manifestation of the 
Word of God”. Another question according to him calling for 
attention is related to the linguistic nature of the Koran. 
Repeatedly, the Koran emphasizes that it is revealed in 
“plain Arabic”, according to Abu Zayd, “simply because God 
always considers the language of the people to whom a 
messenger is sent: ‘We never sent a messenger –thus the 
Koran- but with the language of his people, that he might 
make it clear for them’. It is then not likely –concludes Abu 
Zayd- to assume that the Koran presents literally and exclu-
sively the word of God. According to this assumption the 
word of God would be limited to the Koran only, thus ex-
cluding previous scriptures from the same right of present-
ing the Word of God in their own original languages. This 
will automatically lead to hold Arabic, as has been in fact 
done by Arab Muslims at least, as a sacred language (…) The 
Koran is then one manifestation of the Word of God inspired 
to the prophet Muhammad (…). Thus we can safely distin-
guish between three aspects of the Koran, namely its con-
tent, its language and its structure. There should not be any 
disagreement that the divinity of the Koran is confined to its 
source. The content, however, is strongly correlated with 
the linguistic structure, which is culturally and historically 
determined. In other words, if the divine content of God’s 
Word has been expressed in human language, it is the do-
main of language that represents the essential human di-
mension of all scriptures in general and the Koran in partic-
ular”.What we see here, I believe, is how a Historian of Reli-
gion (of Islam in this case) who accepts the main  
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assumption of religion as a fact of human civilization, at-
tempts to introduce his scientific position into the norma-
tive circle of Islamic thought, resulting in a contribution to a 
modern, liberal Islamic theology in the tradition of religious 
humanism. Rather than being highly original in the strictest 
scientific sense, this is an operation with great potential 
impact in Islamic culture and society, it being one of the 
prerequisites of the harmonious development of a genuinely 
modern Islamic identity.  
Today we honor a man combining a profound commitment 
to the methods and principles of modern scientific research 
on the one hand, with an equally profound commitment to 
the spiritual wealth of the Islamic tradition, on the other 
hand. The secret code of his ability to combine between the 
two, lies perhaps in the humanistic nature of both! 
 
(The quotations are from N.H. Abu Zayd, The Qurán: God and 
Man in Communication. Inaugural Lecture, Leiden 2000). 
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1 One of the signs announcing the end of 
times 
2 Ikhwân al-Safâ', Rasâ'il Ikhwân al-Safâ' 
wa-khillân al-wafâ'. (Beirut: Dâr Sâdir and 
Dâr Beirut, 1957, 4 vols.), IV 18-19. 
Man and his Fellow Creatures: Views of the 
Pure Brethren of Basra 
Remke Kruk 
The question of man’s relation to his fellow creatures has a 
central place in philosophies all over the world. In a reli-
gious context, it is an aspect of man’s relation to God and 
how to live in accordance with His commands. The matter 
comes up in a number of philosophical contexts, such as 
discussions about the ideal ruler, man and society, man’s 
place within the cosmos as a whole, his relation to nature in 
general, and to animals in particular.  
All these matters, and many others as well, are treated in 
the Rasâ’il Ikhwân al-Safâ’, the vast ‘philosophical encyclo-
paedia’ of the Pure Brethren of Basra, composed in the 10th 
century. The Pure Brethren, who were Muslims, but whose 
thought was deeply steeped in Neoplatonic philosophy, are 
known for their eclectic attitude and openness to all kinds of 
religions and philosophies, and one finds in their Rasâ’il 
ideas that stem from a variety of backgrounds. If an idea is 
good and noble, they take it along. In their view, wisdom 
may be gathered from all kinds of sources, including pre-
Islamic philosophical systems and other religions than Is-
lam, even Buddhism. Yet their writings are scattered with 
Qur’anic quotations, which may have served to give them a 
sound Islamic cover. The way they describe their Brother-
hood is a good example of their openness: their Brother-
hood, they say, is a ship of salvation. All are invited to board 
it, be they Christian, Zoroastrian, Neoplatonists or Hermet-
ics:  
“Do you not want, brother –may God support you and 
us with a spirit that comes from Him- to haste and 
board with us the ship of salvation that was built by 
our father Noah, peace be upon him, and save yourself 
from the flood of nature before the sky brings unmis-
takable smoke,1 and so be safe from the waves of the 
sea of matter and not be among those who will 
drown?”2  
In another passage they explain why the messages of the 
prophets who were sent to various communities seem to 
differ. This is “because they are doctors and astrologers for 
the souls, and when they forbid something, it is to protect 
the souls, and when they declare something permitted, it 
serves as medicines and potions. The various forms of wor-
ship are the treatment and the medicines.” The illnesses 
which these prophets have to cure are the wrong views and  
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false opinions that exist among humankind, and since these 
views and opinions differ from place to place and from peri-
od to period, the treatment also has to be different.3 Ideas, 
as we see, very much in line with the thought of Nasr Abû 
Zayd, and since the ideas of the Pure Brethren or not all that 
widely known to non-specialists it seemed appropriate to 
show that Nasr had kindred spirits in Islam as far back as 
the 10th century. In explaining some of their core concepts, I 
will follow the same method that the Pure Brethren used to 
introduce and explain their ideas to non-initiates, namely 
that of allegory. 
A noteworthy aspect of the Pure Brethren is namely that in 
their Rasâ’il they frequently make use of narrative means to 
explain their views. Allegorical tales serve to illustrate their 
ideas and make them easier to grasp, and we may suppose 
that it is exactly in these allegorical tales that their core 
message can be found. The goal of the Brethren, who, as said 
above, are deeply influenced by Neoplatonism, is the ulti-
mate happiness of the soul, and this happiness is not some-
thing to be realized in earthly existence. It is the happiness 
to be reached in the spiritual world, and to this end, man has 
to disengage from the pursuit of material interests, and to 
live a life of humility and of respect for the Creator. If he 
does not manage to overcome his greed, gluttony and hun-
ger for power, he will not only harm his fellow creatures, 
but also endanger his soul and its fate in the hereafter. This 
goal is hard to attain, given human nature, and that is where 
one of their central concepts comes in: ta`âwun, mutual as-
sistance. The Brethren have to help each other to attain 
their ultimate goal, the return of the soul to the spiritual 
world where it originated from. This (in true Platonic vein) 
is the real world; what we see and experience here on earth 
are just images of a higher reality, “images of the true forms 
that exist in the spiritual world...” 4 
How the Brethren of Purity attempted to transmit their ide-
as by way of allegory may be illustrated by the following 
three examples.  
First, the story of the Island of the Apes.5 This story is about 
an idyllic island. There is a city where a happy community 
lives. All the people are related to each other and they feel 
nothing but affection for each other. Strife and jealousy are 
unknown. It is, in short, a `virtuous city’, a madîna fâdila.6  
One day, a group of these people are shipwrecked on the 
coast of another island, an island very unlike their own: it is 
mountainous, wild and inhospitable.The trees hardly bear 
any fruit and it is full of dangerous animals. It is inhabited 
by large apes. These apes are the favourite prey of a giant  
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bird that lives on yet another island and that from time to 
time comes and swoops down on the apes in order to carry 
one of them off. The castaways only manage to keep them-
selves alive with great effort. After a while, they establish 
ties with the apes, and sexual unions between men and apes 
occur from which in due time children are born. As time 
goes by, the people gradually lose all memory of their for-
mer happy life and become more and more animal-like. 
They start to hoard food, jealously guarding and defending 
their possessions. Sexual jealousy causes quarrels and fights 
among them. War and strife are ripe. 
One day, one of them has a dream in which he returns to his 
former happy life and is received with great joy by his for-
mer companions. Bathed and dressed in new clothes he is 
guided back to his former dwelling place. When he wakes up 
the memory stays with him, and he decides to build a boat 
and to go back to his former dwelling place. Other people, 
whose memories of their former life he has rekindled, join 
in the project. Then, one day, the giant bird swoops down 
and carries off one of the humans instead of an ape. Discov-
ering its mistake, it drops the man on the other island, in the 
city where he used to live. He is received with great joy, and 
when the people hear about the miserable life of their 
friends on the island of the apes, they all pray that the bird 
may bring over other companions as well. The people on the 
other island, however, are deeply miserable because the 
bird has taken away their friend, and they deeply mourn 
him. If only they knew what had happened to him, they cer-
tainly would have rejoiced. It is an allegorical way of stating 
that death is not a reason for sadness but for joy, because it 
implies a return to the spiritual world, the world of ultimate 
happiness. 
The allegory, of course, is of a Platonic nature. It is about 
reminiscence of a higher existence, superior in all respects, 
and about the effort it takes to divest oneself of the low and 
despicable earthly existence and return to the former per-
fect and happy spiritual existence. In the view of the Pure 
Brethren, this goal can only be reached by mutual support 
and assistance. Only in this way man may succeed in build-
ing a boat, a ‘ship of salvation’, and escape from his misera-
ble existence. 
The second story is also about the vanity of the material 
world, but has a different approach. It is about the danger in 
which man may bring himself by being exclusively interest-
ed in luxury and the pleasures of the flesh, pursuing riches 
and material gain with total disregard for spiritual matters. 
The Rasâ’il contain several stories which carry a similar  
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message, stories that belong to the so called Bi- lawhar-
Bûdâsaf (or Yûdâsaf) complex, a group of Indian stories 
connected to the Buddhist tradition.7 All these stories em-
phasize that the riches and pleasures of this world are 
meaningless and endanger the fate of the soul in the world 
to come, and they advocate a life of asceticism. 
This particular story is about a man for whom a life of luxu-
ry is the sole purpose of his existence. All his efforts are 
spent on increasing his physical comforts. His house is fur-
nished in the most sumptuous manner, and he only eats the 
choicest foods. His bed is hung up in the air so that no ver-
min can bother him. Nothing is further from his mind than 
to think about the fate of his soul and to improve his morals.  
Then God decides to wake him up from the sleep of his neg-
ligence. One night when he is asleep in his bed in the arms of 
one of his lovely concubines, he has a horrible dream. In this 
dream, he finds himself in a lonely desert, naked, hungry, 
thirsty, his body covered with dirt, his hair long and wild, 
and a heavy burden on his back. Two tall, frightening black 
men with flashing eyes and smoke steaming from their nos-
trils approach with spears in their hands and start pursuing 
him. He flees to the top of a mountain and drops over the 
ridge into in valley. He falls into a well from which smoke 
and fire rise. The two blacks do not give up their pursuit. He 
wakes up screaming and falls from his bed, totally confused. 
People gather around and he tells them what has happened. 
All kinds of suggestions are made. Some people fear that he 
has been struck by jinn, spirits, or has been bewitched by 
one of his enemies, or that demons have put evil thoughts 
into his head. 
Although he denies all this, the next night his bed is sur-
rounded by charms, amulets and all kinds of protective for-
mulas. Fumigations have to drive away the evil spirits. The 
same dream, however, occurs again, in an even more fright-
ening form. After this has happened a third time, astrologers 
and other scholars of the occult are consulted. Nothing they 
suggest, however, is of any avail, and the poor man becomes 
more and more miserable, afraid to go to sleep for fear of 
the horrible dream. 
His case is widely discussed. One day, a man widely known 
for his piety and ascetism passes by a group of the sufferer’s 
close friends who sit there, commiserating their friend’s 
fate. He tells them that he knows how to cure him. It will be 
if no use, however, if he goes to him personally and explains  
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what has to be done: he will not accept it. Maybe, though, he 
will listen to his trusty friends. Then he explains to these 
people the meaning of every single detail of the dream, mak-
ing clear that it is a premonition of the fate that awaits the 
man in the hereafter if he does not change his ways. They 
should go and explain this to him, without mentioning the 
pious ascetic who has told them this. They should also point 
the way to a pious life that may ultimately lead to happiness 
in the hereafter. 
They listen to his advice, and do what he has suggested. 
They tell their friend that he should take a firm resolution to 
repent and alter his ways. He should give his money to the 
poor, put on a hairy cloak to cover his nakedness, fast every 
week for two days, humbly go to the mosque, and pray day 
and night. 
Upon his question where they got this advice, they tell him 
that it came from “the man who is learned in matters of reli-
gion, an adviser about whose words no doubt can exist.” 
Then he starts asking them about matters of religion, and 
they tell him what is in the “books of the prophets”. Accept-
ing their words, he completely changes his way of life, hov-
ering between fear and hope. All his time and effort is now 
spent on devotion and pious deeds.  
At some point sleep overcomes him while he is in the midst 
of his devotions. Again he has a dream. He finds himself in 
what at first looks like the same desert, but now it has 
turned into a luscious garden. There is a well where all the 
dirt is washed from his body. Then he is perfumed and 
dressed in new garments. Two figures stand before him 
with transparent bodies, made of light, and gesture to him 
to step forwards. He finds himself in a space filled with 
lights, full of green pastures and flowers, where rivers flow 
over pebbles that look like pearls and rubies. Heavenly voic-
es sing wonderful melodies. He asks his two angelic com-
panions what this is, and they tell him that this is the para-
dise that awaits him if he continues his pious behaviour. 
When he wakes up, he gives all his possessions to the poor, 
frees all his slaves and dresses himself in sackcloth. He 
starts to preach in gatherings, admonishing people with 
parables and pointing out the way to paradise. People ask 
him how he has come by all this wisdom without ever hav-
ing studied any books. His heart, he says, has become like a 
mirror in which all the higher truths are reflected, and his 
tongue simply puts all this into words. Thus he becomes 
widely known as a pillar of religion.  
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One day one of his neighbours walks into a gathering, and 
sees the pious ascetic questioning his friend about matters 
of religion. Astonished, he walks up to him and says: “This is 
the man whose dream you interpreted and whose cure you 
described! And here you are asking him questions about 
matters of religion and the way to the hereafter!” “Yes,” he 
answers, “for he has obtained knowledge that I have not 
managed to obtain ... What I described to him yesterday 
were human teachings, and what he described to me today 
are angelic teachings.” 
Finally, the man has another dream. In this dream he sees 
his spiritual body depart from his corporeal body. The latter 
is left behind, decays and is eaten by worms. The gates of 
heaven are open, awaiting the ascent of his spiritual body on 
the ladder stretching down from heaven. Angels descend in 
crowds and fill the horizons with their light. A voice is 
heard, calling: “O soul that is at peace, return to your Lord 
(…) and enter My paradise.” 
When he wakes up, he tells people what he has seen. He 
writes his testament and passes away after just a few days.8 
Apart from the central message of the story, the exhortation 
to renounce the world, we should also note two other 
points, both central to the message of the Pure Brethren: 
first, that compassion and help from other people is neces-
sary to reach true insight (personified in the story by the 
faithful friends who pass on the message of the ascetic), and, 
second, that the story does not specify which particular 
prophetic message offers the road to salvation. It just speaks 
about the `books of the prophets,’ suggesting that they are 
all equally valid. 
Thus man has to renounce the world with a view of a higher 
spiritual existence, and needs the help of his brothers to 
reach this goal. The Pure Brethren also emphasize that, 
while here on earth, we have to live in a morally just man-
ner, in accordance with God’s laws. In order to lead a pious 
life, we have to improve our mind and bring ourselves on a 
higher spiritual level. This, as Carmela Baffioni, a prominent 
specialist on the philosophy of the Pure Brethren, expresses 
it: “moral and spiritual superiority is recognized in ‘appro-
priate knowledge, dispositions, opinions and works’; moral 
illnesses designate ‘accumulated ignorance, bad habits, cor-
rupted opinion, and evil deeds’.9  
This applies to every range of society, from kings and high 
officials to the most humble members of society. Of course 
the Brethren are aware of the fact that little of this takes 
place in actual practice, and especially in their allegorical  
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tales they severely criticize the low moral behaviour which 
they observe, particularly of those who carry power, such as 
kings and caliphs. In his, they are sometimes remarkably 
specific, such as when they mention with disgust the prac-
tice of killing one’s close male relatives in the struggle for 
succession, a practice widespread among caliphs, “your so-
called heirs of the prophets’. 10 
The criticism appears in what is probably the best known 
and most widespread story from the Rasâ’il, that of the Case 
of the Animals against Man before the King of the Jinn. It is 
very long, a hundred and ninety pages in the modern Beirut 
edition of the text. Basically, it is a homily against the moral 
depravity of man, and just like in the previous stories, its 
general message is criticism of worldly preoccupations and 
low moral behaviour. That may sound somewhat dull, but 
the story is anything but that. Its elegance, wittiness and 
wisdom makes it one of the gems of Arabic literature, and 
for that reason it has also circulated as a separate book. It 
was transmitted to Europe in 1316 by way of a Hebrew 
translation, made by Kalonymos ben Kalonymos. A century 
later, in 1417-18, Brother Anselmo Turmeda, a Catalan 
priest, wrote a small and amusing treatise clearly inspired 
by the story from the Rasâ’il: The dispute of the donkey and 
Brother Anselmo Turmeda about the nature and nobility of 
the animals. The book closely follows the Arabic story in its 
criticism of human vanity, but also derides the loose behav-
iour of monks and clerics. Brother Anselmo probably read 
the story in Arabic, for he knew it well: he converted to Is-
lam and started to write in Arabic after he had moved to 
Tunis. Some of his works in Arabic are still extant.11  
The Case of the Animals forms part of Epistle 22, ‘On the 
modalities of the Coming-to-Be of the Animals and their 
Kinds’,12 in the section of the Rasâ’il that deals with the nat-
ural sciences. The Brethren explain at the beginning of this 
epistle that they see man as God’s vicegerent on earth and 
that man’s behaviour should be accordingly. In their Rasâ’il, 
they say, they have frequently pointed out all the wonderful 
qualities of man. In this Epistle, they are going to speak 
about the qualities of the animals, and they announce that 
they will also use this as an opportunity to speak about the 
vanity of man and his injustice towards creatures of a lower 
nature. They will also point out man’s ingratitude towards 
their Creator. Human beings seem to take the exalted posi-
tion that God has bestowed upon them completely for 
granted, not feeling obliged to behave in a manner worthy of 
this favoured position. Indeed, while man in his most per-
fect form is almost an angel, man at his most debased is lit- 
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tle more than a demon. All this they will make clear in a sto-
ry in which the animals shall act as their spokesmen.13 
A story, in short, that is intended as a moral lesson in line 
with the message of the Rasâ’il as a whole. This story also is 
set on an idyllic island. On this island, the animals live there 
happily together with the jinn, the spirit creatures that form 
a separate class of rational beings in Islam. They have 
sought refuge on this island to escape man’s persecution 
and harassment, but their happy and peacef ul existence 
comes to an end when a ship arrives on the island. The men 
it brings start to follow their usual pattern of behaviour, 
hunting and capturing the animals, using them for their own 
benefit and treating them with unnecessary harshness. The 
animals gather together and decide to take the matter to 
court. The king of the jinn, who belongs neither to the hu-
mans nor to the animals and thus is not biased in favour of 
one party, will be asked to pronounce a judgement about 
man’s claim of superiority and lordship over all other earth-
ly creatures.  
During the hearing at the king’s court the spokesmen of 
various groups of animals and human beings are offered the 
opportunity to present their views. As they announced in 
the beginning of Epistle 22, the Brethren use this framework 
to vent their criticism of human behaviour. Man’s boastful-
ness, vanity, greed, lustfulness, preoccupation with material 
comfort and power, cruelty and thoughtlessness are put into 
sharp contrast with the noble simplicity and piety of the 
animals. The animals, set an example to man by their ascetic 
life, ascetic not in the sense that they despise earthly exist-
ence, for that would be impossible: it is the only existence 
they have, since God has not bestowed upon them an im-
mortal soul. But compared to man, they are ascetics in the 
way they live: they do not worry about the future, but go out 
in the morning trusting that they will find food. They do not 
eat more than they need for their bodily subsistence, and 
they do not hoard. They live their simple lives, caring for 
their young without expecting a reward, and constantly 
praise God for His bounty. 
There is more than an echo here of that Biblical summary of 
Jesus’ moral teachings, the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 
5-7). It again illustrates the approach of the Brethren: to 
gather wisdom wherever one may find it. 
In the course of the proceedings, the humans, boastfully 
presenting arguments for their superiority, offer ample op-
portunity to be chastised. When they boast about their doc-
tors, jurists and theologians, the animals point out that 
these only count against them: they need jurists because of  
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their crimes and misdemeanours, doctors because of their 
disgusting and unhealthy lifestyle, while their theologians 
only cause them harm, because their continuous discussions 
and debates about theological matters cause strife and dis-
cord among the community. The animals in their simplic-
ityare free from all this, because they do not overfeed, do 
not infringe upon the rights of others, and do not bother 
about the finer points of worship. They just praise God and 
follow by instinct His commands. 
The overall message, as may be clear, is that man’s preoccu-
pation with the material world and its physical pleasures, 
only leads to moral corruption. The animals, with their sim-
ple life and no wishes beyond their basic needs, are free 
from this. Yet in the end the judge has to rule in favour of 
man, for clearly God has accorded him the highest place in 
earthly creation by giving him an immortal soul. Man’s ex-
istence, unlike that of the animals, does not end with death. 
If he has lived the right kind of life, eternal happiness awaits 
him. It has also become clear, though, that few human be-
ings lead such virtuous lives, and the message is that alt-
hough man may rightly claim to be the most superior crea-
ture on earth, he has to earn his status by behaving accord-
ingly, leading a sober and humble life and respecting his 
fellow creatures. 
The message of the Brethren as conveyed in their stories is 
clear, possibly even clearer from their allegorical tales than 
from their long philosophical exposés and discussions, even 
though the stories take up only a small part of their work. 
Their message is a message of soberness and humility. Do 
not get attached to material pleasures, for this leads to 
greed and moral corruption. Do not lose yourself in discus-
sions and quarrels about the finer points of religious wor-
ship, for it leads to strife and misery. Be humble, and grate-
ful to God for the wonderful way in which He has created 
the world, and treat your fellow creatures, animals as well 
as man, with justice and respect. 14 
That, too, is Islam, an Islam very different from that which 
brought so much misery to the life of Nasr Abu Zayd.  
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 The Monotheistic Legacy in the West: Ques-
tioning the Secular in Modern Humanism, 
Islam and Christianity 
Welmoet Boender, Laurens ten Kate en Henk Manschot 
Introduction 
In this panel we have explored the following statement from 
a theoretical/philosophical viewpoint (Ten Kate) and from a 
socio-political, practice-related viewpoint (Boender):  
The secular, or ‘secularity’ as a key feature of mod-
ern history, is not something in itself and on its own, 
but it interrelates in a fundamental way with reli-
gion, in particular the monotheistic religions that are 
intensely connected with modern history. 
In our view, the task for the 21st century is to unfold and 
‘enact’ this interrelatedness, and hence to strive for a new 
conceptualization and operationalization of what is called 
the secular. In order to succeed in this, one has to throw off 
what Welmoet Boender has baptized as the ‘burden of secu-
lar essentialism’. 
In doing so, we hope to contribute to the urgent question 
Nas’r Abu-Zayd has raised throughout his lige and work: is a 
humanistic spirituality possible, and if so, how would this 
affect Islam? 
In his brief response, Henk Manschot takes up ten Kate’s 
and Boender’s account of a reformulation of the secular 
condition by offering new ways of understanding the mono-
theistic traditions (judeo-christian and islamic), and con-
fronts this by a radically pluralistic of world views and reli-
gions, referring among others to the work of Diana Eck. 
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A: The Gnostic Temptation, the Mosaic Dis-
tinction: A Reflection on Hans Blumenberg’s 
and Jan Assmann’s Views on Monotheism 
and Secularism1 
Laurens ten Kate 
1. Preamble 
'Secular' is traditionally used as one of the central features 
of modern history and culture. This feature then refers to a 
presumed development of emancipation and liberation 
from a previous era, dominated by religion, and in particular 
by the monotheistic religions that have accompanied West-
ern views of life, of society and politics. 
Recent thinkers like Hans Blumenberg, Jan Assmann, 
Charles Taylor or Jean-Luc Nancy have nevertheless pointed 
out, in different ways, that vital elements of the 'secular' can 
be found within monotheism and in its origins. In their em-
phasis on the responsibility and freedom of humanity and, 
parallel to this, on the retreat and even 'death' of God, these 
religious traditions question the idea of a secular break-
through marking the beginning of modern times. In the fol-
lowing I will argue that in a world becoming more and more 
complex, it is important to reconsider the usefulness of the 
paradigm of secularization. Should not the relation between 
modern life and religion be conceived of in a radically dif-
ferent way, replacing the concept of the secular for new 
concepts and metaphors? 
Firstly, I will take on this difficult question by concentrating 
on the work of the German philosopher Hans Blumenberg, 
and more in particular, his account of what he names ‘the 
gnostic temptation’ that would be active in monotheistic 
religion as well as in secular modernity, leading to world-
negation as well as to its parallel: the installation of absolute 
power. Secondly, I will deepen out Blumenberg’s observa-
tions by going back to the origins of the Judeo-Christian 
experience of God; I will introduce a concept of the German 
historian of religion Jan Assmann that, as I will show, ren-
ders this God quite ambiguous: the concept of the Mosaic 
distinction. 
Since Blumenberg and Assmann limit their research to the 
Judeo-Christian tradition and how it relates to modern secu-
larization, I will finish my paper with a simple question: 
does a similar problematization hold with regard to Islam? 
Has Islam known – or does it still know – a ‘gnostic’ temp- 
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tation? Does it know an equivalent of the Mosaic distinc-
tion? And if so, what consequences could this have for a 
rethinking of the secular, and for a ‘humanistic Islam’? 
2. Blumenberg’s Warning… 
Hans Blumenberg (1920-1996) has been one of the great 
minds in the previous century when a rethinking of the rela-
tion between modern secular culture and religion is at 
stake. Blumenberg’s problem, however, is not only to re-
think that relation on a historical level, but to formulate an 
answer to the terror of absolute and totalitarian power in 
the modern era. In order to do so, in his most famous work 
The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (wriiten in 1966) he dis-
tinguishes two determining currents in the history of judeo-
christian monotheism: (1) that of respect for and devotion 
to the world as it is, and (2) that of a distancing from the 
world, and even a complete denial of it. To the first current 
belong the Jewish doctrine of creation, adopted by Christi-
anity, and the doctrine of incarnation that early Christians 
added to jewish messianism. Here God is involved in the 
world, and invites humans to relate to it, be faithful to it and 
take care of it. The second current was already quite influ-
ential in the early stages of Christianity, although it was al-
ways opposed and rejected by the official theology: gnosti-
cism. Here God has never been involved in the world, as 
Blumenbergs states, and his Son’s becoming human is just a 
story. Everything is focused on knowledge of and insight 
(gnosis) into another world of salvation and light, in order 
to partake in it and leave the evil and dark world of the here 
and now. So, affirmation and negation of the world, Weltbe-
jahung and Weltverneinung, are the two sides of monothe-
ism, and especially of Christianity. Both the Yes and the No 
to the world have launched long and strong traditions of 
spirituality and of politico-religious praxis within all three 
monotheisms: a never-ending tension determining their 
history. 
Then Blumenberg makes one more step, and a decisive one: 
he criticizes gnosticism as the “temptation” monotheism has 
never been able to liberate itself from. This, he states, be-
comes apparent in the medieval history of Chisti-anity, 
when the intimate, present, earthly God-in Christ gradually 
dissolved into in an infinitely remote , abstract and radically 
transcendent, that is absent God. This “infinitization” of God 
in medieval Christianity, which is also one of the central 
claims of Peter Sloterdijk’s recent major work Spheres, is 
according to Blumenberg the result of the Weltverlust (loss 
of the world) which gnosticism started to advocate a mil-
lennium earlier. Blumenberg’s reconstruction of late- 
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2 H. Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neu-
zeit, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1966, p. 
149. My translation. 
medieval Christianity – one of his real fields of expertise – 
goes as far as to place the clerical power and its doctrinal 
teaching, that flourished with a hierarchical, omnipotent 
and distant God to be represented and mediated by pope 
and bishops on earth, under the sign of this gnostic infiniti-
zation. On the verge of modernity, Gnosticism had actually 
won the battle… Would the modern rupture with the church 
be able to break with this temptation too? 
Unfortunately, modernity, although it is according to Blu-
menberg a completely new selfdetermination (Selbst-
behauptung) of humanity and of the world, rephrasing and 
recreating (umbesetzen) the metaphorical heritage of mono-
theism, has also failed to conquer gnosticism. Every time 
when modern history lets its central project, “to strive for 
change of the world in favour of humanity”2, evaporate into 
a new desired salvation that sacrifices political speaking and 
acting to an absolute power (whether this be religious or 
secular), the gnostic contamination is at work. According to 
Blumenberg the 20th century has more than any other 
epoch been a moment of this contamination, that, instead of 
legitimizing the modern age (title of Blumenberg’s book) 
has led to such terror that modernity has actually deligiti-
mized itself as a “project”. 
Hence, the monotheistic heritage still active in modern cul-
ture is, according to Blumenberg, sharply divided within 
itself. On the one hand, it installs absolute, transcendent 
power ruling the world while remaining outside – or rather: 
above – the world, rendering the world into an object sub-
mitted to the whims of a subject that does not belong to it. 
Here the gnostic God returns in the shape of absolute hu-
man power. The Ancien Régime in France as well as the dic-
tatorial power of the French Revolutionaries by whom it 
was eventually destroyed are just one example of this in the 
18th century. One may also mention the rise of the colonial 
and imperialist powers in the 19th century; and most and for 
all, the disastrous totalitarian experiments of the 20th cen-
tury. Furthermore, the production or constitution of mod-
ern identities like the new class of the bourgeois, who do 
not live in the world but treat the world as a free market to 
be appropriated and exploited, mirrors, in Blumenberg’s 
view, the medieval constitution of religious identities, 
founded as they are on the truths, certitudes, norms, beliefs 
and rules formulated by one omnipresent authoritative in-
stitutional context: the church.  
On the other hand, monotheism has set the stage for a very 
different type of modern politics, that in which the locus of 
power is left empty. Here Blumenberg joins quite an array 
of political thinkers of the last half century who analyze the  
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essence of democracy as the leaving open of the place of 
power and the rejection of any sovereign authority: e.g. 
Georges Bataille, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, Claude 
Lefort, Slavoj Žižek. In their works, the emphasis is not on 
identity, but on plurality, difference, and on the in-stability, 
and even the violence of political discussion and action. 
However, we are not dealing here with democracy, but with 
religion. Blumenberg’s position is so important because he 
presents the modern secular age neither as an age of 
straightforward humanism, nor as a simple continuation of 
the monotheistic configuration. Modernity is a completely 
new Yes to the world, and to a being in the world, a world in 
which neither God nor humanity occupies the centre; the 
centre is empty. Monotheism, inasfar as it opposes the gnos-
tic temptation within itself, has prepared the ground for this 
kenosis of power and of identity. Now, after the narrative 
and artistic structures of monotheism have receded from 
the public sphere, Blumenberg states, it is our task to create 
new stories, symbolizations, metaphors, even new myths 
that can articulate and ‘perform’ this fragile Yes to the 
world. 
If Blumenberg is right in stating that the emptiness of the 
centre, of the locus of power, that legitimizes the modern 
world, refers us back to monotheism, than who is the mono-
theistic God? The Jewish God of the Creation, who leaves the 
earth to the humans while himself retreating into the heav-
ens ? The Christian God who is no God at all but a humble 
human being? What about his presence? or absence? Does 
he leave the centre open? Or is he the empty centre? Pres-
ence in the world and absence from the world may well 
have to be thought in parallel fashion: what if the outside, 
the outerworldly, would be experienced as something inside 
the world, what if the innerworldly consists of its being ex-
posed to the outside? What if presence and absence would 
be entangled? And what if this entanglement of presence 
and absence, of inside and outside, would have to be called 
the “world”: the world gnosticism refuses to accept?  
Blumenberg touches upon this complex structure of the 
monotheistic legacy in modernity, but, in a minute or so, we 
shall have to continue his groundwork, go further, and in-
vestigate the ambiguities of monotheism at a more funda-
mental level. Here the German egyptologist and scholar in 
religious studies Jan Assmann – quite an influential name at 
the moment – is relevant to my line of thought. In the slip-
stream of my account of Assmann’s introduction of an im-
portant feature of monotheism, some  
 Levinas Society 
Journal of the Dutch-Flemish Levinas Society 16 (2011) 
 
70 
elements of the work of the French philosopher Jean-Luc 
Nancy will resonate as well. We will enter our dialogue with 
Assmann and Nancy in Section 3. But let me summarize first 
what we have found so far.  
Intermezzo 
Blumenberg claims that at the centre of the historical con-
figuration we call the Modern Age lies a new ‘turn towards 
the world’. This turn implies a new devotion to and a new 
responsibility of humans for the socio-political, the econom-
ical and cultural context they live in, which consists of an-
other ‘turn’, equally necessary: the turning away from medi-
eval absolute power structures, including the medieval God 
who symbolizes the top of this hierarchy. However, this 
historical analysis does by no means suggest that the Mod-
ern Age is a definitive farewell to religion proper. What in-
terests us today in his diagnosis, is his insight that the per-
sistence in modern times of absolute, transcendent power 
systems, leading to forms of terror that are unique in human 
history, demonstrates that modernity, however secular, 
however humanist it hopes to be, can only be grasped in its 
continuous interrelatedness with religion. As an example of 
this entanglement, some scholars, like the historian John 
Gray, have attempted to show that the Enlightenment and 
its ideal of continuous progress is still impregnated with a 
Christian concept of history as a lineair process towards 
salvation. 
In Blumenberg’s view, the interrelatedness we are exploring 
here has everything to do with a double modern inher-
itance: the inheritance of gnosticism and its disdain of the 
human world, and the inheritance of other currents within 
the Judeo-Christian tradition, advocating love of the human 
world as the crucial meaning of faith, and proclaiming a 
resistance against a powerful God, who, – in Christianity – 
has to become human and vulnerable. The importance of 
this double and contradictory inheritance marks modernity, 
and as such marks the secular as a phenomenon that can 
never be self-evident or founded on itself. For Blumenberg, 
it marks modernity’s fate and hope. 
If he would have been here today, he would have stated that 
‘a humanistic Islam – and a humanistic Christianity – is pos-
sible as long as they stay close to and if needed revive their 
programme of Weltbejahung and shared, pluralistic power. 
But would such an Islam be possible in the West, in modern 
culture? And what of Christianity, what of Judaism? Let us 
now involve Assmann into our discussion.  
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3 Assmann first applied this concept in his 
Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in 
Western Monotheism (Cambridge 
MA/London: Harvard University Press, 
1997), then again in Of God and Gods: 
Egypt, Israel and the Rise of Monotheism 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2008), e.g. 84-85.                  . 
4 The Hebrew word thora actually does not 
mean “law”, but rather “pointing towards”, 
“indication”; it has an aspect of promise in 
it which is covered by Martin Buber and 
Franz Rosenzweig in their German transla-
tion of the Jewish bible, Tenach: they pre-
sent the Thora as Bücher der Weisung. See 
Die fünf Bücher der Weisung (Heidelberg: 
Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1976; orig. 
1925-1928). 
5 This becomes already clear in the very 
first phrase of Genesis – the Thora’s first 
book –, where God’s initial creational act is 
described not as the creation of the world 
or the universe (as some translations have 
it), but of a distinction: “In the beginning 
God created the heavens and the earth”. 
The concept of distinguishing and separat-
ing plays an important role in the ensuing 
story of the creation in its first version, 
that of Gen. 1 and 2: 1-4. 
3. The Mosaic Distinction, the Mosaic Connection: Assmann, 
Nancy 
What is the opposite of the theological absolutism of gnosti-
cism? In my view, it is what Assmann recently has named 
the “Mosaic distinction”. In this distinction, which at the 
same time appears to be a connection, the gnostic system of 
the two opposed worlds and two opposed Gods falls apart. 
Let me briefly follow Assmann’s historical analysis first.  
Maybe the most central characteristic of monotheism, Ass-
mann states, is not the exclusive acknowledgement of just 
one single God, but precisely this “Mosaic distinction”.3 This 
distinction is twofold. 
According to Assmann, it primarily designates the discord-
ant difference between true and false religion, and between 
a true and false God. Assmann demonstrates how this dis-
tinction has turned the natural and obvious presence of re-
ligion itself into a problem. Religion had to ask for its truth 
instead of simply coinciding with it – “being” ist own truth –, 
and in this way its presence was no longer guaranteed, nor 
that of its God: their presence had to be claimed by man. 
God could equally well be absent, or even non-existant. 
This monotheistic distinction is illustrated by Assmann by 
referring to the famous first and second commandments in 
Exodus 20: 3-4: 
Thou shalt have no other gods before me. 
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image. 
Assmann steers the definition of monotheism into a new 
direction, by no longer focussing on the number of Gods 
(one, “mono-”), but on the claim that only one God among 
many should be worshiped. But this is not the aspect of the 
distinction that interests me here. 
A second feature of the monotheist distinction is touched 
upon in monotheism’s iconoclastic program. The ban on the 
representation of the divine by means of images intensifies 
the presence of God as a problem, which establishes itself 
within the “true” religion. This problem articulates the dif-
ference-in-distance between God and humans, and as such, 
monotheism breaks away from polytheism. The ban on im-
ages proclaimed in the Jewish Thora is a plea for – a hint4 at 
– distance, difference and distinction.5 Because the image 
bridges the distance by representing God, it must be de-
stroyed.  
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6 J.-L. Nancy, Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruc-
tion of Christianity, New York: Fordham 
University Press 2008 (orig. 2005). 
So the Mosaic distinction shows that the “truth” of the mon-
otheistic religions is this problem of presence and absence. 
It is played out in various opposing couples of concepts: 
divine-human, transcendent-immanent, outside-inside, Oth-
er-self, infinite-finite, et cetera. Monotheism’s claim to give 
sense to the world and to humanity derives from this com-
plex and contradictory truth. One can see the “deconstruc-
tion of monotheism” carried out by Jean-Luc Nancy as a re-
phrasing of Assmann’s distinction in these terms: the terms 
of a tension between presence and absence, and of a discus-
sion of the problem of the sense of the world. The truth of 
monotheism is hence a very modern truth: sense is never 
available, never “given”, hence never stable, never a found-
ing or grounding basis for the world. Sense is in the world – 
and not underneath it, bearing it –, and it is in the world as 
something that “happens” time and again, announcing, “as-
suring” itself and then disappearing, “withholding itself” 
again. So, following Nancy’s line of thought, from the mono-
theistic distinction, we go to its complex truth, and then to 
its modality of unstable sense – to modernity. That is the 
central movement, or rather, the “space” of the West, ana-
lyzed in the chapter “A Deconstruction of Monotheism” in 
his recent book Dis-Enclosure6: 
I will call a “deconstruction of monotheism” that in-
quiry or search consisting in disassembling and ana-
lyzing the constitutive elements of monotheism, and 
more directly of Christianity, thus of the West, in or-
der to go back to (or to advance toward) a resource 
that could form at once the buried origin and the 
imperceptible future of the world that calls itself 
“modern”. After all, “modern” signifies a world al-
ways awaiting its truth of, and as, world [sa vérité de 
monde], a world whose proper sense is not given, is 
not available, is, rather, in project or in promise, and 
perhaps beyond: a sense that consists in not being 
given, but only in being promised . . . In Christianity, 
the promise is at once already realized and yet to 
come. (But is this not a theme that runs through all 
the monotheisms?) Is such a paradoxical space not 
that in which the presence of sense is at once as-
sured, acquired, and always withheld, absented in its 
very presence? (34-35) 
Let us return to our account of the Mosaic distinction again. 
It does not simply divide two realms of being, but rather 
poses their mutual relation as a problem: as an unstable 
relation of tension and desire. The God who retreats 
fromthe world is at the same time the God who “presents”  
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7 Deut. 4:12 (New Revised Standard Ver-
sion). 
himself as such as the “absent”. As the ungraspable distant 
force the monotheistic God enforces himself onto the peo-
ple: that is the remarkable paradox in the “monotheistic 
revolution”, as Assmann calls it, expressed for instance in 
the well-known scene of Exodus 19 and 20, when God gives 
his Thora (in its concentrated form of the Ten Command-
ments) while remaining absent. Here, the God who distin-
guishes himself from the gods and humans, asserts himself 
by bringing his absence proper into presence The distinc-
tion plays itself out by blurring itself as soon as possible, 
and becoming a connection. The scene is rephrased in Deu-
teronomy 4: “Then the Lord spoke to you out of the fire. You 
heard the sound of words but saw no form; there was only a 
voice.”7 
The problem monotheism addresses and in a way enacts 
(“performs”) in its narrative, rituality, doctrine and art, is 
this impossible connection. The “living God”, as the authors 
of the Jewish bible often call Jahwe, is not the God of pres-
ence, but he who “lives” in the interval between absence and 
presence.  
How can one think and experience, how can one “live” pres-
ence as absence and the reverse? How can the monotheistic 
God be outside-in/inside-out the world at the same time? 
How can the distinction be a connection, a relation, albeit an 
impossible one? How can the impossible be a possibility? 
The instability of the Mosaic distinction, letting religion os-
cillate between distinction and connection, between its own 
destruction (“religion without God”) and construction (“re-
ligion of the without-God”), designates monotheism’s com-
plex character: that it is a constant process of self-
deconstruction. It is this self-deconstructive drive that is, in 
Nancy’s view, the unthought, unheard of, unexpected aspect 
of monotheism; and it is this aspect of monotheism that has 
persisted in a radical form in modernity. Hence, the decon-
struction of monotheism is a deconstruction of modernity. 
The modern problem of presence-in-absence should be ar-
ticulated and elucidated by applying it to the one “thing” 
modernity rejects: God. God should be grasped not as an 
identity, let alone a religious identity, nor a power; God is a 
question, that is, God contests himself, or rather, he is the 
name and the event of self-contestation.  
This would imply that, although faith seems to be ‘opposed 
to identity’, we should present the concept of religious iden-
tity as an impossible concept, as an oxymoron. It is not only, 
not simply this opposition we are dealing with here, as if 
both realms, that of faith and that identity, would have  
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nothing to do with each other; faith – at least in monotheism 
– should be defined as the contestation of identity: maybe it 
is nothing more than this contestation.  
Let me conclude that within the monotheist faith the prob-
lem of divine AND human identity is central. Monotheism is 
a religious configuration that wanders, or ‘dances’ (Nietz-
sche) around this problem. Or, to put in Blumenberg’s 
words, it is a dance around the empty centre of power: the 
the dance of democracy. 
4. Coda and Question 
However modern or postmodern we are, we are still very 
close to Moses – to his distinction, to his connection, to the 
impossibility of these two. We are still close to his strange 
God, as described in Exodus 19 and 20, a God who passes by 
“in a dense cloud” (Is he present? Is he absent?) in order to 
give to Moses his “words” (devarim) as a series of winks and 
hints rather than commandments. I quote Ex. 19 and 20: 
Then the Lord said to Moses, “I am going to come to 
you in a dense cloud” . . . Then God spoke all these 
words . . .8 
We are still close to that “thora” that announces the retreat 
of religion. Retreat of religion: for it warns us time and again 
not to believe in God, but to direct our attention to the earth, 
to the humans, that is, to love our neighbours. The famous 
announcement, in Leviticus 19: I am JAHWE your God, 
means nothing in itself: it is only filled with meaning by the 
words preceding it: love your neighbour, in this context the 
stranger, as yourself So: a religion of the retreat of religion: 
for it does not only warn us not to believe in God. It equally 
warns us not to believe in ourselves, as humans, as humani-
ty. For who are we? We are first of all strangers to ourselves. 
Maybe that is, in a very minimal way, our ‘religious identity’, 
our ‘humanist identity’… 
So, as a conclusion, let me cite Leviticus 19: 
But the stranger that dwells with you shall be unto you as 
one born among you, and you shall love him as yourself; for 
you were strangers in the land of Egypt: I am JAHWE your 
God. 
My paper has circled around one and the same particular 
question, directed to all of you, Jews, Christians, humanists, 
and most and for all Muslims and Islamic scholars: if this is 
the Jewish and Christian claim about Jahwe, rooted in their 
Holy Book, or at least, if this is one of the possible claims 
about their God, then what about Allah? Can we retrace  
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Moses’s distinction in the koran, can we follow a gnostic 
history within Islam, and if so, is that history an undercur-
rent, or is it dominant? And if Islam differs fundamentally 
from these ambiguities in the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
what then is its own unique entanglement with secular mo-
dernity? If any? I have shared these difficult questions with 
my colleague and friend of the last nine years; we have not 
solved them, maybe we did not intend to solve them. In not 
solving anything, he has taught me so much! So I now dedi-
cate them to you Nas’r, where ever you are. I remember you 
with great joy, but consider all these words as an expression 
of deep loss. 
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B: The Secular Burden in the Dutch Devel-
opment Sector 
Welmoet Boender  
A Tribute to Nasr Abu Zayd 
I feel very honored to be here today and discuss with you 
some of my thoughts and current work. As a student of Is-
lamic Studies in Leiden I was one of the first Dutch students 
of Nasr Abu Zayd in 1995. He taught us tafsir. He once told 
me how important we were for him, as his first students he 
could teach here in the Netherlands. I do not think I realized 
at that time the scope of this remark, nor what he had been 
part of. I am grateful to have known him. 
1. A Syllogism 
The point of departure of Nasr Abu Zayd’s memorial confer-
ence is the question: How can a humanistic approach to Is-
lam be realized? There are many ways to approach this 
question. Some contributors discuss this in philosophical or 
theological hermeneutic ways; others deal with it related to 
gender and human rights. But perhaps one could also read 
the question as if it asks whether a humanistic approach to 
Islam is possible? If this would be the case, I think it is also 
useful to ask the question in which conceptual framework 
does the central question of the conference become relevant? 
This would be a secular discursive framework. While 
searching for ‘humanism in Islam’, it is inevitable to also 
consider the paradigm of the secular. 
As soon as one starts to talk about humanism and Islam, a 
syllogism seems to pop up. In ‘the West’ (but also in ‘the 
Muslim world’), a clear tendency can be noticed to regard 
‘Islam’ and ‘the secular’ as two opposite forces –or at best as 
seemingly opposite. Whereas, at the same time, ‘humanism’ 
is easily connected to secularism. So, in a Socratic way, you 
would get the syllogism of: 
Islam is not secular 
Secular is humanist 
Islam is not humanist 
 
2. The End of the Secularization Thesis 
Since the late 1960s the secularization theory, in which 
modernization and secularization were seen as two sides of 
the same coin, became rooted in development thinking. De-
velopment was expected to either accelerate or coincide 
with the decline of religion (Berger 1999:1-18). However, in 
the past decades, this secularization these has been tackled, 
notably by Jurgen Habermas, José Casanova, Charles Taylor 
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1 "The entwinement of these two meanings 
of the secular created not only confusion 
on a theoretical level, it worked out that in 
the nineteenth and twentieth century 
secularism became a world view, even the 
intellectually most attractive and academi-
cally dominant worldview (Taylor 2007)" 
(Suransky and Manschot 2009: 13). 
2 See for instance Amir-Moazami 2001. 
 
and their followers. They bring up that we now live in a 
‘post-secular age’. The role of religion and religious move-
ments is difficult to ignore in the context of globalization. 
This is often referred to as ‘the resurgence of religion’ in the 
public sphere. Rosalind Hacket describes this as “the drive 
to claim recognition for, and the possibilities for implemen-
tation of religious ideas, values, practices and institutions in 
the governance of nation-states and the lives of citizens. … 
The new discursive, performative, and participative public 
space is not confined to formal institutions recognized by 
state authorities.”  
Nevertheless, the remnants of the secularization thesis are 
still visible in Western European and Dutch public debate. 
Perhaps we could call this ‘the burden of secular essential-
ism’. This does not refer to the separation between state and 
religion (secularization as differentiation, as Casanova calls 
it (1994)). It refers to the still dominant idea in public de-
bate that religion does not fit into modern society and that it 
belongs to the private sphere. In this line of thinking the 
distinction between the secular and the religious is a value-
loaded opposition, in which the secular represents the posi-
tive, and the religious the negative value (Suransky and 
Manschot 2010:13).1 The Leuven based sociologist Nadia 
Fadil explains this in her PhD thesis (2008) as follows: “In a 
secular context religious and /or secular subjectivities are 
primarily disciplined and regulated through a liberal agency 
model, while non-liberal ways of relating to the religious 
self are problematized”.  
This juxtaposition has become particularly apparent in ‘post 
9-11’ discussions about Islam, where the abovementioned 
syllogism has increasingly become ‘salonfähig’. In these de-
bates, Islam or Muslims are often depicted as a homogenous 
block. The Norwegian social scientist Christine Jacobsen 
frames this as follows: “The production of Muslim identities 
through local and global imaginaries are intimately linked 
and interlocking processes. Both are energized by cultural-
ist differentialism which construct Muslims, at the local lev-
el, as external to the Norwegian imagined community [or 
any other Western European nation-state, WB] and, at a 
global level, as external to the modern, secularized West.” 
She continues with: “A recurring question in literature on 
Muslims in Europe has been whether there is insurmounta-
ble antagonism between Islam and secular democracy” (Ja- 
cobsen 2007:163). Muslims are increasingly framed as ‘the 
Other’, external to the modern secularized West.2 This feel-
ing of ‘otherness’ is strengthened by the way young Salafi 
mark the boundaries between their lifestyles (like dress) 
and their surroundings. 
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3 Its current members are Cordaid, ICCO 
Kerk in Actie, Oikos, Seva Network Foun-
dation, Edukans, Mensen met een Missie, 
Islamic Relief Nederland, Samenwerkende 
Moslim Hulporganisa-
tions/Migrantenconsortium 
(www.religion-and-development.nl). 
4 Parallel to the founding of the Knowledge 
Centre Religion and Development, the 
Knowledge Forum Religion and Develop-
ment Policy was set up by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Minister van Ardenne) and 
several Dutch NGOs. Furthermore, Hivos 
initiated its Pluralism of Knowledge Pro-
gram in cooperation with the University 
for Humanistics and Kosmopolis. Similar 
initiatives were taken in Sweden and the 
United Kingdom.                    .  
5 Ter Haar et al 2006. 
In this politicized debates it is not only important to decon-
struct essentialist notions of Islam. It is also important to 
carefully look at the notions of secularism which are used.  
3. Deconstructing Normative Assumptions 
How to deal with the ‘burden of secular essentialism’ when 
approaching religion in general and Islam in particular? It is 
an interesting case in point to look at the Dutch develop-
ment sector.  
Once the secularisation theory no longer appeared to apply, 
the topic of religion was put back on the international de-
velopment agenda at the end of the last century. This is ex-
emplified by the establishment of the World Faiths Devel-
opment Dialogue (WFDD) in 1998. The WFDD arranged for 
dialogues between people of various religions and with in-
ternational development organizations, such as the World 
Bank and the IMF. The big question was how religion and 
development interrelate. The WFDD also wanted to know 
what impact this relationship had on development policy 
decisions and on poor communities around the world.  
In the Netherlands, several development organizations are 
engaged in the topic of religion and development. The Dutch 
development sector is indeed aware of the ‘resurgence of 
religion’. They come across it in their daily work. However, 
development agencies respond in different ways. One way 
of reacting has been the establishment of the Knowledge 
Centre Religion and Development in 2006. This is a coopera-
tion of nine faith-based NGO’s, both Christian, Hindu and 
Muslim.3 The Knowledge Centre Religion and Development 
(KCRD) aims to share knowledge and stimulate religious 
empathy, by combining practical experiences with respect 
to religion in development processes with academic reflec-
tion.4 
4. A Secular cCncept of Development 
The participants in the Knowledge Center want to reflect 
upon their own normative assumptions in their approaches 
at the development agenda. One of their starting points is 
the realization that “if you do not take into account religion 
and its dynamics, if you do not have a sensitivity towards 
religious devotion, you simply cannot understand the mech-
anisms and strategies of the social movements nor the mo-
tives of the people who are your partners in development” 
(Ter Haar et al 2006). Moreover, the participants realize 
that they often depart from a secular concept of develop-
ment.5 During a conference organized by the KCRD in 2007, 
the importance was stressed of approaching development 
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6 These organizations, which operated 
mostly in colonies at the time, were tradi-
tionally accustomed to take religion into 
consideration. However, since the second 
half of the 20th century development co-
operation has focused much less on reli-
gion. One of the factors which influenced 
these stances was the above mentioned 
‘secularization thesis’. 
as a whole instead of considering religion as a separate phe- 
nomenon in development processes. In other words, reli-
gion and spirituality should be taken into account as soon as 
a partnership is set up, whether it be for assessing situa-
tions or finding solutions to problems. This is particularly 
important when partner organizations in the South them-
selves draw attention to the importance of religion.  
What should be the consequences of this realization? The 
questions are huge among these Dutch development organi-
zations. How should development agencies deal with their 
own bias about development? What should you do with 
your secular ideals? Should you let go off your highly valued 
secular ideals, or would that mean an overreacted cultural 
relativism? What if the religious values of the partner organ-
ization do not meet the donor’s expectations about the lib-
eration of the individual towards autonomy? And what 
about your religious values as a faith-based organization 
(since, as you know, many Dutch development organiza-
tions stem from missionary work)?6 In order to discuss 
these questions, the Knowledge Center published a Practi-
tioners’ Guide. This book centers on practical experiences of 
development professionals, supplemented by theoretical 
considerations. The book does not provide cut-and-dried 
answers to questions, nor does it provide a ready-made 
approach. However, it does stimulate readers to reflect on 
the topic of ‘religion and development’. It encourages Dutch 
and other development professionals to discuss the dilem-
mas and practical accounts contained in this book in more 
detail – and to raise their own dilemmas. 
One of the responses of faith-inspired organizations like 
Cordaid and ICCO was framed in the slogan: “No outreach 
without inreach”. ‘Inreach’ stands for the reflection on your 
own identity and that of your organization. ‘Outreach’ refers 
to the attention for religion in a certain situation, communi-
ty or region. Dutch development organizations should not 
only reflect on the role of religion in non-Western societies 
where they work (‘outreach’), but they should also reflect 
on the asumptions within their own organizations and in 
the Netherlands ( ‘inreach’). Without introspection, no at-
tention can be paid to religion in projects in the South. First 
find out for yourself how you think, act and react and what 
identity your organization has. Only then can you say some-
thing about how others think, act and react or should think, 
act and react.  
In her book entitled Vision of Development Wendy Tyndale 
quotes sociologist Kurt Alan Ver Beek. Ver Beek suggests 
that many development professionals avoid the topic of 
religion out of respect for local culture and for fear of im-
posing their own views. However, Tyndale states that with- 
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holding your own view might appear to be condescending: 
you evidently consider your view superior to those of the 
other (Tyndale 2006) . In the Western world many people 
strongly believe that religion is unscientific and ultimately 
cannot be sustained from a rational point of view. This opin-
ion is constantly fed to us, either consciously or uncon-
sciously, Tyndale contends. Whether you are religious or 
not, you must be aware of your own view of the world. Only 
then can you put it aside – in any case for just a while – and 
listen with a more or less open mind to what moves the oth-
er party and what that other party considers desirable.  
5. How to Deal with Islam 
Many professionals in the development sector do depart 
from the notion of pluralism. But exactly there are fields of 
tension. Secular notions of the autonomy of the individual 
and human rights are highly valued, also among the faith-
inspired organizations who participate in the Knowledge 
Center. They are fully convinced that the implementation of 
the Universal Human Rights is very much worth striving for. 
But religions do bring in visions which can be at odds with 
these liberal visions. Moreover, development workers di-
rectly experience how the Western paradigm of the secular 
–including highly valued notions of human rights – is being 
openly challenged in post-colonial states. Particularly by 
religious actors. Some sort of confusion then might emerge: 
are ‘the secular’ and ‘the religious’ indeed ‘incongruent’ or 
are they not? The confrontation with radical forms of Islam 
makes this question more apparent –although this is not 
only the case with Islam.  
Dutch development organizations fostering democracy and 
respect for human rights in the Middle East, North Africa 
and Asia, observe a growing importance of Islamic move-
ments. They also see that it is Islamic organizations who 
reach grass roots level. Dutch NGO’s are exploring options of 
cooperation with these movements. Nevertheless, there are 
not many partnerships between Dutch development agen-
cies and Islamic NGOs in Muslim countries, yet. One expla-
nation is the fact that Muslim organizations are not the ‘nat-
ural partners’ of many Dutch organizations. Their ‘natural 
partners’ are mostly either secular or Christian organiza-
tions. So new partnerships must be made, and this takes 
time –from both sides. But it is not just a matter of time and 
energy. It is also about visions and shared aims. The trust 
given to a secular partner organization is not automatically 
extended to Islamic organizations in the same region. Just a 
quote from a Dutch development professional from IKV Pax 
Christi: “We have m 
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7 For more information about this research 
see www.mensenmeteenmissie.nl. 
ore trust that secular organizations actually want all the 
same things that we do. With Islamic organizations, that can 
be the case in part, but not concerning the whole. That blind 
faith has not yet developed.” And someone from Hivos (a 
humanist development organization): “We have come to the 
conclusion that there is a need to cooperate, or at least to 
start a dialogue with Islamic organizations. Now we must 
look if we can meet organizations, who work under the cov-
er of being Islamic, who nevertheless strive for the same 
things as we strive for: an open society, more space for the 
individual, democracy, transparent government, respecting 
human rights, respecting the position of women.”  
Research of Ward Berenschot, commissioned by the Catho-
lic development agency Mensen met een Missie, brings up 
that many Dutch organizations are reluctant to support Is-
lamic liberal NGO’s in India and Indonesia, whereas precise-
ly those organizations can make a difference there. In these 
countries Dutch NGO’s often support secular and church-
related NGO’s in fostering processes of democratization. 
Berenschot’s research shows that these organizations often 
operate in the margin. Because secular organizations refrain 
from using a religious discourse, they are no actors in the 
neither in public or even political debate. “If you want to 
support the actors who can make a difference towards a just 
society, then you should be willing to support religious or-
ganizations, liberal Islamic organizations”, Berenschot ar-
gues.7  
For us it is important to note that for Dutch donor organiza-
tions it is not an easy task to estimate who to support in a 
religiously tensed field as in Indonesia or India and to de-
cide about cooperating with Muslim partners. To under-
stand these difficulties, one must first point at the complex 
situation in the field. Second, anxieties about Islam influence 
the decision making process as well. But it is also notewor-
thy to refer to the secular framework of Dutch NGOs in 
which Islam –and religion- is being perceived. 
6. Secular Notions 
Thus, it is important for a development professional to care-
fully consider what secularism means. A development pro-
fessional should reflect upon his or her notion of ‘the secu-
lar’. To mention just two options: it differs quite a lot 
whether you use the modern paradigm 'secular' as referring 
to "the quality of the common, the public as an inclusive 
space for all citizens regardless of their religion or 
worldview" or as "the opposite of religion" (Manschot and 
Suransky 2009:13). The first could be called an inclusive  
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notion, the second an exclusive notion. Which notion one 
takes, might influence the way a development professional 
perceives ‘the religious ‘ and the views about the ‘religious 
other’ in the context of development cooperation.  
Nadia Fadil (2009) refers to secularization as an analytical 
concept and a discursive formation (Foucault): “a regime of 
truth which implies the regulation and dissemination of a 
particular understanding of religion (understood as belief) , 
the social (reified as ‘entity’) and the religious self (struc-
tured through liberal agency) through a set of discursive 
and non-discursive operations (see also Asad 2003)”. De-
velopment professionals also act and think in this secular 
discursive formation.  
While reflecting upon these conceptions, it becomes visible 
that ‘the secular’ and ‘Islam’ do not have to be incongruent. 
Secularism as a differentiation between church and state 
with its attached liberal values and emphasis on personal 
freedom and autonomy, is a virtue of modern Western soci-
ety. However, secularism is not static, nor is it an ontologi-
cally neutral terrain. Influence of religion in the public 
sphere remains, as Casanova and others have convincingly 
argued. ‘The secular’ and ‘the religious’ do not necessarily 
exclude each other. However, if a development professional 
presumes a priori that the secular excludes religion, confu-
sion occurs. 
One of the aims of the Knowledge Center Religion and De-
velopment is to encourage the reflection on these notions. 
By looking carefully at the ways ‘secularism’ (and also ‘Is-
lam’ or broader ‘religion’) are envisioned, we can try to 
avoid the trap of juxtaposing Islam and secularism, or Islam 
and humanism.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
In my presentation here, I do not want give you the impres-
sion of a sector which is in any way shortsighted about de-
velopment, religion or Islam. But I do think it is interesting 
to bring it in today, as an empirical case in which the ques-
tion of the conference becomes relevant. In response to 
Jurgen Habermas’ definition of our times as a post-secular 
age, in which we must ask ourselves if there is something as 
‘a universal truth’, and if the liberal-democratic model is 
indeed the ultimate ideology (or ‘the end of history’ as Fran-
cis Fukuyama put it), several Dutch development agencies 
ask themselves “how normative are we in our thinking 
about development.” Faith-based organizations like Cordaid, 
ICCO Kerk in Actie and Mensen met een Missie are (re)con- 
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8 And also of someone like Abdullah An-
Naim, to name someone else. 
sidering their own identity as a faith-inspired or faith-based 
organization. They realize that in their work they are very 
much defined by notions of the secular. And parallel to that, 
they are in the process of reconsidering what it means to be 
a Catholic or a Protestant organization. It helps them to crit-
ically discuss their own normative perspectives, how they 
look at development, religion and Islam while departing 
from a (liberal) secular perspective. 
It is people like Nasr Abu Zayd who can be of very much of 
help in these debates within the development sector.8 They 
try to show that Islam is dynamic and can be congruent with 
‘the secular’ –as can any religion. But that it depends on the 
way the paradigm of the secular is defined by all actors en-
gaged. 
 
Of course there is much more to say about these notions then I 
bring up in this paper. The Knowledge Centre Religion and 
Development provides a platform for these discussions and for 
publications. I welcome you to visit our website and digital 
documentation centre at www.religion-and-development.nl. 
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C: Response to Welmoet Boender and Lau-
rens ten Kate  
Henk Manschot  
I am certainly not able to do justice to the richness and 
complexity of the two presentations. Your profound philo-
sophical and reflexive introductions evoke so many ques-
tions: questions about the modern, liberal paradigm of the 
secular, about the complex, often not articulated interrelat-
edness of the secular and the religious, questions about the 
West and Non-Western Traditions and behavior and so on. 
All these questions are related to your suggestion that we 
should go beyond the liberal–secular paradigm. They ex-
press your intention to rethink the relationship between the 
secular and the religious. So let me start from here: Rethink-
ing the secular, re-imagining the secular.  
1. Rethinking the Secular 
I start by briefly recalling some of the arguments you pre-
sented in favor of rethinking the secular. These arguments 
are basically twofold: 1. We witness in our time – it is said – 
the growing presence and influence of religions worldwide 
– a phenomenon opposite to what was expected in de mod-
ern paradigm – And 2. with the advent of globalization and 
mass migrations, the multitude and diversity of religions 
has become an everyday experience. Diversity of religions 
has become a fact, a given characteristic of all societies, a 
precondition of our day to day coexistence. This condition 
forces us to rethink the dominant interpretation of the secu-
lar which ignores and even denies this new reality.  
Both Welmoet and Laurens suggest that we should disen-
gage from the idea that religions occupy only a second-class 
position with regard to public morality, they encourage us 
to disengage from this ‘burden of secular essentialism’. A 
new concept of the secular is needed, they argue. I agree 
with them. How can we deal with the growing presence and 
the diversity of religions in our daily life in such a way that 
people can live together respectfully and peacefully? That’s 
my question.  
2.  
Let us take the growing global presence of religions and 
their diversity seriously. Let me try to go deeper in this 
question. How does the fact that the growing presence of 
religious and their diversity challenge for instance the way 
the State has to deal with religions? And how does it chal-
lenge the religions and worldviews themselves and their 
faith-based civil society organizations? The Indonesian Con- 
 Levinas Society 
Journal of the Dutch-Flemish Levinas Society 16 (2011) 
 
86 
stitution offers a very interesting example of how the State 
could deal with the presence and diversity of religions in a 
positive way. Indonesia, as we all know, is a majoritarian 
Islamic nation The Indonesian Constitution provides not 
only “all persons the right to worship according to their own 
religion and belief”. It also extends official status to six faith 
traditions which are mentioned by name: Islam, Catholi-
cism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucian-
ism. These religions have official status in the public do-
main. The Indonesian policy of six constitutionally recog-
nized religions is not ideal, of course. It immediately raises 
questions about the status of non-recognized religions and 
secular world views. But the positive side is that the consti-
tution itself offers a legal basis for the existence and value of 
the diversity of religions in the public domain.  
Another example is offered by the Constitution of India 
which defines the secular attitude of the State as “paying 
equal respect to all religions” and the principle of the State 
keeping ‘equal distance’ to all religions. In both constitu-
tions religions are seen as principally valuable, as potential-
ly positive forces within society and the public domain. 
Laws and regulations are based upon this interpretation of 
the secular.  
But it is not my main intention today to focus on the State 
and its regulatory role in the public domain.  
3.  
Today I would reflect on civil society actors, in particular on 
the religious and the faith based institutions – the religious 
and the secular or humanist institutions. What kind of ques-
tions does the new historical situation, the every- day reality 
of the diversity of religions, impose on these institutions?  
My suggestion would be the following: Each religion and 
worldview is challenged to articulate what it means to be 
one religion among others. An important question which 
emerges is: What are the implications for my religion or my 
worldview, if we would no longer define the public space as 
a space which is devoid of religious expression (as the mod-
ern paradigm of the secular would proclaim) but as a space 
where different religions and worldviews can express them-
selves and have to live together in a peaceful way? What are 
the implications for religions and other worldviews if we 
define the secular in an inclusive way, instead of seeing the 
public domain and religious spaces as opposites?  
Jürgen Habermas has formulated my question as follows: In 
our society – which he qualified as the ‘post-secular society’  
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– each Religion or life stance has to embark on a learning 
process and rework its tradition by confronting itself with 
the question: what does it mean to be one religion or 
worldview among others? All philosophies of life, both secu-
lar and religious, will be required to embark on such a learn-
ing process if they wish to respond adequately to current 
developments.  
4.  
Both Welmoet and Laurens were – in my view – engaged in 
this question in different ways. They both have indeed em-
barked on a learning process.  
Welmoet by taking seriously the impact that our modern 
paradigm of the secular has on other religions and spiritual 
traditions. She encourages us to pay more attention to our 
own presuppositions in our contact with people from other 
religions and traditions. I would like to discuss further with 
her how we – in the words of Talal Asad – can “unpack – 
step by step – these assumptions”. That is not an easy task 
given the fact that many ideas and values which are central 
to our liberal-secular model, are part of our identity. Think 
of the notion of dignity of the individual, of the value of 
equality before the law, of the neutrality of the State etc. I 
fully agree that we need to articulate a careful exchange 
with other religions on all these fundamental values. Other 
religions and worldviews may have different insights. They 
might confront us with additional values, values of commu-
nity –life for instance; they might confront us with the 
vagueness of our idea of equality as purely legal and not 
social equality, with questions about the vulnerability and 
suffering of people and the obligations to deal with it. But 
does questioning our liberal secular model imply that we 
abandon it entirely? I would ask Welmoet if she could give 
us examples of the dilemma’s that she has encountered in 
her learning process. 
And Laurens ten Kate: was Laurens’s profound and subtle 
way of questioning the Christian heritage of monotheism 
not a fine example of how Christians could interpret their 
monotheism without claiming absolute truth? If I under-
stood Laurens well, he was basically saying: Monotheism 
does not mean that we know who God is, because God is 
always partly absent in his presence. In other words: Gods 
presence can never be fixed. He (‘The Thing’ ) is always be-
yond our knowledge and understanding. The Christian reli-
gious interpretation of God should be such that our 
knowledge of God is open, constantly challenged, and is one 
among others. This is a very original way of dealing with the 
idea that my interpretation of God is one among others,  
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even within my own religion. Humbleness of the believer in 
the face of truth. Have I understood you rightly?  
So in both of you I admire your Socratic critical attitude to-
wards yourself, toward your own tradition. I fully agree that 
this attitude is very important for religions in a post-secular 
society. In the best humanist traditions, Socratic Critical 
Self-understanding is the starting point of an open, mean-
ingful and respectful life.  
5.  
But I would like to provoke both of you to go one step fur-
ther.  
Are we doing enough if we question our own ideas and con-
victions about monotheism, about the liberal paradigm of 
the secular and demonstrate a willingness to reconsider 
them? Or should we go a step further when challenged by 
the aforementioned question: ‘what does it imply that I, that 
my religion or world view is one among others?’  
Professor Diana Eck, Director of the Harvard Pluralism Pro-
gram, and partner of our Kosmopolis Institute, has formu-
lated her next step in this direction.  
She says: what we need to do, is more than just 
acknowledge the plurality of religions. What we also need is 
to actively engage with the other. What we need is the cour-
age to engage with the otherness of the other. In her words: 
Pluralism is not diversity alone, but the energetic 
engagement with diversity. Pluralism is not just tol-
erance but the active seeking of understanding 
across lines of differences. Pluralism is not relativ-
ism but the encounter of commitment and dialogue. 
Practices of engagement with the other: isn’t that what a 
new paradigm of the secular would have to encourage and 
make possible if we strive for a peaceful, free and open soci-
ety in an inclusive way? Diana Eck focuses predominantly 
on differences between religions. That is certainly the most 
difficult aspect of these encounters. But here I would like to 
add: engaging with similarities and common values of reli-
gions and secular life stances is also an important aspect of 
an active engagement with ‘the other’. 
So: my final question to you and to the audience is: Would 
you agree with Diana Eck that – in our globalised society 
religions only take the diversity of religions seriously if they 
embark on a learning process of reciprocal engagement,  
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and develop from within practices and models of dialogue, 
exchange and commitment to interact with other? 
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The Teaching of Nasr Abu Zayd 
Towards a Democratization of Teaching 
Sabry Emam 
As a student of Arabic language at the faculty of literature, 
Cairo University, I have attended many lectures from Prof. 
Nasr Abu Zayd. During 4 years, from 1989 till 1993, Nasr 
taught us subjects as Rhetoric, Koran sciences, Prophetic 
hadith and translation from English to Arabic. What I want 
to testify is just the way he used to teach us. I will give some 
examples to illustrate that. But let me begin briefly with the 
“traditional” way of teaching in Egypt (at least in those 
years). 
In Egypt, the way of teaching is almost one way, not only at 
primary and secondary / high school, but also at the univer-
sity. The teacher tells the story (sometimes reading from a 
book), the students write down what the teacher says, try to 
keep it in mind and when they have an exam. They just re-
produce what they have learned. As a student you rarely 
have questions. Everything is clear.  
Moreover, the relationship between teacher en student is 
very hierarchical. The teacher knows everything, deter-
mines everything and the student accepts everything and 
has no doubt about the truth in the words of the teacher. So 
there is no reason to ask questions or to have a kind of criti-
cism. We were always thinking about the examinations and 
our results. 
Prof. Nasr said in his first lectures: “I am not going to read 
from my books. And you are not going to write down every 
word I say.” That was a shock for us, a new phenomenon. He 
said: “You are going to read and ask me if you have ques-
tions.” So that way of teaching meant that we had to be ac-
tive, we had to think and try to understand. “My lecture is 
not one way, it is an interaction, a dialogue, between me and 
you. How else can you learn, if you don’t have the chance to 
discuss and to ask questions?”  
At the beginning it was hard for us to handle this new way 
of teaching. But prof. Nasr helped us by giving an introduc-
tion to every of his lectures; just in general lines what the 
subject was about. The details that we have already read, we 
knew or we had questions about. And because we were al-
most 140 students in a, not very big classroom, the time 
wasn’t enough for all our questions. Then a new phenome-
non was born, namely walking with prof. Nasr after the lec-
ture to his room or to another  
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location if he had to give a lecture. Those moments were 
very important for me and  some others. Those were the 
moments when you had a discussion face to face with a 
teacher who always had respect for his students. I will come 
later to this point. 
That was not the only thing about the teaching of prof Nasr. 
Beside this way of teaching, there was of course the content 
of the topics he taught. And here I would like to give you 
some examples to imagine how interesting his lectures 
were, but also shocking for some students. One of the most 
important subjects was the Koran (Koranic sciences). We 
had read prof. Nasr’s book “Mafhum an-nas” (the concept of 
the text, a study in Koranic sciences). In his first lecture on 
that subject, prof. Nasr said: “Sometimes the scientific lan-
guage confronts the religious feeling. But that does not 
mean that this language does not respect the religion.” It 
was important for us as students to know that there are 
levels of using language within the religious discourse 
which are sometimes shocking the reader. When Prof. Nasr 
said that Koran has been changed to be an icon, a kind of 
decoration, a tool to get some blessing. Some students, who 
knew that it was true because they could see that at home, 
were confronted by that fact. 
Moreover, when we read that Koran is a linguistic text 
which we have to study according to the modern methods of 
literature, we were shocked. I remember that some of us 
thought that that was meaning that Koran is not divine. And 
that is an example I want to give you, how prof Nasr has 
explained that point to us. He made a comparison between 
Jesus and the Koran. According to the Islamic traditions, the 
birth of Jesus is a miracle (as part of the soul of God) but 
that does not deny his humanity. And his humanity does not 
deny the divine miracle of his birth. The same can be said 
about the Koran. It is the word of God but it is revealed in a 
human language to a human being (Mohamed). So the fact 
that Koran is a text does not mean that we deny its divine 
origin. Koran as a text has then a human side which we have 
to study to understand what de divine / God wants. That 
comparison made some of the stuff easy to follow. It is just a 
simple explanation but had a very big impact on us. As in the 
same book prof Nasr said that the concept of revelation – 
relationship between human beings and ‘ginn’ (a kind of 
spirit) – was a known phenomenon in the Arabic peninsula. 
But that does not mean that the revelation to Mohamed was 
not divine. It was no new phenomenon. Putting actions in 
their historical and cultural context does not mean that they 
are not divine. 
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Another subject which we have had from prof Nasr was the 
Prophetic Hadith. Within the framework of the subject we 
have read his book about Imam Ash-shaf‘y, It was a study to 
show how Ash-shaf’y gave the traditions of Mohamed a 
prominent place in the Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence). That 
was the reason that prof. Nasr chose this book for that sub-
ject. That year (our third year) was maybe the most im-
portant year concerning conceptual thinking. This is my 
second example to illustrate the way of prof. Nasr’s teach-
ing. 
I remember that the first lectures of prof. Nasr were about 
concepts. He wanted to make some concepts clear before we 
really could go on with the book (which was not yet pub-
lished). The concepts he explained were: Religion and reli-
gious discourse, text and interpretation, religion and belief 
etc. When we got the book, we could read it in the light of 
those concepts. And that is what I mean when I say that 
Prof. Nasr ‘s way of teaching was to prepare us to be inde-
pendent, to read and ask and more important to (be able to) 
disagree with what we read. 
One of the most important points in that context is the dif-
ferent kinds of texts. We were confronted with the fact that, 
to get progress, we have to get rid of the authority of texts. 
And again prof. Nasr explained that point to us so that we 
could go on with reading texts in another light. He said: “The 
texts I mean here are the texts of Muslim scholars who, as 
me, were men who were interpreting Koran and hadith. But 
their texts are not divine and we may and have to criticize 
and correct them. If I criticize As-shaf’y , it does not mean 
that I am better than him. I just see things different”. That 
respect to others we have learned from him.  
I will take you back to my former point, that of asking ques-
tions after lectures. As I said, we were not always able to ask 
questions during the lecture, so we walked very often with 
prof. Nasr to the room of teachers or to another location. 
What I liked about those discussions was the patience of 
prof. Nasr. He took all the time to listen to us and to answer 
us, and to give us tips to read more books or articles.  
One of those times I asked him: what is your scientific pro-
ject generally? He laughed (not sarcastic) en he said: “well, if 
you want to call it a project, then it is at -turath w at- ta’wil 
(heritage / legacy and interpretation)”. I have read most of 
the works of prof. Nasr and in all of them these two terms 
are indeed the themes of his writings. Using the most mod-
ern methods, he tried to redefine and explain the heritage 
and tried to renew our concepts. 
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Finally I want to end with some words / sentences which 
prof. Nasr often said: 
- The Islamic heritage is not one but more than one 
- We have not yet studied the Islamic legacy critically 
- If you are afraid of making mistakes, you will never 
get forward 
- Any text does not give itself an authority, that is what 
people do 
- I learn from my students 
- I work in the kitchen, my books are the meal 
And the last one: 
I AM A TEACHER OF YOUNG PEOPLE (ana mu’allemu sibya) 
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A Humanistic Interpretation of the Qur’an?1 
Peter Derkx 
The presence of great numbers of Muslims in Europe, in-
cluding The Netherlands, makes it no longer appropriate to 
view Islam as a non-Western religion. Naturally, Muslims, 
too, are people who adapt their identity and culture – in-
cluding their religion – to their circumstances, and simulta-
neously try to turn these circumstances to their advantage. 
The fact that Muslims have become ever more visible in The 
Netherlands has led to public debate on a variety of topics: 
on forms of cremation and burial, ritual slaughter, honour 
killing, headscarves, marriage migration and, at the same 
time, on more abstract questions in the background, for 
instance the separation of church and state, cultural relativ-
ism and the multicultural society.2 Over the past few years – 
and especially since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001, the appearance of Pim Fortuyn and the murder of 
Theo van Gogh – Islam itself has become subject of discus-
sion.3 Pim Fortuyn called Islam a backward religion; authors 
like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Herman Philipse, Paul Cliteur and Af-
shin Ellian opened a head-on attack on ‘the’ Islam. The fol-
lowing may serve as an example. In response to the objec-
tionable statements by Rotterdam imam Khalil el-Moumni 
on homosexuality as a pathological deviation, Cliteur, for-
mer chairman of the Dutch Humanist Association, states 
that Muslims view the revealed will of God as the fundamen-
tal touchstone of morality. He continues: by reasoning in 
rigid consistency with this starting point they arrive at the 
most abhorrent moral points of view. Thus, Cliteur states, 
they resemble Abraham, who was willing to sacrifice his son 
Isaac, because God ordered him to do so. This may be con-
sistent from El-Moumni’s point of view, but not, in my view, 
from the position of a humanist assessing El-Moumni’s 
claims. What Cliteur obviously forgets here is that a human-
ist adheres to the position that someone who thinks (s)he 
must do the will of God, is still, in fact, responsible for what 
(s)he decides to do. This is not just because humanists at-
tribute personal responsibility to all human beings, whether 
they wish to carry that responsibility or not. It is also be-
cause it is impossible to draw practical consequences from 
God’s will without being responsible, as a human being, for a 
certain image of God, a specific theory about and interpreta-
tion of divine revelation, just to mention a few points. A hu-
manist, therefore, does not accept El-Moumni hiding behind 
the will of God. El-Moumni interprets this will. He interprets 
‘the’ Islam, just as Cliteur does in his turn. Referring to the 
views of Abdoellah  
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5 Van Bommel et al. 2003: 25-48; Abu Zayd 
2004. 
6 Van Westerloo 2004. 
Haselhoef and El-Moumni about homosexuality Cliteur 
writes that they are the ‘real Muslims’. 
‘Liberal Muslims (like Professors Arkoun and Abu Zayd)’ 
are, as Cliteur believes, ‘a negligible minority …. The majori-
ty of Muslims really believes what is written in the Qur’an’.4 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali reasons along exactly the same lines in her 
open letter to Amsterdam mayor Job Cohen in Trouw of 6 
March 2004. 
How do Cliteur and Hirsi Ali know who are the real Mus-
lims? How do they know what the Qur’an really says? On 
important points, the disputes among Muslims about the 
interpretation of the Qur’an are extremely vivid.5 Quite 
haughtily, Cliteur and Hirsi Ali push problems of interpreta-
tion and hermeneutics aside. In that sense they are funda-
mentalists in their own right. In fact, they do not seem truly 
interested in a serious dialogue with Muslims, because they 
already know what ‘true’ Muslims think. They do not appear 
prepared to test their generalizations in relation to the 
views expressed by Muslims as discussion partners – or 
hardly so. They ignore publications, discussions and dis-
putes in Islamic circles about the meaning of Islam. Not only 
do they ignore the efforts and activities of many Muslim 
intellectuals, but also of organizations such as Ihsan (the 
Islamic Institute for Social Activation), the Dutch Muslim 
Women’s Organization Al Nisa and the Yoesuf Foundation. 
The developments inside the Milli Görüs organization are 
also worth noting.6 There is movement in many areas. Au-
thors like Cliteur and Hirsi Ali, as atheists, intervene in a 
debate about what is the best or most correct interpretation 
of Islam and then choose to put down Islam in its least open 
form as the real Islam. As a humanist, I do wish to take the 
discussion about the interpretation of Islam among Muslims 
seriously and in this article I will do so by responding to the 
inaugural lecture of Nasr Abu Zayd, my colleague at the Uni-
versity of Humanistic Studies, held on 27 May 2004. This 
address was titled Rethinking the Qur’an: Towards a Human-
istic Hermeneutics and focuses on the human aspect of the 
Qur’an. Abu Zayd himself writes that this text is a follow-up 
to the address delivered in Leiden on 27 November 2000, in 
acceptance of the Cleveringa chair there. This earlier lecture 
was called The Qur’an: God and Man in Communication. In 
this article I will first restate some of the important points 
from the Leiden inaugural lecture. Next, I will similarly dis-
cuss the 2004 inaugural lecture at the University of Human-
istic Studies. In my conclusion I will comment on both lec 
tures, concentrating on the relation between humanism and 
Islam. In his inaugural lectures Abu Zayd does not only 
speak of the Qur’an, but for instance also about the Sunnah  
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(the normative teachings and practices of the prophet Mu-
hammad), the Hadith (the stories ascribed to the prophet 
Muhammad), the consensus (idjmaa) among the Ulama (Is-
lamic religious scholars) and the qiyas (deductive analo-
gies). Naturally, these sources of Islam are also important 
for Qur’an interpretation, but here I will primarily focus on 
the Qur’an itself, as the source highest in authority. 
The communication between God and human beings 
In his Leiden address, Abu Zayd tells us that the word 
‘Qur’an’ derives from the verb qua’ra, to recite, to declaim 
aloud and by heart. The prophet Muhammad (appr. 570-
632)7 first received the texts of the Qur’an through commu-
nication or inspiration by the Holy Spirit, and afterwards 
recited them to his companions. They were not written 
down for a long time. Also after that, until the invention of 
book printing, the Qur’an was not normally considered a 
written text. Even in the daily life of Muslims today, it is felt 
that the Qur’an is first of all a text which is recited, sung or 
listened to. The important aesthetic and ceremonial signifi-
cance of the Qur’an is primarily bound up with being heard 
rather than read. For Muslims the Qur’an is the word of God, 
as revealed to the prophet Muhammad in clear Arabic over a 
period of 23 years. This description, uncontested among 
Muslims, has three important elements in it: the word of 
God, the Qur’an, and wahy, i.e. revelation or inspiration. It 
may look as if these three concepts are treated as synony-
mous phrases in modern Islamic speech, but in classical 
Islamic theology they differ in meaning, as the linguistic 
usage in the Qur’an reflects.  
Is the word of God the eternal and infinite content of the 
Qur’an, expressed in that text in human language, with its 
limitations and temporary nature? Or is the linguistic ex-
pression part of the word of God? To conceive of God as 
availing himself of human language calls up many difficult 
theological issues, lively debated more than a thousand 
years ago by the Mu’tazilites, the Hanbalites and the 
Ash’arites. The teachings of the Hanbalites, according to 
which both the contents and the language of the Qur’an are 
divine and eternal, have become predominant after centu-
ries of fierce debate and political conflicts in the history of 
Islam. 
Wahy refers to the vertical communication process by 
which the word of God reached mankind. According to the 
Qur’an itself, sura 42: verse 51, man can receive the word of 
God in three ways only: by inspiration (non-verbal commu-
nication); by listening in the way of Moses to God speaking 
from behind a partition such as a bramble bush or  
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8 Abu Zayd’s references to the Qur’an are to 
the chapter’s number according to the 
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using the A. Yusuf Ali translation as his 
starting point. 
a mountain; or via a messenger like the angel Djibril (Gabri-
el), who, with the consent of God, reveals what God wants 
through inspiration. In the latter manner the Qur’an was 
revealed to Muhammad. The Qur’an is the definitive confir-
mation of earlier revelations by God to mankind (particular-
ly the Jewish Tanakh and the Christian New Testament). 
Qur’an and revelation thus do not coincide. 
What does it mean that the Qur’an repeatedly emphasizes 
that it was revealed in clear Arabic? According to the Qur’an 
God chose the prophet Muhammad to communicate His 
message to his people. According to the Qur’an Islam is not a 
new religion communicated to Muhammad to preach to the 
Arabs, but it is essentially the same message preached by all 
prophets since the beginning of the world. In the Qur’an all 
prophets are considered to be Muslims. Islam is the absolute 
submission of the self to God, Lord of the universe. Repeat-
edly the Qur’an emphasizes, as in sura 2: verse 112, that: 
’whoever submits his whole self to God and is a doer of 
good, he will get his reward with his Lord; on such shall be 
no fear nor shall they grieve’; see also 5: 69.8 
Although intended for all people, the message in the Qur’an 
is expressed in the Arabic language – in a poetic variant of 
Muhammad’s own Quraish dialect, because God always 
takes into account the language of the people to whom he 
sends a messenger (sura 14: verse 4). As a matter of fact, 
not only did the Arabic of Muhammad’s time in part deter-
mine the meaning of the Qur’an, the Qur’an in turn also in 
part determined the later development of the Arabic lan-
guage. 
Following Abu Zayd we may conclude that the Qur’an is one 
of the manifestations of the word of God, revealed by inspi-
ration to the prophet Muhammad through the intervention 
of the angel Djibril. We may thus differentiate between four 
aspects of the Qur’an, i.e. its source, its content, its language 
and its structure. The divine nature of the Qur’an is limited 
to its source. The content, however, is strongly tied up with 
the language in which the Qur’an was written down and that 
language is obviously culturally and historically determined. 
If the divine content of God’s word is expressed in human 
language, then the language represents the essentially hu-
man dimension of the holy scriptures in general and the 
Qur’an in particular.  
Clearly, the structure of the Qur’an also shows a human di-
mension, according to Abu Zayd. The Qur’an was not re-
vealed to Muhammad all at once, but in parts. The various 
portions in which the Qur’an was disclosed, often corre 
spond to needs and questions in the community. ‘They are  
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asking you’ is a phrase repeatedly found in the Qur’an, for 
instance related to wine or gambling, orphan girls, dietary 
regulations and the spoils of warfare. By answering ques-
tions of this kind the legalizing aspect of the Qur’an was 
gradually phrased, with the word of God answering ques-
tions the mind of Muhammad’s contemporaries.  
Abu Zayd writes that the process of canonization of the 
Qur’an also shows evidence of human influence on the way 
in which the word of God reached, and still reaches, human-
kind. The first act of canonization of the Qur’an was the cod-
ification of the official text of the entire Qur’an during the 
reign (644 – 656) of the third Caliph, Uthman. Because in 
early Arabic script, with only consonants used, this did not 
guarantee a uniform rendition by a long shot, the missing 
vowels were added later on and consonants of (nearly) the 
same form were differentiated with the help of signs. The 
Uthmanic canonization involved another important inter-
vention. The numerous traditional fragments of the revela-
tion, big and small, were not put in chronological order, but 
combined into 114 longer or shorter parts, called suras, and 
then ordered according to their size, the longer ones first. 
The human influence which Abu Zayd implies here, was 
expressed by Leemhuis as follows:  
‘The precise reasons why certain parts were com-
bined into longer suras can no longer be traced. It is 
clear, however, that considerations of chronology, 
content or outward form (rhyme!) played a role. It 
remains unclear what ultimately determined the 
adoption of a certain part in a certain sura. In a 
number of cases it is quite probable that parts were 
inserted somewhere at random for lack of a better 
place to put them.’ 9 
As Abu Zayd writes, it is clear that this art of reorganizing 
the text partially destroys the motivation behind and histor-
ical context of each fragment of the revelation. The semantic 
structure of the Qur’an will thus lose part of its relation to 
the original reality in which it was brought forth. The origi-
nal content of the word of God in its unknown absoluteness, 
in other words, before it was expressed in Arabic, is divine 
and holy, but that does not hold true for its expression in 
language. The Qur’an which we read today cannot be identi-
cal to the eternal word of God. 
The meeting between Muhammad and the angel Djibril in 
which (from a chronological perspective) the first five vers-
es of the Qur’an (96: 1-5) were revealed, is the model of 
communication between man and God, a model also incur-
porated in various rituals. In the meeting mentioned Mu- 
 Levinas Society 
Journal of the Dutch-Flemish Levinas Society 16 (2011) 
 
99 
hammad is ordered by Djibril to recite, but it is not clear at 
first what he must recite. Eventually, Muhammad under-
stands that he must recite what the angel passes on to him. 
Next it becomes clear to him that recitation in the name of 
God is most important of all. The mysterious content which 
he is to recite – inspired by God through Djibril – remains 
implicit until he is reciting it. Only the voice of Muhammad, 
after he was spoken to or inspired, turns recognizable and 
explicit in human language. Through the human activity of 
the recital the word of God is humanized. In the inspired 
recitation Muhammad finds himself in the existential sphere 
between God and man. Entering this sphere and remaining 
there is a time-bound activity, in which the meeting of God 
and man has a beginning and an ending. Wahy thus implies 
a time-bound communication process between God and 
man in which only the voice of a human being externalizes 
God’s word and makes it explicit. 
Something similar is also true for a Muslim who recites the 
Qur’an in an inspired mood, speaking from the heart. One of 
the five religious duties of any Muslim is the ritual prayer 
session (salah), which has to be undertaken five times a day, 
preferably in a group. Reciting the Qur’an is the heart of the 
salah. The salah can be seen as a daily communication chan-
nel between the believer and God, parallel to the one be-
tween Muhammad and God through which the Qur’an was 
disclosed. This is the more acceptable if we take into ac-
count that the first meeting between Muhammad, Djibril 
and God was not just a matter of recitation but also of listen-
ing. Before reciting, Muhammad was ordered to listen with 
care. In Muslim prayer, the reciting of the Qur’an must be 
matched with careful listening to what is being recited and 
what is revealed in it. For this reason, the Qur’an must be 
recited in a voice that is neither too soft nor too loud. If too 
loud, this would harm the listening aspect. 
Reciting and listening to the Qur’an do not only play a role 
in the salah, but also in the Hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca), 
during the Ramadan (the yearly month of fasting), in the 
obligatory weekly Friday prayers and in numerous situa-
tions in daily life, such as birth, marriage and death, in 
greetings, in calling out the name of a deceased person, in 
hushing a crying child, at the beginning and end of meals, a 
journey or whatsoever else. In this way reciting the Qur’an 
represents an atmosphere of communication between God 
and human being for each single Muslim, each Muslim 
community and the whole Muslim world. Formulae and 
phrases from the Qur’an thus make out a natural part of the 
daily life and speech of Muslims throughout the world. 
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tion in interpreting the Qur’an is ‘whether 
an ideal status quo had already been 
reached at the time of the prophet or 
whether the Qur’an and the practical exam-
ple of the prophet only indicated a direction, 
as it were, on a road which must be trav-
elled by all succeeding generations.’ (Abdel-
lah e.a. 2004: 2) It is clear that Abu Zayd’s 
view accords more with the latter option.  
According to Abu Zayd, the vision of the Qur’an which is 
dominant in the entire Muslim world is the following – an-
dZayd states emphatically that by this he does not imply the 
views of radical Islaimsts, but the generally accepted views 
among Muslims: 
’As a word from God, the Qur’an is the foundation of 
the Muslim life. It provides to him the way to fulfil-
ment in the world beyond and to happiness in the 
present one. There is for him no situation imagina-
ble for which it does not afford guidance, a problem 
for which it does not have a solution. It is the ulti-
mate source of all truth, the final vindication of all 
right, the primary criterion of all values, and the 
original basis of all authority. Both public and pri-
vate affairs, religious and secular, fall under its ju-
risdiction’.10 
This dominant view is probably one of the most important 
causes of the polarized conflict which we are watching in 
the entire Muslim World today. Secularists, following the 
blueprint of Western points of view, propagate the absolute 
separation of Islam from the greater world, Islamists try to 
indoctrinate a badly informed population with slogans such 
as ‘Islam is the solution’ and ‘Islam is scientifically superior’. 
In an ideological framework of this kind it is impossible to 
think rationally or act reasonably.  
What the Qur’an represents for Muslims, so Abu Zayd, is 
neither the islamization of life as a whole, nor the absolute 
separation of religion from life. The separation of religion 
and state is essential, but that does not mean that religion 
only plays a secondary role in social life. The Qur’an as a 
mode of communication between God and human being 
teaches us something – so Abu Zayd – beyond ‘laws’ and 
‘politics’ in the narrow sense of the words. If we interpret 
the Qur’an literally and canonize the Arabic words in which 
it was revealed, says Abu Zayd, we lock up the word of God 
in the historical moment in which it was announced. Such a 
position induces us to restrict the Qur’an to the first phase 
of its historical construction, whereas we should be con-
scious of the dynamics and the way in which the Qur’an has 
been able to shape the life of Muslims.11 An awareness of the 
essentially historical character of all religious language can 
protect us from total immersion in that language against 
indoctrination and the loss of our human identity. On the 
other hand we need to understand that we do not hold our 
identity as human beings in our own, autonomous hands, or 
that this identity is fully detached from other forms of life on 
earth or in the universe. Our identity as human beings is 
divine, as much as the fact that  
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12 In his lecture Abu Zayd is not too con-
sistent in his use of the word ‘discourse’, 
which plays such an important role in his 
argumentation. The central element in its 
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oral) discussion’, between different parties 
and so multi-interpretable. The nature of 
the discussion may range from a friendly 
conversation to a verbal political dispute. 
the Divine identity is made human by our observation of it. 
The Qur’an model outlined by Abu Zayd of the meeting be-
tween God and man is well-presented, he says, in the philo-
phico-mystical system of the great Andalusian mystic Ibn al-
Arabi who lifed from 1165 to 1240. 
The communication between human beings about the word of 
God 
In his inaugural lecture at the University for Humanistic 
Studies Abu Zayd, as he himself writes, develops the human 
aspect of the Qur’an one step further. He now focuses in 
more depth on what he calls the human aspect of the hori-
zontal dimension of the Qur’an. With ‘the horizontal dimen-
sion of the Qur’an’ he does not only refer to the gradual 
preaching of the Qur’an’s message by Muhammad, the can-
onization of the Qur’an or the dissemination of its message 
by means of the corpus of interpretational literature. Abu 
Zayd implies here the horizontal dimension embedded in 
the structure of the Qur’an itself, appearing in all clarity 
during the process in which the Qur’an was revealed. We 
can only become aware of this horizontal dimension if we 
change the frame of reference for interpreting the Qur’an 
and no longer see the Qur’an as a closed written ‘text’ but as 
living ‘discourse’, a ‘discussion’.12 It increases the possibili-
ties of interpretation and re-interpretation if, under the in-
fluence of a literary approach, we view the Qur’an as an au-
tonomous text, but it also makes it possible for it to be ma-
nipulated in its meaning and structure.  
Recently, Abu Zayd writes, I started to realize how the view 
of the Qur’an as a text reduces its status and denies the fact 
that the Qur’an today still functions as a ‘discussion’, an ‘ex-
change of thoughts’. The Qur’an as written text has an 
enormous influence on Islamic views and cultures, but if we 
cast our eyes, not on the elite, but on the masses, it is rather 
the recited Qur’an, and the one listened to, the Qur’an as 
‘discussion’ or ‘discussions’ which plays the determining 
role in culture and public life. To arrive at a democratic, 
humanistic hermeneutics it is not enough that intellectuals, 
in debate amongst themselves, place passages of the Qur’an 
in their historical context again and then interpret them in 
the context of today. Because the Qur’an is closely associat-
ed with the ‘meaning of life’ of millions of people, it is im-
portant to return the power over the meaning of the Qur’an 
to the community of believers, the Ummah. The diversity of 
religious meanings is part of our human diversity. To link 
the Qur’an once again to existential questions it is necessary 
to take it anew for what it is, a continuing conversation, a 
body of dialogues and debates, of addition, acceptance and  
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rejection, not just of pre-Islamic norms, practices and cul-
tures, but also of preliminary judgments, presuppositions, 
claims, etc. Islamic legal experts who rely on the hermeneu-
tic principle that later revelations nullify earlier ones, do not 
understand mutually conflicting stipulations in the Qur’an 
can be a positive phenomenon, a diversity which must be 
kept open as a body of options for the community of believ-
ers confronted with an ever changing social order. Theolo-
gians and philosophers, too, with their dichotomy of clear 
versus ambiguous passages in the Qur’an, with the former 
taking priority over the latter, have no eye for democratic 
diversity and openness. They think that it is clear without 
discussion which are the transparent passages and which 
the opaque, but above all they assume that there can only be 
a single interpretation which is the right one for all times 
and places. 
The Qur’an recited in the liturgy, in daily life, in social, polit-
ical or moral disputes, brings with it a certain interpretation 
reflected in the way it is intonated and applied. The Qur’an 
is a living phenomenon, much like the music played by an 
orchestra. The text determined by canonization is like a 
silent musical score, and no more. To pretend as if this 
equals the music of the Qur’an is manipulation and abuse of 
power. The Qur’an must be brought to life. In the eyes of 
Abu Zayd, the hermeneutics of Ibn al-Arabi and other Sufis 
would appear to offer the best point of departure for an 
open, democratic hermeneutics in Islamic culture. The Sufis 
assume that the Qur’an has different levels of meaning; lev-
els which refer to one another and are not mutually conflict-
ing. Moreover, the Sufis’ hermeneutics keeps the Qur’an 
accessible for all believers, regardless of their education and 
intellectual powers. 
According to Abu Zayd large parts of the Qur’an are reflec-
tions and even fragments of discussions, negotiations and 
conflicts such as took place in Muhammad’s time between 
Muslims among themselves, between Muslims and Arabic 
polytheists and between Muslims and other monotheists 
(Arabic Jews and Christians). These discussions, negotia-
tions and conflicts are partly described in detail in the 
Qur’an and partly left implicit. For a good interpretation of 
the Qur’an it is thus not only necessary to give meaning to 
the text in the context of other Qur’an passages but also in 
the context of historical circumstances and developments 
which are not described in the Qur’an but which are still 
organically a part of the book. Furthermore, Abu Zayd states 
that it is self-evident in his view that recommendations or 
stipulations from the Qur’an, which served as input to a dis-
cussion, negotiation or conflict in the patriarchal Arab cul- 
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13 Cf. a few interesting passages in Abu 
Zayd & Nelson 2004: 60 and 100. 
14 Abu Zayd 2004: 27, 36, 45, 47, 48, 50, 57 
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Abu Zayd finds himself in the company of 
predecessors like Shah Wali Allah, Refa’a 
Rafi’ al-Tahtawi, Sayyid Ahmad Khan and 
Muhammad Abdu. Also cf. Abu Zayd 1996: 
51. 
15 Abu Zayd 2004: 58. 
ture of the 7th century need not always be maintained in a 
(late) modern environment. The Qur’an in itself contains 
diverging clues and suggestions, which reflect the various 
contexts in which it came into existence. In addition, there is 
something else of importance. In the 7th century there were 
historical developments which the Qur’an responds to, but 
time has not stopped since then. The Qur’an, in part, pro-
vides answers to questions of people from the 7th century, 
but readers from the 21st century do not live out of time or 
context either. The Qur’an can be of much significance in 
modern days, in a society in which the state and organiza-
tions embodying worldviews are strictly separated but then 
it must be read with (late) modern people in mind13. For 
(late) modern persons reading the Qur’an it is important to 
solve problems of interpretation by themselves through 
ijtihad (personal efforts and independent rational judg-
ment). This fully legitimate practice from the first centuries 
of Islam ought to be restored. It is disgraceful, so Abu Zayd, 
to claim that there was enough reflection by wise Muslims 
in the past, making it unnecessary to undertake this today.14 
Important starting point in all of this should be, and here 
Abu Zayd follows Muhammad Abdu, that the Qur’an is not a 
history book, nor a work of science, nor a political hand-
book, but a book which points out a spiritual and moral di-
rection to people.15 
A humanistic hermeneutics?  
Abu Zayd subtitled his inaugural lecture at the University of 
Humanistic Studies: Towards a Humanistic Hermeneutics. Is 
it justified to call the manner of interpreting outlined here 
humanistic? Abu Zayd’s reflection on the interpretation of 
the Qur’an brings the human aspect to the forefront and in 
that sense we have an undeniable case of humanistic her-
meneutics here. When Abu Zayd points out the human as-
pect, he does so primarily as a scientist, as a scholar trying 
to achieve objectivity. If we think reasonably about the 
Qur’an and how it should be interpreted, it is impossible to 
avoid the conclusion that there are a number of human as-
pects to it. Because the Qur’an, through centuries of Islamic 
tradition, attained such an unassailable, absolute and divine 
status for many Muslims that the idea never aris es that they 
might critically reflect on it, it is important that these human 
aspects of the Qur’an are emphasized and made visible. That 
Abu Zayd does just that, does not make him the lesser Mus-
lim. He uses arguments which must appeal to any right-
minded person striving for the truth and in this he harks 
back to important Islamic thinkers. These are first of all phi-
losophers of the first ages of Islam, before the Hanbalistic 
vision on the Qur’an had become the overriding tradition,  
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and on the other hand scholars from the Islamic reform 
movements which developed from the 18th century on-
wards. The human aspect which Abu Zayd points out con-
verges in the insight that all meaning attached by Muslims 
to (passages from) the Qur’an in past and present results 
from human interpretation (tafseer, ta’weel). Interpretation 
is inevitable and therefore hermeneutics (the theory and 
practice of interpretation) cannot but be important. Mus-
lims who claim to have direct acces to the truth embeddedin 
the Qur’an and categorically deny that they interpret the 
Qur’an, evidently do not feel the need for hermeneutics.16 
Taken in this sense, ‘humanistic hermeneutics’ is a pleo-
nasm. 
There is not a single finding in the Qur’an with a unique and 
transparent meaning disengaged from human interpreta-
tion. For the Arabic sentences in the Qur’an, too, the insight 
from general linguistics holds true that no single linguistic 
utterance taken by itself has only one unique meaning. Con-
text decides which interpretation is adequate. This brings us 
to a second important scientific insight valid for the inter-
pretation of texts, be it Medea, the Bible, the Qur’an, King 
Lear or The Pickwick Papers. A text (passage) can only be 
interpreted correctly if its context is taken into account. Any 
text passage must be interpreted in the light of the text sur-
rounding it and ultimately of the text as a whole. But there 
are many other types of context. A text can only be inter-
preted well if the reader or listener knows the language in 
which it is spoken or written (or translated). This is self-
evident. But as Renaissance humanist Lorenzo Valla already 
emphasized, language is also liable to change. The context of 
a text also entails that the reader or listener has knowledge 
of the language as it was used at the moment that text was 
originally created. A correct interpretation of a text, howev-
er, does not only take into account the context of the text as 
it was produced at one time, but also the context in which 
the text is recited, read or listened to. The language of the 
listener or reader can be very different from the language of 
the original speaker or writer, even if both have a good 
command of what is termed ‘the same’ language. The lan 
guage of Shakespeare (15th/16th century) is very different 
from the language of Jane Austen (19th century), which 
again differs from the English of Iris Murdoch (20th century). 
Interpretation not only fails if the language of the original 
text is not known, but also if there is insufficient command 
of the language of the reader or listener. Added to this is the 
fact that it is not enough for a proper understanding of the 
text just to know the linguistic context. This element again 
calls forth a whole series of other contexts. Language is used 
to communicate about mankind, society, culture and the  
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than an aside, but the central claim made 
by Abu Zayd in his inaugural lecture is that 
it is important for a good understanding of 
the Qur’an that it is not to be taken as 
‘nothing but a text’ nor that it is enough to 
understand the text in its context. Accord-
ing to Abu Zayd it is essential to interpret 
the Qur’an as discourse, a discussion. In the 
end I do not understand this claim and so 
cannot agree with it. I can, however, agree 
to the idea – and maybe this is what he 
intends – that for a correct understanding 
it is essential to take the context seriously 
in all the meanings of that term. This im-
plies that one should not lose from sight 
that text passages in the Qur’an were, and 
are, very often part of a discussion in a 
historical setting.                   . 
18 Cf. Waardenburg 2002: 130 
 
world and without knowledge of the extra-linguistic context 
of both the text itself and of the one who produced or pro-
duces the text and the one who listens to the text or reads it, 
interpretation often goes astray. An important claim of Abu 
Zayd is that the Qur’an at the time of the prophet Muham-
mad played its role in the midst of discussions, negotiations 
and conflicts as they unfolded over a period of more than 20 
years and that the Qur’an, again and again, (received and) 
receives its meaning for listeners and readers in the context 
of discussions, negotiations and conflicts in which they 
(were and) are involved. The Qur’an is not a text in isolation 
but a text enclosed, then and now, in a dynamic world in 
which it may have great significance for humans.17  
The fact that the meaning of a Qur’an passage is always a 
matter of human interpretation, and that knowledge of the 
context, in its many senses, is required for a proper inter-
pretation, also makes it clear that Muslims and Islamic au-
thorities who evoke the Qur’an and Allah as legitimization of 
their views and actions, still have to justify themselves to-
wards their fellow human beings. The more violence is used 
by a group of people to keep the meaning of the Qur’an out-
side the realm of discussion, the more it looks as if that 
group wishes to appropriate the authority of Allah and to 
use the Qur’an for private human interests. In this light I 
understand Abu Zayd’s remark, that the Qur’an is about the 
‘meaning of life’ for millions of people and that it is there-
fore important to give the power over the meaning of the 
Qur’an back to the community of believers and to see the 
diversity of religious meanings in the Qur’an as part of our 
human diversity. This diversity does not pose a threat, but 
rather harbours a great value in an ever changing world. 
The position chosen – also appearing from other remarks 
made by Abu Zayd – can be called humanistic, because it 
emphasizes the unity of mankind and the solidarity of all 
people as equals. It can be taken as a position of resistance 
against elitist, undemocratic claims to power and as a stand 
for the human dignity of all people18.  
Because the human character of each interpretation is ar-
gued with the help of strong and valid reasoning we can 
speak of a humanistic hermeneutics and a humanistic Islam 
here in a deeply fundamental sense. However, it is a good 
idea not just to look at similarities, but also at the differ-
ences between the group of people who explicitly call them-
selves ‘humanists’ and those who call themselves ‘Muslims’. 
An important point in the Qur’an is the way in which the 
person of Jesus of Nazareth (Isa) is discussed. Abu Zayd fo-
cuses on this figure with some emphasis. It is quite remark-
able that Ibrahim (Abraham), Musa (Moses) and Isa are 
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address at the University of Humanistic 
Studies, on 28 May 2004, he confirmed 
this, as far as I have gathered. See also 
section 1. 2-1 of his Leiden inaugural lec-
ture: ‘The Qur’an is the Word of God. About 
this doctrine there has never been disa-
greement among Muslims throughout the 
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21 Cf. e.g. Leo Polak in a radio speech of 
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and reality, valid for all – to the light of 
eternity within you, one in us all – to the 
universal, the truly catholic, that is to say 
absolutely valid, not merely roman, or 
jewish, or protestant, or muslim, but hu-
man ratio and reason, to universal, not 
merely roman, or jewish, or protestant, or 
muslim love and justice.’ (Polak 1947: 107). 
important prophets according to the Qur’an, bearers of a 
word of God, predecessors to Muhammad. Muslims and hu-
manists seem to be able to agree on the status of Jesus19.  
Both for Muslims and for many humanists Jesus of Nazareth 
was an exceptionally exemplary man, but he remains a hu-
man being who must not be deified and who is thus imper-
fect and mortal. For both Muslims and humanists Jesus is 
not God nor the son of God. Of course, it is easier for Mus-
lims than it is for Christians to reject the divine status of 
Jesus, but Muhammad, too, remains a human being in the 
Qur’an. In practice the status of Muhammad is so high and  
unimpeachable that he approaches the divine status, but the 
Qur’an is clear in stating that Muhammad is a human being 
who makes mistakes (Sura 80: verses 1-10) and his mortali-
ty is certain. Different from the case of Jesus there is no 
mention of a rising from the dead or resurrection of Mu-
hammad (other than the rising from the grave of all dead 
people on Judgment Day).  
But what do humanists think of Muhammad as the ‘messen-
ger of God’ and about the Qur’an as the ‘word of God’? In 
section 4 of his inaugural lecture at the University of Hu-
manistic Studies Abu Zayd writes that there is no discussion 
about the fact that the Qur’an is the ‘speech of God’. I will 
assume that Abu Zayd, in his writings about Islam, is so used 
to addressing an audience of Muslims (or of religious schol-
ars who empathize with Muslims) that this must be a ‘slip of 
the keyboard’20. There are around one billion Muslims and 
that is a great many, but there are even more people who 
are no Muslims and for whom the Qur’an is only ‘the word 
of God’ inasmuch as they put themselves in the position of a 
Muslim. Here we encounter a difference between many of 
the people in The Netherlands in 2005 who call themselves 
‘humanists’ and those who call themselves Muslims. For 
humanists the main point is what is human and common to 
us all; particular worldviews come second place.21 Many 
humanists know that God is very important, if not the most 
important aspect in life for a Muslim, but they have no idea 
of what further to imagine with regard to God. We have seen 
earlier that the message of Islam is basically the same as the 
one preached by all prophets since the world’s beginning, 
that the Qur’an views all prophets as Muslims, that Islam is 
the total submission of the self to God and that the Qur’an 
reads that ’whoever submits his whole self to God and is a 
doer of good, he will get his reward with his Lord; on such 
shall be no fear nor shall they grieve’ (2: 112). The absolute 
submission of the self to good and doing what is good in the 
conviction that this is ultimately what is best for all people:  
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Utrecht inaugural address. 
all of this is endorsed by many humanists as much as by 
Muslims. What is different then, if God is added? That is 
what many humanists fail to understand. In a dialogue on 
the philosophy of life between Muslims and humanists this 
question is one of the most important ones for many hu-
manists.  
A lot of people in The Netherlands calling themselves hu-
manists are atheists in the sense that they do not take the 
existence of a ‘God’ into consideration in the daily practice 
of their lives, inasmuch as they understand what is meant by 
that expression (which is often not that much). But at the 
same time these humanists mostly attempt to strive to be 
good towards themselves and others, and to live morally 
responsible lives, for example by acting justly.  
Both the words of Abu Zayd and various passages in the 
Qur’an make me wonder what the Qur’an means by the 
term ‘unbelievers’. The fate held out as prospect to ‘unbe-
lievers’ is dreadful, but who are the ‘unbelievers’? On the 
one hand there are no passages in the Qur’an – as far as I 
know – which make clear that, by the term ‘unbelievers’, 
atheists in the modern sense are intended. They did not 
seem to exist in 7th century Arabia. When the Qur’an speaks 
of ‘unbelievers’, usually polytheists are meant, and some-
times monotheists of other faiths, for instance Christians 
who believe Jesus to be (the son of) God22. On the other 
hand it is quite dramatic how often ‘believing’ and ‘doing 
right’ are found together in the Qur’an. So often in fact that 
they appear to be almost the same. In Sura 5: verse 85 God’s 
reward is mentioned for believers who do good: eternally to 
reside in gardens underneath which rivers flow. How then, 
according to the Qur’an, ought the attitude of Muslims to be 
versus humanists who do not understand what is meant by 
‘God’, but who, in the practice of their daily lives, truly do 
their utmost to do good? 
 
References 
 Abdellah, Marzouk Aulad, Ahmed El Baghdadi, Nedim 
Bahçekapili e.a., Tussen Mekka en Rotterdam: van profe-
tische traditie naar het leven van hedendaagse moslim-
meiden (Schiedam, Stichting Islamitische Universiteit 
van Europa, 2004). (Between Mekkah and Rotterdam: 
from prophetic tradition to the lives of Muslim girls of 
today) 
 Abu Zaid, Nasr & Esther R. Nelson, Voice of an Exile: 
Reflections on Islam. (Westport, 2004)  
 Levinas Society 
Journal of the Dutch-Flemish Levinas Society 16 (2011) 
 
108 
 Abu Zayd, Nasr Hamid., Vernieuwing in het islamitisch 
denken: een wetenschappelijke benadering  (Amsterdam, 
1996) (Renewal in Islamic thinking: a scientific ap-
proach) 
 Abu Zayd, Nasr, The Qur'an: God and Man in Communi-
cation (Leiden, Faculteit der Letteren, 2000) 
http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/forum/01_1/onderzoek/l
ecture.pdf 
 Abu Zayd, Nasr, Rethinking the Qur'ân: Towards a Hu-
manistic Hermeneutics (Amsterdam, 2004) 
 Bommel, Abdulwahid van, Joep Avezaat, Sezai Aydo-
gan e.a., Wankele waarden: levenskwesties van moslims 
belicht voor professionals. Redactie Rekha Ramsaran & 
Bregje Spaans (Utrecht, 2003) (Unstable values: existen-
tial issues of Muslims illuminated for professionals) 
 Cliteur, Paul, Moderne Papoea's: dilemma's van een 
multiculturele samenleving (Amsterdam, 2002). (Modern 
Papuas: Dilemmas of a multicultural society) 
 Derkx, Peter, De multiculturele samenleving: een hu-
manistisch ideaal (Amsterdam, 2004) (The multicultural 
society: A humanistic ideal) 
 Fortuyn, Pim & Abdullah R. F. Haselhoef, De islamise-
ring van onze cultuur: Nederlandse identiteit als funda-
ment. Met een kritische reactie van imam Abdullah R. F. 
Haselhoef  (Uithoorn, 2001) (The islamization of our cul-
ture: Dutch identity as foundation. With a critical reac-
tion by Imam Abdullah R.F. Haselhoef) 
 Hirsi Ali, Ayaan, ‘Open brief aan burgemeester Job Co-
hen’, Trouw, 6 maart 2004, 37. (‘Open letter to Amster-
dam Mayor Job Cohen’) 
 Leemhuis, Fred., ‘Koran’, in Jacques Waardenburg, 
red., Islam: norm, ideaal en werkelijkheid. (Houten, 2000, 
vijfde, herziene en aangevulde druk), 54-74. (‘Qur’an’ in 
Islam: norm, ideal and reality) 
 Polak, Leo, ‘Eenheid boven geloofsverdeeldheid’, in 
Verspreide geschriften: Deel I. (Amsterdam, 1947), 101-
126.  (‘Unity over disparity in faith’ in Scattered writings, 
Vol. I) 
 Pos, H. J, ‘Personalisme en humanisme’, Het Keerpunt: 
Internationaal Personalistisch Tijdschrift 1, nr. 8 (sep-
tember), 472-483. (‘Personalism and humanism’) 
 Waardenburg, Jacques, ‘Are There Hermeneutic Prin-
ciples in Islam?’in Islam: Historical, Social, and Political 
Perspectives. (Berlin, 2002), 111-133. 
 Levinas Society 
Journal of the Dutch-Flemish Levinas Society 16 (2011) 
 
109 
 Westerloo, Gerard van, ‘Revolutie bij de zwartekou-
senmoslims. M - het maandblad van NRC Handelsblad 
(februari 2004), 10-25. (‘Revolution among rigidly or-
thodox Muslims’ In M – NRC Handelsblad’s monthly 
magazine) 
  
 Levinas Society 
Journal of the Dutch-Flemish Levinas Society 16 (2011) 
 
110 
Journal of the Dutch- 
Flemish Levinas Society 
Mededelingen van de  
Levinas Studiekring 
 
XVI, december 2011 
 
ISSN 1385-4739 
1 This is the re-edited text of Nasr Abu 
Zayd’s inaugural lecture, addressed 27 May 
2004, on the occasion of his accepting the 
Ibn Rushd chair of Humanism and Islam at 
the University of Humanistic Studies in 
Utrecht, The Netherlands. This inaugural 
lecture was originally published with SWP-
book in Amsterdam, and re-published here 
with the kind permission of SWPbook. The 
editors would like to express their gratitu-
de to Peter Derkx and Abdelilah Ljamai for 
their help revising and editing this text. 
Rethinking the Qur’ân: Towards a Human-
istic Hermeneutics1  
Nasr Abû Zayd 
 
Introduction 
The world has already become, whether for good or for bad, 
one small village in which no independent closed culture, if 
there is any, can survive. Cultures have to negotiate, to give 
and take, to borrow and deliver, a phenomenon that is not 
new or invented in the modern context of globalization. The 
history of the world culture tells us that the wave of civiliza-
tion was probably born somewhere around the basin of 
rivers, probably in black Africa, Egypt or Iraq, before it 
moved to Greece, then returned to the Middle East in the 
form of Hellenism. With the advent of Islam, a new culture 
emerged absorbing and reconstructing the Hellenistic as 
well as the Indian and Iranian cultural elements before it 
was handed to the Western New World via Spain and Sicily.  
Shall I mention here the name of the Muslim philosopher 
Ibn Rushd, known as Averroes in the Latin environment and 
the importance of his writings in constructing synthesis of 
both the Aristotelian and the Islamic legacies, thus, transfus-
ing new intellectual light to the European dark ages?  
I would like to take the opportunity to express my gratitude 
to the Humanist Foundation 'Socrates', the Humanist Devel-
opment Organization, HIVOS, and the Board of Governors of 
the University of Humanistics for the very significant initia-
tive to establish an Academic Chair for Islam and Humanism 
in the Arabic name 'Ibn Rushd' instead of the Latin Aver-
roes. I am so honored to be the first scholar to occupy the 
Chair, and in the vein of Ibn Rushd's thought I hope not only 
to present my lecture today, but more to contribute to the 
process of building solid bridges between Islam and Human-
ism. 
Why is it now so vital for Muslims to rethink the Qur'ân? 
Besides the present context of Western Islamophobia, espe-
cially after the trauma of September 11th and the aftermath 
terrorism operations everywhere in the Muslim as well as 
the non-Muslim World, which reduced Islam to be radical, 
violent and exclusive, one should emphasize the importance 
of this invitation to 'rethink the Qur'ân' for Muslims in gen-
eral, and for Muslims living in Europe in particular. I am not 
here claiming any missionary task to formulate a specific 
Islam, but rather situating my hermeneutical position. The 
process of 'rethinking tradition' as well as negotiating the 
'meaning' of the Qur'ân in the Muslim World has been, how- 
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ever, an ongoing development since the eighteenth century. 
I would like to argue not only for the continuation of this 
process of rethinking but for moving it further toward a 
constructive method for Muslims, wherever they are, to be 
actively engaged in formulating the 'meaning of life' in the 
world in which they live.  
In the year 2000 I was honored with the Cleveringa rotated 
Chair of Law, Freedom and Responsibility, especially Free-
dom of Religion and Conscience by the Chair's curatorium at 
the University of Leiden. In my inaugural lecture on Monday 
27 November 2000, exactly three and a half years ago, I pre-
sented the concept of the Qur'ân as a space of Divine and 
Human Communication. Under the title 'The Qur'ân: God 
and Man in Communication', I attempted a rereading, and 
therefore re-interpretation, of some basic principal assump-
tions contained in the classical disciplines, known as 'the 
sciences of the Qur'ân', `ulûm al-Qur’ân in Arabic, especially 
those sciences which deal with the nature of the Qur'ân, its 
history and its structure.  
In such rereading, and re-interpretation, I employed some 
methodological apparatus, such as semantics, semiotics as 
well as historical criticism and hermeneutics that are not 
generally applied, nor appreciated, in the traditional 
Qur'ânic studies in the Muslim World. I focused in my analy-
sis on the Vertical dimension of revelation, wahy in Arabic, 
i.e., the communicative process between God and the 
Prophet Muhammad that produced the Qur'ân. As these 
vertical communications, which lasted for more than 20 
years, produced a multiplicity of discourses (in the form of 
verses, passages, short chapters) these discourses had a 
chronological order.  
In the process of canonization, from which the canonized 
scripture emerged as mushaf, this chronological order was 
not preserved; it was replaced by what is now known as the 
'recitation order' while the chronological is know as the 
'decadence order'. According to the orthodox view, the 
Qur'ân was perfectly preserved in oral form from the begin-
ning and was written down during Muhammad's lifetime or 
shortly thereafter when it was "collected" and arranged for 
the first time by his Companions. The complete consonantal 
text is believed to have been established during the reign of 
the third caliph, `Uthmân (644-56), and the final vocalized 
text in the early 4th/10th century. It is important, even if we 
uncritically adapt to the Orthodox view, to realize another 
human dimension present in this process of canonization, 
which entailed the early rearrangement and the late appli-
cation of signs of vocalization to the only consonantal script. 
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Today, I would like to develop my thesis about the human 
aspect of the Qur'ân one further step, moving from the ver-
tical dimension towards the Horizontal dimension of the 
Qur'ân. By the horizontal dimension I mean something more 
than the canonization, or what some other scholars identify 
as the act of the prophet’s gradual propagation of the mes-
sage of the Qur'ân after receiving it, or the spread of the 
message through the 'interpretive corpus', according to M. 
Arkoun. I do mean the horizontal dimension that is embed-
ded in the structure of the Qur’ân and was manifest during 
the process of communication itself. This horizontal dimen-
sion could only be realized if we shift our conceptual 
framework from the Qur'ân as a 'text' to the Qur'ân as 'dis-
course'. 
1- The Qur'an as 'Discourse’ 
Recently, Muhammad Arkoun and others2 rightly distin-
guish between the phenomenon of the Qur'ân, the recited 
discourse, and the Mushaf, which contains what Arkoun 
identifies as the 'Closed Corpus' or Scripture through the 
process of canonization explained above, which trans-
formed the recited discourse into scripture or a 'text'. Today 
I would like to bypass this historical moment of transfor-
mation known in the history of every religion. Since that 
historical moment Muslim scholars of the Qur'ân, though 
theoretically aware of the impact of this transformation and 
occasionally return back to the pre-text structure of the 
Qur'ân, never were able to recapture the living phenome-
non, the Qur'ân as a 'discourse'.  
Modern scholars of the Qur'ân share the concept of the 
Qur'ân as a 'text' despite the different paradigm of 'meaning' 
each tries to grasp and deduce from the Qur'ân. Dealing 
with the Qur'ân as only a 'text' enhances the possibilities of 
interpretation and reinterpretation but allows as well the 
ideological manipulation not only of the meaning but also of 
the 'structure', following the pattern of polemic interpreta-
tion of theologians.  
I was one of the propagators of the textuality of the Qur'ân 
under the influence of the literary approach initiated by the 
modern, and still appreciated, literary approach3. I recently 
started to realize how dealing with the Qurân as a text alone 
reduces its status and ignores the fact that it is still function-
ing as a 'discourse' in everyday life.4 The volume entitled 
'The Qur'ân as Text', which presents the proceedings of the 
symposium held in 1993 in the Oriental Seminar of the Uni-
versity of Bonn, enjoyed so many reprints5, because it intro-
duces the shift to which Stefan Wild refers, at least in the 
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Western Qur'ânic scholarship, from the paradigm of the 
'genesis' of the Qur'ân, whether Jewish or Christian, to the 
paradigm of textus receptus.  
It is true that the Qur'ânic textus receptus, the Qur'ân as a 
text contained in the mushaf, shaped and shapes the reli-
gious convictions of Muslims and is, more the central cul-
tural text in so many Islamic cultures.6 But this is true only 
when we limit our definition of 'convictions' and 'cultures' 
to the high level, the 'convictions, and 'cultures' of the elite. 
On the lower level of 'cultures' and 'convictions, on the level 
of the masses, it is more the recited Qur'ân, the phenome-
non of the Qur'ân as discourse, that plays the most im-
portant role in shaping the public consciousness.  
For Muslim scholars the Qur'ân was always a text, from the 
moment of its canonization till now. It is time now to pay 
close attention to the Qur'ân as discourse or discourses. It is 
no longer sufficient to re-contextualize a passage or some 
passages when it is only needed to fight against literalism 
and fundamentalism or when it is needed to wave away 
certain historical practice that seems unfit in our modern 
context. It is also not enough to invoke modern hermeneu-
tics in order to justify the historicity and, therefore, the rela-
tivity of every mode of understanding claiming in the mean-
time that our modern interpretation is the more appropri-
ate and the more valid. These insufficient approaches pro-
duce either polemic or apologetic hermeneutics.  
Without rethinking the Qur'ân, without re-invoking its living 
status as a 'discourse', whether in the academia or in every-
day life no democratic hermeneutics can be achieved. Why it 
has to be democratic? Because it is about 'meaning of life' it 
has to be democratically open hermeneutics. If we are sin-
cere in freeing religious thought from power manipulation, 
whether political, social, or religious in order to return the 
formulation of 'meaning' back to the community of believ-
ers, we need to construct open democratic, humanistic her-
meneutics.  
The empirical diversity of the religious meaning is part of 
our human diversity around the meaning of life in general, 
which is supposed to be a positive value in our modern liv-
ing context. In order to re-connect the question of the mean-
ing of the Qur'ân to the question of the meaning of life it is 
now imperative to indicate the fact that the Qur'ân was the 
outcome of dialoguing, debating, augmenting, accepting and 
rejecting, not only with pre-Islamic norms, practice and cul-
ture, but with its own previous assessments, presupposi 
tion, assertions etc. It might be surprising to claim that in 
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the early Muslim era, before the Qur'ân was fully canon-
ized,and definitely before Islam was fully institutionalized 
the differentiation between the Qur'ân, the still alive dis-
course, and the mushaf, the silent text, was explicated 
against an invitation to politicize the Qur'ân. This moment 
needs to be remembered.  
2- The Qur'ân versus the Mushaf: the spoken and the silent 
I would like here to start with a statement related to the 
Fourth caliph, `Alî, the cousin of Muhammad and his son-in-
law, in which he described the mushaf as silent; it does not 
speak, but humans speak it out. The context in which this 
statement emerged is important, because it could shed a lot 
of light on the present situation in which the political ma-
nipulation of the meaning of the Qur'ân is hardly challenged  
It was in the context of `Alî, the legally chosen Caliph, 
fighting against Mu`âwiyya, the governor of Syria who did 
not recognize `Alî’s authority, in the battle of Siffîn in 657. 
Mu`âwiya's star seemed to be sinking, when his collaborator 
`Amr b. al-`Âs advised him to have his soldiers hoist copies 
of the Qur’ân on their lances. This gesture, famous in Muslim 
history, did not imply surrender; by this means Mu`âwiya 
invited the combatants to resolve the question by consulta-
tion of the Qur’ân. Weary of fighting the two armies laid 
down their arms. `Alî was forced by his partisans to submit 
the difference to arbitration, as proposed by Mu`âwiya, and 
further to choose the arbitrator for his side from among the 
"neutrals". So sure were his followers that they were in the 
right! In these decisions the qurrâ’, those who memorize the 
whole Qur’ân by heart and are the professional recitors, 
played a large part. The mission of the arbitrators was to 
consult the Qur’ân "from the first to the last sûra" and, in 
default of clear indications in the sacred Book, the sunna of 
the Prophet, excluding what might give rise to divergences. 
In the absence of a clear definition of subject of consultation, 
certain individuals had protested against recourse to arbi-
tration with the cry lâ hukma illâ li'llâh, literally "no arbitra-
tor but God". The phrase implied that it was absolutely im-
proper to appeal to men for a decision since, for the case in 
dispute, there existed a divine ordinance in the Qur’ânic 
verse 49:8-9: "If two parties of the Believers fight with one 
another, make peace between them, but if one rebels 
(baghat) against the other, then fight against that one which 
rebels (allatî tabghî), until it returns to obedience to God 
...".The dissidents maintained that it was `Alî's duty to con 
tinue to fight against Mu`âwiya, as no new fact had inter-
vened to alter the situation.7  
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In response to such a cry `Alî made the differentiation be-
tween the silent mushaf, the text, in one hand, and the vocal-
ized Qur’ân by the people on the other hand. This state-
mentof `Alî, which is heavily quoted by modernist Muslim 
scholars merely to indicate the multiple possibilities of in-
terpretation, as well as the possibility of political manipula-
tion of the Qur’ânic meaning, has more implications than 
has been realized. The vocalization of the Qur’ân, whether in 
liturgy, in everyday life, in any social, political or ethical 
dispute, carries with it certain mode of interpretation and 
re-interpretation by ways of intonation and appropriation.8 
The Qur’ân is a living phenomenon, like the music played by 
the orchestra, whereas the mushaf, the written text, is anal-
ogous to the musical note; it is silent. A humanistic herme-
neutics of the Qur’ân must take seriously the living phe-
nomenon and stop reducing the Qur’ân to the status of solely 
a text. 
The modern political Islamist movements whether radical 
or moderate agree on God's absolute authority in determin-
ing and stipulating the regulations of the detailed behavior 
of the individual as well as the laws that govern the society 
as a whole. In modern political hermeneutics such a claim of 
the absolute Divine source of legislation, is based on the 
similar claim of the protestors against arbitration. While the 
protestors of the seventh century cried 'no arbitrator but 
God' by interpreting the Qur'ânic vocabulary yahkum as to 
judge or arbitrate the modern political protestors under-
stand the same word as to rule by way of legislation.  
This political and ideological manipulation can also be found 
in the classical era of Islam. Based entirely on an explicit 
assertion that the Qur'ân is only a text, its manipulation 
continued. 
3- The 'Text' Reconstructed and Manipulated 
When I started to examine the different methods of inter-
pretation applied to the Qur'ân as a 'text' in traditional Is-
lamic theology in my first book (1982),9 I investigated the 
emergence of the concept of “metaphor” that was intro-
duced to Arabic rhetoric at the beginning of the 9th century 
by the rationalist school of theology, known as the 
Mu’tazilites, through their effort to explain the anthropo-
morphic images of God in the Qur’ân, on the one hand, and 
the verses that seem to support a doctrine of “predestina-
tion”, on the other. The Mu’tazilites employed the concept of 
“metaphor” as a linguistic tool to interpret those types of 
verses of the Qur'ân that they considered “ambiguous”. 
This forged a powerful instrument to interpret the Qur’ânic 
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Book: in it are clear, well established vers-
es; they are the backbone of the Book: 
others are ambiguous. Those in whose 
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the chapter’s number according to Cairo 
edition followed by the verse or verses’ 
number. For translation, Yusuf `Ali’s is 
used as only guiding reference. 
text according to the Mu’tazilites’ transcendentalist stand-
ards: where it suited their ideas, the Qur’ânic text was la-
beled “clear” and, therefore, not in need for metaphorical 
interpretation; where it did not, it was considered to be 
“ambiguous” and need to be interpreted metaphorically.  
The main conclusion I have reached, after comparing the 
Mu’tazilites’ and the anti-Mu’tazilites’ discourses, was that 
the Qur'ân became the site of a fierce intellectual and politi-
cal battle. That battle was sited at one of the most important 
junctures of the structure of the Qur’ânic text (Qurân, 3:7).10 
Both the Mu’tazilites and their opponents agree on the prin-
ciple that the Qur’ân includes ambiguous verses as well as 
clear verses, and that the “clear” should furnish the norms 
for disambiguating the ambiguous. However, they disagree 
when it comes to practical implementation; thus, the con-
troversy does not only revolve around the meaning of the 
Qur'ân, it also involves its structure. What the Mu’tazilites 
consider as “clear” is considered as “ambiguous” by their 
opponents, and vice versa. Such intellectual disputes about 
the structure and the meaning of the Qur'ân constituted the 
first hermeneutical principle as the dichotomy between 
clarity and ambiguity. 
The intellectual opponents of the Mu’tazilites were the tra-
ditionalists, who upheld the literal interpretation of all 
Qur’ânic verses, to the extent that they affirmed the existen-
tial reality of all divine attributes, all the eschatological im-
ages, and even the idea that God can be seen by human eyes. 
The Mu’tazilites objected to their idea that the literal inter-
pretation of the holy text was a religious duty, regarding it 
as an obstacle to the fulfillment of mankind's destiny. They 
believed that God himself imposed on mankind the duty to 
acquire real knowledge by using his rational faculties. 
Later I will explain that this conjecture declaring 'clarity' 
and 'ambiguity' in the Qur'ân is part of the dialogue dis-
course of the Qur'ân, the dialogue with the Christians of 
Arabia, the Nasârâ. For the theologian to assume an estab-
lishing rule or a principle of hermeneutics required the as-
sumption of the 'textuality' of the Qur'ân. As for the jurists, 
their approach is based on another structural principle that 
differentiates between the ‘early’ and the ‘late’ revelations. 
According to this principle, there should be no contradiction 
in any prescription or proscription, because the ‘late’ always 
abrogates the ‘early’.  
Though they seem to ascertain awareness concerning the 
Qur'ân as 'discourse', it presented them with a problem that 
needs to be solved. They did not understand that the differ-
ent rulings of the Qur'ân could be a positive phenomenon, 
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`Arabî’s Hermeneutics of the Qur’ân The 
Arabic Cultural Center, Casablanca and 
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my faith.” See. Ibn Al-`Arabî's Tarjumân Al-
Ashwâq, a collection of mystical odes (The 
Interpreter of Desires), trans. By Reynold 
A. Nicholson, London 1911, p.67 
a diversity that should be kept open as options for the 
community of believers to be able to compete with the ever-
changing social order; instead they aimed at fixing the 
meaning by considering the gradual process of revelation as 
gradual development in the content of the message. Consid-
ering the later revelation to be the final and the previous to 
be provisional they applied the concept of 'abrogation', thus, 
eliminating all the previous options in favor of the last re-
vealed articulation. According to this concept of abrogation 
the Qur'ân is divided into four categories: 
1-Verses and passages that are entirely deleted from the 
present Closed Corpus, i.e., they once belonged to the 
Qur'ân, but now they no longer belong to the Qur'ân.  
2-Verses and passages whereby their rules and stipulations 
are no longer valid, but still exist in the Qur'ân to be recited; 
their legal power is deleted but not their divine status as 
God speech.  
3-Verses and passages whereby their rules and stipulations 
are valid though they are deleted from the Qur'ân; the ston-
ing penalty for fornication committed by married people 
belongs to this category. 
4- Of course the verses and passages that were not subject 
to abrogation.11 
The Sufi hermeneutics might be the possible ingredient for 
an open democratic hermeneutics in the Islamic culture. 
Muhyî ‘Dîn Ibn `Arabî, the great Andalusian Sufi who was 
born in Spain, wrote his greatest treatise in Mecca (The 
Meccan revelation, Al-Futûhât Al-Makkiyya) and died in Syr-
ia (638/1240). His hermeneutics of the Qur'ân formed the 
topic of my second book (1983),12 and planted the seeds of a 
possible open democratic hermeneutics. Ibn `Arabî's her-
meneutical project is based entirely on emphasizing the 
inclusive nature of the Qur'ân, meaning bringing together, 
versus the Furqân, another name of the Qur'ân meaning the 
separation and differentiation.13 By such emphasis he con-
stituted an attempt to integrate all knowledge existing up to 
his time (from Plato to Averroes) in the Qur'ân; his herme-
neutics opens the meaning of the Qur'ân, and the meaning of 
Islam, to be very conclusive meaning that integrates Christi-
anity, Judaism, and all other religions. Ibn `Arabî's Islam isa 
religion of comprehensive love, as Ibn `Arabî terms it in his 
poetry.14  
The hermeneutics of the Sufi in general, and of Ibn `Arabî, 
follows it in general not in details, depending basically on 
the notion of four semantic levels applicable to every verse: 
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15 Cf. On the Harmony of Religion and Phi-
losophy, translation of Ibn Rushd’s Fasl al-
Maqâl by George Hourani, E. Brill, Leiden 
1992, Chapter 3. 
the outward (zâhir), the inward (bâtin), the limitation 
(hadd), and the upward (matla’). This multi-semantic struc-
ture of the Qur’ân enabled the Sufis to avoid the dichotomy 
of clarity and ambiguity employed by the theologians, be-
cause every level leads to the upper and contains the lower 
with no contradiction nor dichotomy. It also keeps the 
Qur’ân accessible to all the believers regardless of their edu-
cation or their intellectual capacity. 
Ibn Rushd critically developed the Mu’tazilite system fur-
ther in order to open up the meaning of the Qur'ân to the 
findings of philosophy. According to him, the Qur'ân, being 
intended to address and reach all humans, regardless of 
color, ethnicity or level of knowledge, includes three modes 
of semantic expression. The first, and most common, is the 
outward poetic (khâtabî) form addressing the masses; the 
second is the argumentative (jadalî) form intended to ad-
dress the theologians; the third and most refined is the phil-
osophical (burhânî) form intended for the philosophers.15 
The difference between Ibn Rushd and the theologian, 
against whom he launches a severe attack accusing them of 
destroying the masses' convictions by propagating their 
interpretation as the only valid understanding, is that he 
does not consider the poetic meaning, addressing the mass-
es, as inferior to the philosophical. He asserts the difference 
not the hierarchy. His being a jurist, a physicist as well as a 
philosopher might explain his unique position. Although he 
quotes the conjecture verse (3:7), always invoked by the 
theologian to reconstruct the Qur'ân in terms of 'clarity' and 
'ambiguity', he only used it as a justification, alongside other 
legal principles - such as legal syllogisms, for the right of the 
philosophers to be engaged in hermeneutics. Ibn Rushd' 
hermeneutics have not yet been studied probably because 
his theological treatises did not go beyond these general 
outlines. A through study of his hermeneutics would need to 
investigate his total writings, including his commentaries; 
he was after all deeply involved in a heavy interpretative 
task.  
So far the Sufi hermeneutics, which emphasizes the seman-
tic multiplicity in accordance with the recipient engagement 
in producing the meaning, seems closer to recognizing the 
nature of the Qur’ân than are the theologians, the philoso-
phers (except Ibn Rushd perhaps), and the jurists. They 
were able, according to the notion of individual engagement 
with the Qur'ân, to develop the concept of ‘samâ`’ (listening 
attentively) and so present the other side of the coin, the 
Qur’ân, meaning vocalization and recitation. Dealing with 
the Qur’ân as a text alone would find ‘interpretation’ to be 
the other side of the coin, in this case the mushaf not the 
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Qur’ân.  
Now, the question is, ‘could any hermeneutics ignore the 
fact that the Qur’ân is not only a text?’ So far, the history of 
exegesis shows that the Qur’ân has been dealt with as a text 
that needs only a structural and philological analysis to un-
cover its meaning. This is obvious in the theological as well 
as the philosophical approach, which is built on the assump-
tion of the ‘clarity-ambiguity’ dichotomy, and which sur-
vived until today. As we have seen already such a dichotomy 
facilitates the semantic manipulation of the Qur’ânic mean-
ing. Dealing with the Qur'ân as 'discourse' would present a 
rather different paradigm that might enhance our proposed 
hermeneutics.  
What follows will only offer some examples of the some 
characteristic of the Qur'ânic discourse; a comprehensive 
and detailed projection needs a book. I hope that the follow-
ing examples will present only the skeleton of a broader 
project. 
 4- Polyphonic not Monophonic, Who Speaks and Who Lis-
tens? 
Because the concept of the Qur'ân as only 'text, predomi-
nates in both east and west there is a difficulty in presenting 
an accurate typology of the Qur'ânic structure The Encyclo-
pedia of Islam's categorization of the 'Literary Form' of the 
Qur'ân, for example, is based on a mixture of 'style'-
structure and 'content' norms, thus the literary forms are 
numerated as: a. Oaths and related forms; b. Sign-passages; 
c. Say-passages; d. Narratives; e. Regulations; f. Liturgical 
forms and Others.16  
Muhammad Arkoun, though emphasizing the structure of 
the Qur'ân as a discourse, following Paul Ricoeur's typology 
of the Bible, which is based on the oriented definition of a 
text, distinguishes five types of discourse utilized in the 
Qur'ân, 'prophetic, legislative, narrative, sapiential and 
hymnal (poetic)'17 However, he maintains a notion of one 
structure of 'grammatical relations' and one 'realm of 
grammatical communication' defined in all Qur'ânic dis-
course.18 Here the diversity and the multiplicity of the 
grammatical relations and the grammatical communications 
are reduced to one singular dominating structure. 
The Qur’ân is the ‘speech of God’; there is no dispute about 
this doctrine, but the discourse structure of the Qurân re-
veals multiplicity of voices not only one. As a discourse the 
Qur'ân is polyphonic not monophonic; there are so many 
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voices in which the 'I' and/or 'We' speaker is not always the 
Divine voice. Sometimes the Divine voice is presented in the 
form of the third person ‘He’ or sometimes in the second  
person 'You'. The 'He' manifestation of the Divine preceded 
by the imperative ”say” enunciated by another, probably 
unknown for certain, voice addressing Muhammad is to be 
found, for example, in chapter 112, one of the early chapter 
revealed in Mecca: 
Say: He is Allah the One; 
Allah the Eternal Absolute; 
He begets not nor is He begotten; 
And there is none like Him 
According to the Islamic belief this unidentified voice should 
be the voice of Gabriel, the mediator and messenger of the 
Divine to reveal His message to Muhammad. As messenger 
he is explicating God’s speech through his own voice acting 
on behalf of the Divine. Afterwards the implicit Divine voice, 
which became explicit to Muhammad via the angel’s voice, 
has to be announced to the people, the target group of the 
message, via Muhammad’s human voice. With all the in-
volved three voices the mode of discourse in the chapter is 
the ‘informative’. 
In the chronologically first revealed verses of the Qur'ân (1-
5, chapter 96) where the addressee is obviously Muham-
mad, the voice of the speaker is the voice of the Angel who 
appeared to him at the cave of Hirâ’19, for first time, or may 
be for the second time, introducing Muhammad to the Lord. 
The Lord is introduced in the third person. In this first 
enunciated discourse the angel voice does not seem expli-
cating the Divine Voice; it is rather providing information 
about Him to Muhammad; the mode of discourse is ‘in-
formative’. 
Recite, in the name of your Lord who creates 
Creates man from a clot. 
Recite; your Lord is the Most Bounteous, 
Who teaches by the pen, 
Teaches man that which he knew not. 
 Levinas Society 
Journal of the Dutch-Flemish Levinas Society 16 (2011) 
 
121 
The report in the ‘biography of the Prophet’ through which 
we learn that Muhammad was hesitant to comply with the 
angel strong and repeated demand to ‘recite’ suggests that 
Muhammad might had been already involved in a certain 
‘recitation’ in the name of certain divinity; the angel’s voice 
demanding Muhammad to ‘recite’ seems to be aiming at 
convincing Muhammad to redress his recitation to the Lord 
presented. The structure of the discourse where the impera-
tive ‘recite’ repeated twice supports this suggestion. 
Moreover, in the hymn or/and the liturgical passages the 
voice of the speaker is the human voice and the addressee is 
the Divine being. The best example is the opening chapter of 
the Qur'ân to be recited in the five daily prayers which are 
obligatory for every Muslim. 
Praise be to Allah the Lord of the Worlds. 
The Compassionate, the Merciful. 
Master of the Day of Judgment. 
It is You whom we worship and it is You from 
Whom we seek help 
Guide us to the right course,  
The course of those whom You blessed,  
Not the course of whom provoked Your anger 
neither those who got astray. 
Interestingly, the recitation of this chapter is considered as 
invoking God's response, but while the recitation is explicit 
the Divine response is implicit. In other words, the recitor 
has to slowly recite the verses pausing to receive the an-
swer. In other words, recitation of this chapter contains 
both vocalization and attentive hearing, samâ`. The follow-
ing report is narrated as a (qudsî) hadith where God says: 
salât is divided between Me and My servant into 
equal shares  
When he says, praise be to God, the Lord of the 
whole world,  
I say, My servant praised Me;  
When he says, The Compassionate The Merciful,  
I say, My servant exalted me; 
When he says, the Master of the Day of Judg-
ment, 
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I say, My servant glorified me;  
When he says, It is You whom we worship and it 
is You from Whom we seek help  
I say, this is between Me and My servant; all 
what My servant asked for is guaranteed; 
When he says, guide us to the right course, the 
course of those whom You blessed, not the 
course of whom provoked Your anger neither 
those who got astray,  
I say, these are for my servant and all are guar-
anteed for him.20  
 
This type of implicit dialogue between man and God, where 
man, although reciting God's speech, becomes the speaker, 
and God, the default Speaker of the ‘recited’ Qur’ân, be-
comes recipient, is very explicit in the structure of the 
Qur'ân. Within the polyphonic structure of the Qur’ânic dis-
course ‘dialogue’ is another characteristic to be presented.  
5- Dialogue 
To mention frequent examples of 'dialoging' it is sufficient 
to refer to what is categorized as the 'say passages' where 
the structure 'they say … you say’ exists. A ‘dialogue’ could 
be polemic, apologetic but it could be also inclusive or ex-
clusive; it could be as well productive or destructive. We 
confine our self here to present three types of dialogue clas-
sified in terms of the addressee, the dialogue with unbeliev-
ers, that with the Jews and the Christians of Arabia and the 
dialogue with the believers.  
The dialogue with the unbelievers, the polytheists of Mecca, 
started calm and soft, but gradually was hardened. When 
the pagan of Mecca started to negotiate with Muhammad, 
suggesting a way for Muhammad to show respect for their 
deities in exchange of recognizing his Lord, it seems in the 
context of the soft calm dialogue that Muhammad accepted. 
This brings the curious story mentioned in ancient historical 
sources which relates that Muhammad was reciting chapter 
53 in the presence of a number of Meccan Polytheists and 
when he came to the names of three of their favorite deities 
mentioned in verses 19 and 20 two short verses were pro-
nounced by Muhammad, ‘they are the high-flying cranes 
(gharânîq) / whose intercession (with God) to be hoped for.’  
When the prophet reached in his recitation the last verse of 
the chapter, ‘so prostrate yourselves before God and serve 
Him’ the polytheists prostrated with Muslims in a signal of 
reconciliation between Muhammad and the Meccans. 
Muslim scholars reject the story as a later invention while 
most European biographers of Muhammad accept it as his- 
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torical. It is not our concern here to get involved in this de-
bate, because the Qur’ân itself alludes to the story in chapter 
22, verse 52, devaluating the validity of those two verses by 
attributing them to a satanic intrusion on Muhammad’s 
tongue, an intrusion to be deleted. 
Never did We send an apostle or a prophet before 
thee, but, when he framed a desire, Satan threw some 
(vanity) into his desire: but God will cancel anything 
(vain) that Satan throws in, and God will confirm (and 
establish) His Signs: for God is full of Knowledge and 
Wisdom (verse 52). 
 
Whether this devaluation reflects a process of negotiation or 
not the fact remains that there is Qur’ânic evidence of the 
historical existence of the event, and this devaluation might 
be considered the first step of absolute demarcation be-
tween ‘monotheism’ and ‘polytheism’. But this demarcation 
has to be set gradually.  
First step was expressed in one of the early chapters, chap-
ter 109, where Muhammad is advised, by the unknown 
voice - the angel’s voice - not to negotiate with the unbeliev-
ers, the polytheists any more, but in the meantime to dis-
tance his conviction from theirs.  
 
Say: O you who reject to believe! 
I worship not that which you worship 
Nor will you worship that which I worship. 
And I will not worship that which ye have been wor-
shipping 
Nor will you worship that which I worship. 
To you be your Way and to me mine. 
Repetition of the phrase ‘I worship not that which you wor-
ship’ twice signifies the existence of strong opposition on 
the side of the unbelievers, accompanied with a strong re-
peated counter invitation to Muhammad for an exchange of 
worshipping. In other words, the style structure of that 
short chapter reveals the existence of dialogue in which the 
chapter is engaged. 
But when an attack is launched against Muhammad and his 
prophetship is questioned the Qur'ân defends Muhammad. 
The people of Mecca contest the issue of the authenticity of 
the divine source of the Qur’ân, and therefore the issue of 
Muhammad’s sincerity, honesty, trustworthiness - his cred- 
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ibility - is challenged. The allegation that Muhammad forged 
and fabricated the Qur'ân is disputed and responded to not 
in the style form of 'they say', but it is understood from the 
refutation that it is a response. This is very characteristic of 
the 'discourse' structure, i.e., its involvement and engage-
ment with another implicit, or explicit, discourse.  
The Arabs tried every mean to explain the Qur'ânic unusual 
effect on them by explaining it in terms of all types of genres 
known to them, discourses like 'soothsaying', poetry and 
even performing witchcraft. All their explanations were 
mentioned and refuted. When the Arabs explain the nature 
of the Qur'ân as ’poetry’ and accuse the prophet of compos-
ing it, the answer given to such an explanation and accusa-
tion is: “We have not taught him poetry; it is not seemly for 
him” (chapter 36:69). When they say that Muhammad is 
nothing but a soothsayer the Qur'ân replies: “By your Lord's 
blessing you are not a soothsayer neither possessed” (chap-
ter 52:29). In the context of that debate the nonbelievers 
claimed that the Qur'ân was nothing but stories forged by 
Muhammad who claimed that they were revealed to him by 
God. They claimed that they were able to produce similar 
discourse. Facing such a challenge, the Qur'ân made its own 
counter challenge asking them to bring forth ’ten forged 
chapters like it’ (chapter: 11: 13). 
When the nonbelievers failed to respond to this strong chal-
lenge, the Qur'ân, pretending to make it easier for them, 
decreased the challenge from ’ten’ chapters to only ’one’ 
(chapter 10:38). The last step was to indicate the absolute 
failure of the Arabs in challenging the authenticity of the 
Qur'ân: 
 
 “And if you are in doubt concerning that We have sent 
down on Our servant (Muhammad), then bring a chapter 
like it, and call your witnesses, apart from God, if you are 
truthful. And if you do not-and you will not- then fear the 
Fire, whose fuel is men and idols, prepared to unbelievers” 
(chapter 2: 23-24).  
This dispute and debate with the polytheist Arabs grounded 
the development of the doctrine of i`jâz, the stylistic and 
literary incompatibility, or supremacy of the Qur'ân.  
Another common form of the dialogue is the dialogue with 
the believers in the form "They will ask you [Muhammad] … 
you say" which is attested 15 times in the Qur'ân. These 
questions to which the Qur'ân responds cover different are-
as of interest. Questions were raised about wine and gam-
bling (chapter 2:219), about the orphans (chapter 2:220), 
menstruation (chapter 2:222), dietary law (Chapter 5:4) 
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21 "The majority (of the jurists) upheld the 
permissibility of marriage with the kitâbiy-
yat (women of the people of the book) who 
are free (not slaves) through a contract, as 
the principle is to construe (by exemption) 
the particular from the general (=one of 
the principles of textual deduction). The 
words of the Exalted … -(giving permission 
to marry women of the people of the book 
in 5:5)- is particular, while His words -(in 
2:221 not to wed idolatress till they be-
lieve)- is general. Those (jurists) who in-
clined toward its prohibition, which is the 
opinion of some of the fuqahâ', jurists, 
considered the general meaning (in 5:5) to 
have abrogated the particular (in 2:221)" 
Ibn Rushd, Bidâyat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat 
al-Muqtasid (A beginning for who is to be 
an independent jurist and a sufficient 
(source) for who is just seeking to learn 
not to be an expert), Vol. 11, p. 51.  
 
 
charity (chapter 2:215,219), prohibition of fighting during 
the sacred month (chapter 2:217), and spoils of war (chap-
ter 8:1) Providing answers to such questions, much of the 
legal aspect of the Qur’ân was gradually articulated, thus 
reflecting the dialogical nature of the Qur'ân with the hu-
man interest. 
Would the answers provided in the dialogical context be 
considered final legislation? What about different answers 
given to questions related to one issue? Lets take the exam-
ple of intermarriage, which is one always provoked in any 
discussion about Human Rights in Islam. While in chapter 
5:5 Muslims are allowed to marry non-Muslim females, such 
permission seems to be revoked in chapter 2:221. The ques-
tion is which rule will prevail? The second question, which 
is only provoked in the modern age, is whether this permis-
sion is guaranteed only to male Muslim or should it be ex-
tended to the female as well? 
Ibn Rushd tells us about two positions held by the jurists; 
the position of those who hold the permissibility considers 
2:221 as presenting the general, the preference to marry a 
Muslim female, while 5:5 particularizes the general. The 
position of those who prohibit intermarriage is grounded on 
'abrogation', i.e., that 2:221 abrogated 5:5.21 
If we deal with the Qur'ân as discourse we can go far beyond 
the jurists' outlook that is motivated by law formulation that 
needs a certain mode of fixation. Each of the two verses is an 
independent discourse; while 2:221 reflects the non-
negotiable stand with the polytheists, a position we earlier 
referred to, the verse of 5:5 is about 'togetherness' in social 
life. It is about 'making good things lawful'; it starts with 
'food' indicating not only that 'the food of the people of the 
book' is lawful to Muslims but that 'the food of Muslims' is 
lawful to the people of the book as well. 
This day are (all) things good and pure made lawful 
unto you. The food of the People of the Book is lawful 
unto you and yours is lawful unto them.  
 
This is a discourse about, first of 'good' things being lawful'; 
the first example of these 'good things' is sharing food. In- 
termarriage is introduced here as part of parcel of 'good 
things' which emphasizes the implicit call for social 'togeth-
erness'. 
 
Lawful unto you in marriage are chaste women who 
are believers as well as chaste women among the 
People of the Book revealed before your time when 
you give them their due dowers and desire chastity 
not lewdness nor secret intrigues. If anyone rejects 
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22 Chapter 5:5, and compare with 2:221 
where another mode of discourse of no-
negotiation with the polytheists is obvious 
"Do not marry unbelieving women (idola-
ters) until they believe; a slave woman 
who believes is better than an unbelieving 
woman even though she allure you. Nor 
marry (your girls) to unbelievers until they 
believe: a man slave who believes is better 
than unbeliever even though he allure you. 
Unbelievers do (but) beckon you to the 
fire. But Allah beckons by His grace to the 
Garden (of Bliss) and forgiveness and 
makes His Signs clear to mankind: that 
they may celebrate His praise.          
23 The legal opinion provided by the Euro-
pean Council of Fatwâ to allow the contin-
uation of the marriage for a newly con-
verted Muslim female to her non-Muslim 
husband, which created a furious reaction 
in the Muslim World, was based on tradi-
tional early cases and justified on the wish-
ful expectation that the guided wife will 
inspire the husband to convert. 
faith fruitless is his work and in the Hereafter he will 
be in the ranks of those who have lost.22  
 
Addressing the modern question about equality in inter-
marriage, it suffices here to emphasize that the addressees 
of the Qur'ânic discourse in matters of marriage and divorce 
are males; it is after all a discourse which emerged in a pa-
triarchal environment. Since the addressees are males, it is 
understandable that permission is voiced to men to marry, 
divorce, and marry off their relative females. If we recognize 
that, we are in a better position to express that, according to 
paradigm-shift of meaning where equality is essential com-
ponent, equality in intermarriage is possible.23  
The justification provided by modern `ulamâ` to sustain the 
classical position could be easily negotiated. Addressing the 
modern question about equality in intermarriage, it suffices 
here to say that they still belief in the superiority of the male 
in the family affair, and accordingly they argue that the faith 
of non-Muslim women married to Muslim men will be re-
spected. If a Muslim woman is married to non-Muslim, they 
fear that the non-Muslim husband will not respect the faith 
of his Muslim wife. They also invoked that Islam, being the 
last of God's revelations pays respect to both Judaism and 
Christianity, therefore, the faith of a non-Muslim woman 
married to a Muslim man is protected by the husband's 
faith. The reverse position is not possible, because Christi-
anity does only recognize Judaism while Judaism recognizes 
neither Christianity nor Islam.  
It is obvious that the `ulamâ' are still imprisoned in the pa-
triarchal 'world vision' in one hand, and in the religious vi-
sion of the world on the other hand. Marriage decision is, or 
should be, the decision of the individual; it is her or his deci-
sion to set the condition she or he wants for the future life 
with spouse. The issue at stake is not so much intermar-
riage; it is rather the individual freedom that entails free-
dom of religion and belief. There is no time or space to ad-
dress this issue here. It suffices to mention that there is no 
one single verse in the Qur'ân stipulating world punishment, 
or legal penalty, for apostasy; freedom of religion in the 
form of 'no coercion' is widely quoted even by the tradition-
al `ulamâ', but in an apologetic manner. 
6- Negotiation 
As we have already shown the non-negotiation position 
with the polytheists brings about an exclusive mode of dis-
course; the only possible way of communication is dispute, 
debate and rejection. The discourse with the believers var-
ies according to the way they handle their problem, accord- 
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24 See the detailed account in The Life of 
Muhammad, op cited, pp. 106-7. 
 
ing to their success they are praised; when they fail they are 
blamed and even condemned. This is also true for the 
Prophet himself. When he was busy preaching the rich peo- 
ple of Quraysh hoping that they would strengthen the newly 
formed community of believers, he did not pay attention to 
a poor blind fellow, identified as Ibn Umm Maktûm by the 
early exegete, who came asking for advice. The Qur'ân 
strongly blames Muhammad's attitude addressing him at 
the beginning by the third person, a sign of negligence. 
 
He frowned and turned away 
When the blind man came to him 
What would make you know that he might elevate 
himself (if you kindly responded to him) 
Or be aware and such awareness brings him benefit 
But as for whom who considers himself free from any 
need 
To him you pay much attention 
No blame on you if he would not elevate himself 
As for who came to you striving (for knowledge) 
While in fear (from God) 
You did not pay attention to him! (Chapter 80:1-10) 
The Qur'ânic discourse with the people of the book, the Jews 
and the Christians, or the Nasârâ, is the negotiate discourse 
par excellence. It is well known that the prophet Muham-
mad and his wife Khadîjah sought advice from a Christian 
Arab priest Waraqa b. Nawfal, who happened to be a cousin 
of Khadîjah. The matter of consultation was the first en-
counter with the Holy Spirit during the vision Muhammad 
had when he was meditating on mountain Hirâ’.24  
It is also important to mention that the first Muslim migra-
tion hijra was to Abyssinia. In order to escape being perse-
cuted by the people of Mecca, the Prophet ordered the Mus-
lims to go there where, according to a statement related to 
the Prophet himself, “there is a Christian king who never 
does injustice to anyone.” Muslims enjoyed his protection 
and hospitality till they returned back after the migration to 
Medina. During the period of their stay in Abyssinia, a dele-
gation from Mecca visited the Emperor persuading him to 
send Muslims back to Mecca. The envoys of Mecca told the 
Negus that those who were enjoying his protection and gen- 
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25 Ibid., pp. 146-152.  
26 Ibid., the full text of the document pp. 
231-233.
 
erosity were only some rebels who protested against the 
religion of their own people’s and converted to an unknown 
religion rather than to Christiantity. In order to turn the 
Negus against Muslims he was told that they (the Muslims) 
blasphemed against Jesus Christ. When the Emperor asked 
the Muslim refugees about their belief concerning Jesus they 
read to him this passage of the Qur’an from the chapter 
called 'Mary' or Maryam in Arabic (19).25  
‘Son of Mary’ is one of the commonest titles given to Jesus in 
the Qur’ân in order to emphasize his human nature. Never-
theless, the Qur’ân also speaks of Jesus as ‘a spirit from God’ 
and ‘His word caste into Mary’ by the Holy Spirit. More than 
that: It was Jesus, according to the Qur’ân, who prophesied 
‘Ahmad’ -Muhammad- to be the coming prophet. 
 
And remember Jesus the son of Mary said: "O 
Children of Israel! I am the apostle of Allah 
(sent) to you confirming the Law (which came) 
before me and giving glad Tidings of an Apostle 
to come after me whose name shall be Ahmad." 
But when he came to them with Clear Signs they 
said "This is evident sorcery!" (61.6) 
 
It was only after migration to Medina that Muslims started 
actual contact with the Arab Jewish tribes who had long 
before come from Yemen and settled in Medina. The well 
known 'Medina Covenant' between the Prophet and both 
Jewish and pagan tribes clearly indicates an essential equal-
ity between all the peoples who lived in Medina. Liberty of 
religious practice was guaranteed on an equal footing as 
long as all the parties defended the security of the city 
against any outside attack or intrusion. Concerning different 
types of religious faith, equality was essentially guaranteed 
unless a war is initiated against Muslim, then the war condi-
tions as historically practiced come into force.26  
In this context the Qur'ân prescribed siyâm, fasting, for Mus-
lims and in this also Muslims directed their prayers in the 
same direction as Jewish prayers, Jerusalem. But the rela-
tionship between the Muslim community and the Jewish 
community didn’t continue as smoothly as it had started. 
Polemic dispute flared, engaging the Qur'ân which started to 
substitute the previous 'one religion' called 'Islam', that of 
all the prophets since Adam till Jesus:  
1- Those who believed (in Muhammad), and those who be-
came Jewish, and the Christians and the Sabian, any who 
believe in God and the last day, and do righteousness, shall 
have their reward from their Lord (11:62, also 5:69.) 
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2- Those who believed (in Muhammad), and those who be-
came Jewish, and the Sabians, Christians, Magians, and poly-
theists, God will judge between them on the Day of Judg-
ment (22:17.) 
 
3- Say (Mohammed), the truth comes down from God: Let 
him who will, believe, and let him who will, reject: for the 
wrong doers We have prepared a fire (18:29.) 
4- He who will turn back from his faith, soon will God bring 
about (other) people whom He will love and they will love 
him (5:54.) 
5- Those who reject faith after they accepted it, and then go 
in adding to their defiance of faith, never will their repent-
ance be accepted; for they are those who have gone astray 
(3:90, also 4:137.) 
The change of the praying direction for Muslims from Jeru-
salem to Mecca may indicate the first sign of demarcation 
between the two communities. The polemic dispute some-
times reaches the level of harsh condemnation. However, 
occasionally it is a type of quiet reminder of God's grace on 
the sons of Israel. This polemic dispute with its quiet as well 
its harsh manifestation can be followed in chapter 2, called 
'the Cow', because it contains certain narrative reflecting 
the arrogance of the sons of Israel in complying with the 
simple demands of their prophets. There is a remarkable 
frequency in the use of the imperative 'remember' (some 19 
times in chapter 2 alone), addressed directly to the son of 
Israel preceding different narrative units of their history of 
reluctance and rejection to follow the right path.  
Not being able to appreciate the 'discourse' structure it is 
likely to extend the discourse to be addressing all the Jews 
until the present. It is not only a question of contextualiza-
tion, which is pivotal in discourse analysis, but more than 
that it is what the discourse tells about the context and how. 
Now, the question is which is historical and which is univer-
sal, a question that keeps all the modern liberal Muslim 
scholars of the Qur'ân busy. Being confined to the Qur'an as 
'text' alone, the conservatives win at the end of the day. 
When the liberals, for example, emphasize 'togetherness' as 
the universal eliminating the 'hostility' limiting its meaning 
to the negative past the conservatives will apply the princi-
pal of 'abrogation' to historize 'togetherness' as abrogated 
and will universalize 'hostility', as the abrogat. In the pre-
sent context of unsolved Palestinian-Israeli trauma, whose 
hermeneutics or meaning is valid? The winner is sure to be 
the meaning of ghetto, separation and isolation, the meaning 
of Mr. Sharon's wall.  
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27 Ibid., pp. 270ff. 
The same is true about the polemic dispute with the Chris-
tians, the Nasârâ, about the nature of Jesus. We have shown 
already that the Qur'ân rendered Jesus prophesizing the 
coming of a prophet named Ahmad. And we have also seen 
how the chapter named Mary (19) was recited in the court 
of the Negus and in the presence of the bishops. A quick 
reading of this chapter and comparison with Matthew's 
Gospel will easily reveal common ground. Nevertheless, 
there is non-negotiable issue that maintains the boundaries 
between Muslims and Christians to the extent that the con-
cept of 'togetherness' is almost forgotten.  
The first issue is that of the human nature of Jesus ac-
cording to the Qur'ân and the divine nature according to the 
shared dogma of the Churches. As we confine ourselves to 
the second chapter projecting the Qur'ânic discourse, or the 
Qur'ânic disputation with the Jews, we would also be better 
to confine our presentation to the Qur'ânic disputation with 
the Nasârâ to chapter three, which in its very opening, verse 
3, advocates the credibility of all the revealed scriptures. 
 
It is He Who sent down to thee (step by step) in truth 
the Book confirming what went before it; and He sent 
down Law (of Moses) and the Gospel (of Jesus) before 
this as a guide to mankind and He sent down the Cri-
terion (of judgment between right and wrong). 
In verse four, however, it presents the possibility of mis-
understanding as to keeping the shared ground as solid as 
possible. But we have to see the disputation context. While 
the Qur'ân recognizes Jesus as a 'word' from God (verse 45) 
and presents the Apostles as Muslims (52), it was clearly 
indicated in the earlier chapter of Mary, by way of relating 
to the child Jesus the statement 'I am the servant of God' 
(19:30). This seems to have caused certain confusion for the 
Christians of Najrân who came to Medina to debate with 
Muhammad.27 The discussion became heated, probably after 
it was explained that the miraculous birth of Jesus, from a 
mother who had not had intercourse with a male, makes 
him no different than Adam; the two cases are alike. 
 
This similitude of Jesus before Allah is as that of Adam: He 
created him from dust then said to him: "Be" and he was 
(3:59) 
 
Then the Qur'ân made serious religious challenge that 
seems to cause fear among the delegation. Here we can real-
ize the 'power' of discourse, or the discourse as 'authoritari-
an'; such a powerful discourse could not emerge in Mecca 
simply because Muslims were a small persecuted communi- 
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28 For a detailed discussion about the way 
this specific verse was isolated and, there-
fore, manipulated whether in terms of its 
grammatical articulation or in the meaning 
of its vocabularies and further more for the 
theological dispute, see Leah Kinberg art. 
'ambiguous' EQ, vol. 1, pp. 70-76. Also my 
Al-ittijâh al-`Aqlî fi `Tafsîr: dirâsa fi mafhûm 
almajâz fi al-Qur'ân ind `l-Mu`tazila (the 
Rational Trend in Exegesis: study of the 
Mu`tazilites' concept of metaphor), op 
cited, pp. 180-9; Mafhûm al-Nass, op cited, 
pp. 179ff. 
 
ty. As the sources tells us the members of the Christian del-
egation withdrew preferring to pay annual collective 
amount of money jizya than face a possible curse as pro-
voked by the Qur'ân. 
If anyone disputes in this matter with you now after 
(full) knowledge has come to you say: "Come! let us 
gather together our sons and your sons our women 
and your women ourselves and yourselves: then let us 
earnestly pray and invoke the curse of Allah on those 
who lie!" (3:61) 
 
The non-negotiable issue for the Qur'ân was the divinity of 
Jesus, whether God or the Son; it is absolutely unacceptable 
just as there was no possible negotiation with the polytheist, 
hence the Qur'ân sometimes calls those who believe in Je-
sus' divinity either polytheist or unbelievers. So the only 
possibility of coming to terms with Christians is for them to 
relinquish their claim about Jesus, this being an impossible 
demand. The Qur'ân further cites the Christians' false argu 
ments about things they do not know; the final truth is re-
vealed to Muhammad. The claim of both the Jews and the 
Christians of being the only heirs of Abraham is shown to be 
false. The evidence shows this to be false: he was neither a 
Jew nor a Christian because both the Torah and the Gospel 
were revealed after his death (see 3: 64-67).  
 
Now, the point I would like to indicate is that the Qur'ân 
never repudiated the Jewish and the Christian Scriptures; 
they are both revealed through the same channel as the 
Qur'ân: wahy. What is always disputed is the way the people 
of the book understood and explained these scriptures; the 
issue at stake is the wrong hermeneutics, and here comes 
the significance of the verse 7 in the same chapter 3, which 
was taken by Muslim theologians as setting hermeneutical 
principal. It reads 
 
He it is Who has sent down to you the Book: in it are 
verses that are clearly expressed; they are the founda-
tion of the Book: others are ambiguous. For those in 
whose hearts is perversity they follow (literally) 
the ambiguous seeking discord and searching for its 
hidden meanings but no one knows its hidden mean-
ings except Allah and those who are firmly grounded 
in knowledge say: "We believe in the Book; the whole 
of it is from our Lord"; and none will grasp the Mes-
sage except men of understanding.28  
 
My assessment here is that in the context of repudiating the 
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Christian misunderstanding the verses in which the Qur'ân 
describes Jesus as the 'word' and the 'spirit' from God were 
declared 'ambiguous' whereas the verses emphasizing his 
humanity as only a prophet and messenger were declared 
the 'clear', the backbone of the book.  
Another disputed issue between Muslims and Christians 
is the doctrine of crucifixion, which Muslims believe that the 
Qur'ân denies. Muslims see no conflict between normal 
death and ascension, both are asserted in the Qur'ân. An-
other disputed issue between Muslims and Christians is the 
doctrine of crucifixion, which Muslims believe that the 
Qur'ân denies. Muslims see no conflict between the normal 
death of Jesus and his ascension; both are asserted in the 
Qur'ân. The context in which the issue of crucifixion is men-
tioned is not the context of a dispute with the Christians; it 
is the context of argumentation and disputation against the 
Jews in defense of Mary and Christ (4:153-158). In this con-
text the Jewish blasphemous allegation of adultery against 
Mary is strongly repudiated and condemned by the Qur'ân. 
In the same context the claim of the Jews that they slew Je 
sus, implies a threat that they can also slay Muhammad, was 
also to be repudiated. 
 
The people of the Book ask you to cause a book to de-
scend to them from heaven: indeed they asked Moses 
for an even greater (miracle) for they said: "Show us 
Allah in public" but they were dazed for their pre-
sumption with thunder and lightning. Yet they wor-
shipped the calf even after clear signs had come to 
them; even so We forgave them; and gave Moses man-
ifest proofs of authority.  
And for their Covenant We raised over them (the tow-
ering height) of Mount (Sinai); and (on another occa-
sion) We said: "Enter the gate with humility"; and 
(once again) We commanded them: "Transgress not in 
the matter of the Sabbath." And We took from them a 
solemn Covenant. 
(They have incurred divine displeasure): in that they 
broke their Covenant: that they rejected the Signs of 
Allah; that they slew the Messengers in defiance of 
right; that they said "Our hearts are the wrappings 
(which preserve Allah's Word; we need no 
more)"; nay Allah has set the seal on their 
hearts for their blasphemy and little is it they 
believe. 
That they rejected faith: that they uttered 
against Mary a grave false charge. 
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That they said "We killed Christ Jesus the son of Mary 
the Apostle of Allah"; but they killed him not nor cru-
cified him but so it was made to appear to them and 
those who differ therein are full of doubts with no 
(certain) knowledge but only conjecture to follow for 
of a surety they killed him not. 
Nay Allah raised him up unto Himself; and Allah 
is Exalted in Power Wise(4:153-158). 
  
If the issue of crucifixion was as important to the Qur'ân as 
the issue of the nature of Jesus, it would have been brought 
again and again in different contexts. Since it exists only in 
the context of responding to the Jewish claim, the discourse 
structure suggests it was denying the capability of the Jews 
to have done this depending on their own power, and by 
implication telling Muhammad that their implicit threat to 
slay him, as they slew Jesus, is not feasible, as God will not 
permit it. Now, once again the question is which meaning 
will prevail, togetherness or isolation? This duly brings the 
relationship of the West and the Muslim World into our dis-
cussion. How does relationship affect the way Muslims 're-
think' their own tradition so as to modernize their lives 
without relinquishing their spiritual power, particularly in 
view of America’s colonizing project?  
Now, let me present the possibility of real reformation in 
the domain of sharî`a if the concept of the Qur'ân is accept-
ed. 
 
7- Deconstructing Sharî`a 
Would dealing with the Qur'ân as discourse, deeply involved 
in dialogue with the believers as well as with the non-
believers, help us tackle the burning unsolved legal issues 
considered divine revelation by the majority of Muslims? 
Some radical groups may still be crying and fighting for the 
restoration of Caliphate, but the well-established national-
state in every Muslim country in the post-colonial era has 
made a shift towards the question of law. The obligation to 
establish an Islamic state ruled entirely by shari`a is now the 
disputable issue between the two basic trends of modern 
Islamic discourse. That ‘Islam is the official religion of the 
State and the principles of shari`a are the source of legisla-
tion’ is an article in the Constitution of all Muslim states.  
 
The conflict sometimes taking the form of a severe and vio-
lent struggle between state and radical groups is not so 
much about whether or not shari`a is to be implemented in 
both social and in individualistic life. It is much more about 
the degree of implementation and, so, if the political system 
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 is westernized or not and hence anti-Islamic.  
 
If it is enough for the individual to confess Islam and to 
perform the other four pillars, praying five times a day, 
fasting the month of Ramadân, paying the annual prescribed 
alms, and performing hajj if it can possibly be financially 
afforded, for the community it is not enough. If an Islamic 
state is not established, every individual Muslim is 
responsible before God for such a religious failure; so 
preach the representatives of the radical Islamic groups and 
the representatives of the so-called ‘moderate’ Islamic 
discourse.  
Muslim intellectuals, who hold different view about the rela-
tionship between Islam and politics, are condemned as 
‘westernized’; not real Muslim thinkers. The views of the 
non-traditional, nor radical, Muslim thinkers are not well 
known beyond the boundaries of the Muslim World, espe-
cially of those who prefer to address their readers in their 
own regional language. As for the highly radical, provocative 
preachers, the Western media is very keen to present their 
ideas, so creating the impression in the Western mind that 
Islam has but one face: the face of Ben Laden.  
Let me present now briefly my scholarly view concerning 
the concept of shari`a. The Qur’ânic verses which seem to 
contain legal connotation and which are considered the ba-
sis of shari`a are about 500 verses according to the tradi-
tional sources. On these verses, which amount to one out of 
six, or 16% of the whole Qur’ân, the jurists built a system of 
induction and deduction called ‘the principles of legislation’, 
`ilm usûl al-fiqh. According to these principles, they added a 
second source to the Qur’ân, i.e., the Prophetic tradition, al-
sunna al-nabawiyya. They categorized the sunna the second 
source of legislation and considered it as divine as the 
Qur’ân. As two divine sources were not enough to regulate 
the increasing political, social, economic as well as criminal 
problems, the jurists had to adopt a third principle based on 
the already agreed upon practiced legal rules called ‘con-
sensus’, ijmâ’, of the earliest Muslim generation, the com-
panions of the Prophet (al-sahâbah). A fourth principal of 
‘rational inquiry’, ijtihâd, was urgently needed in order to be 
able to solve the problems that were not solved in the other 
three sources. But this principle of ijtihâd was practically 
restricted to apply the technique of ‘analogy’, qiyâs, which is 
to reach a solution to a certain problem by only comparing 
its position to a similar problem previously solved by any of 
the three sources.  
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The whole body of shari`a literature, as expressed in the 
major four sunni schools, madhhabs, at least, is built on the 
aforementioned principles, which means that shari`a is a 
man-made production; nothing is divine about it. It is nei-
ther possible to claim its validity regardless of time and 
space.  
If we contextually examine some of the Qur’anic legal stipu-
lations, such as the penalty of fornication, zinâ, robbery, 
sariqah, or causing social disorder, hirâbah, as well as slay-
ing, qatl, which are called hudûd, pl. of hadd, the question is: 
are these penalties basically initiated by Islam, and, there-
fore, Islamic? The answer is definitely ‘no’; all these penal-
ties were generally pre-Islamic, some of them belong to the 
Roman law and were adopted in the Jewish tradition, while 
others were even older tradition. It is not likely in our mod-
ern age of Human Rights and respect of the integrity of the 
human being to consider amputation of the members of the 
human body, or execution, as obligatory religious punish-
ments binding by divinity.  
Other aspects of shari`a, such as those dealing with the 
rights of religious minorities, women’s rights, and Human 
Rights in general, have to be revised and reconsidered as 
well. Contextualization of the Qur’ânic stipulation, and ex-
amining its linguistic and stylistic structure -as discourse-
would reveal that the jurists’ work was basically to unfold 
the meaning of such stipulation and to re-encode such 
meaning in their different social contexts. The Qur’ân is not 
in itself a book of law; legal stipulations are expressed, as 
we have already proved, in discourse style, which reveal a 
context of engagement with human needs in specific time, 
which, in turns, opens up the appropriation of the 'meaning' 
intended into every paradigm of meaning.  
As discourse it provides multi-options, various solutions, 
and open gate of understanding. The conclusion is that to 
claim that the body of shari`a literature is binding for all 
Muslim communities regardless of time and space is simply 
ascribing divinity to human historical production of 
thought. If this is the case, there is no obligation to establish 
a theocratic state claimed Islamic. Such a demand is nothing 
but ideological call to establish a theo-political unquestion-
able authority; it is the recreation of the most devilish dicta-
torship political regime on the expense of the spiritual and 
ethical dimension of Islam. 
8-The Challenge of Modernity: confusing context 
Muslims so far have been rethinking, redefining and modify-
ing the sources of Islamic knowledge. Traditions such as  
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Sunna, consensus and legal syllogisms have been under 
deep and controversial discussion and debate since the 
eighteenth century. The meaning of the Qur'ân, and subse-
quently the meaning of Islam, has been the subject of inves-
tigation, research, appropriation, re-appropriation and ne-
gotiation since the late nineteenth century. This type of 're-
thinking' was essentially and initially motivated by a strong 
commitment to develop Muslim societies in the direction of 
modernization on one hand, and to keep the spirit of Islam 
and its forces alive on the other hand; modernity was, after 
all, a foreign power imposed from above by the colonial 
European domination of the entire Muslim World after de-
constructing the Ottoman Empire.  
By the end of the nineteenth century, the British had suc-
cessfully colonized much of India. The French, under Napo-
leon Bonaparte, occupied Egypt in 1798. France then went 
into Algeria in 1830; occupied Tunisia in 1881, and Britain 
marched into Egypt in 1882. The Dutch were already there 
long before that in Indonesia. There were many other ex-
cursions as the West's program of the colonization unfolded 
throughout the Muslim World.  
Here one can mention at least three challenging powers that 
motivated and constructed the way Muslims rethought their 
traditions. First of all, it was the challenge of scientific dis 
coveries and the advanced technology. The second challeng-
ing question was the question of rationality and rationalism 
whereas the third was the political challenge. Needless to 
say these three challenging questions, presented here inde-
pendently, were always mixed in each one of the exegesis' 
trends we are going to present.  
1- Modern science and technology were introduced to the 
Muslim world in the form of strange unknown military 
equipment that caused their defeat against the imperial 
Western powers and lead to the occupation of their land by 
non-Muslim invaders. When the French army reached Alex-
andria in 1798 the Mamlûk worriers were ready to fight in 
man-to-man combat. However, they were shocked to see the 
powerful artillery machines that killed dozens of soldiers 
with one shot, from a long distance. Napoleon Bonaparte 
brought with his army a number of natural and social scien-
tists. Al-Jabartî in his history tells of the reaction of the 
Azharî `ulamâ' when they were invited to watch some chem-
ical experiments performed for them in the laboratory es-
tablished in Cairo. They were terrified, some of them ran 
away whispering the isti`adha formula (seeking God's pro-
tection from devil), because they perceived these experi-
ments as witchcraft. That was the first encounter of Egyp- 
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29 A statesman, diplomat, and historian 
who directed a major French colonial ex-
pansion in Africa and who championed a 
Franco-Russian alliance that proved im-
portant in the events leading to World War 
I. As a French nationalist he was commit-
ted to policies of colonial expansion. Dur-
ing his ministry, French domination was 
established in French West Africa, Mada-
gascar, and Tunisia; inroads were made in 
Algeria.  
30 See the translation of Hanotaux article 
into Arabic and Muhammad `Abdu's re-
sponse in Al-A`mâl al-Kâmilah lil Imâm Muh
ammad `Abdu, (the Complete Works of Imâm 
Muhammad `Abdu) ed. Muhammad 
`Amârah, 5 vols, Beirut 1972 v. 5, p. 201f 
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be found in N. Keddie, An Islamic Response 
to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writ-
ings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani 
(Berkeley, 1983); R. Matthee, ‘Jamal al-Din 
al-Afghani and the Egyptian National De-
bate‘, IJMES, Vol. 21 (1989), pp. 151-169; E. 
Kedourie, ‘Afghani and Abduh. An Essay on 
Religious Unbelief and Political Activism’, 
Modern Islam (London, 1966). 
 
tian intellectuals with modern technology courtesy of mod-
ern scientific investigation and research. Their response 
was to learn in order to gain the power to be able to fight 
back. Learning modern sciences, by sending missions of 
students to acquire the sciences in Europe, and importing 
modern technology, especially military weapons - this was 
the basic response by both Turkey and Egypt. 
2- Within the military power there was an intellectual 
weapon holding Islam responsible for the weakness of the 
Muslim world. In this context the Muslim World was per-
ceived, approached and addressed by the colonizer's men-
tality as Muslim, with no other sub-identity attached, like 
Indian, Indonesian or Arab. The matter became more com-
plicated when the colonized unquestionably accepted the 
identity imposed on them by the colonizer, and by way of 
internalization reduced their identity, thus, creating an 
identity crisis.  
It was explicitly advocated that it was necessary to neglect 
and even abandon Islam, if this part of the world was to 
make any progress toward catching up with modernity. It is 
enough to mention the French philosopher Ernest Renan 
(1832-1892) and the French politician and historian Gabriel 
Hanotaux (1853-1944)29, who served as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs from 1894 to 1898. Renan posited the absolute in-
compatibility between Islam and both sciences and philoso-
phy. Whatever is labeled Islamic science or Islamic philoso-
phy is, according to Renan in his doctoral thesis, Averroès 
etl'Averroïsme (1852; "Averroës and Averroism"), mere 
translation from the Greek. Islam, like all religious dogmas 
built on revelation, is hostile to reason and freethinking. 
Hanotaux too held Islam responsible for the backwardness 
of the Muslim world. His allegation was based on the theo-
logical difference between Islam and Christianity. According 
to him the dogma of incarnation in Christianity has its con-
sequence in building a bridge between man and God, thus 
freeing man from any dogma of determinism. Islamic pure 
monotheism, tawhîd, on the other hand, has created a non-
bridged distance between man and God, leaving no space for 
human free will. By such theological reason Hanotoux ex-
plained the political despotism characterizing the Muslim 
World.30 
Jamâl al-Dîn al-Afghânî (1838-1897)31 and Muhammad Ab-
du (1848-1905) responded defensively, relating the back-
wardness of Muslims not to Islam per se, but to the contem-
porary Muslims' misunderstanding of Islam. They both ar-
gue, if Islam is understood properly and explained correctly, 
as was the case in the golden age of Islamic civilization, Mus- 
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lims would not have been easily defeated, and dominated by 
European power.  
The basic question that confronted the early modern Mus-
lim reformers was whether Islam is compatible with mo-
dernity or not. How could a faithful Muslim live in a modern 
socio-political environment, without losing her/his identity 
as a Muslim? Does Islam accommodate science and philoso-
phy? Second came the question of the compatibility or oth-
erwise of the divine law (shari‘a) that constitutes traditional 
society, and the positive law that constitutes the modern 
nation-state. Were modern political institutions such as 
democracy, elections, and parliament accepted by Islam, 
and could they replace the traditional institutions of shûrâ, 
consultation, and the authority of the elite ‘ulama (ahl al-
hall wa al-‘aqd)? 
3- The discussion of such questions are embedded in the 
question of religion and politics. The issue of political Islam 
emerged under the colonial occupation of most of the Mus-
lim countries as early as 1798 in Egypt for example, where 
Muslims became aware of a different lifestyle brought about 
in their everyday life by their colonizers. They look and 
dress differently, behave and speak differently. They eat 
harâm food, drink wine, interact freely with women who are 
not their mahram, even their women are dressed improper-
ly. In brief, Muslim social and religious identity was ex-
tremely violated by the very existence of those intruders in 
otherwise purely Muslim territory.  
Ironically, or paradoxically may be, that Bonaparte present-
ed himself to the Egyptian `ulamâ' as the protector of 'faith' 
against both the Catholic Pope and the corrupted Ottoman 
Sultan. Then he advanced his claim pretending that he con-
verted to Islam. Nothing of this worked out. The issue of 
politics emerged again after the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire with the end of the First World War. The decision of 
the new national Turkish movement to abolish Caliphate 
raised the question whether Caliphate was an Islamic insti-
tution or was only a form of political system that could be 
replaced by another without losing the identity of Islam. 
Amidst such state of stress and uncertainty in such transi-
tional period the Muslim world found itself suddenly 
stripped of its identity, namely the Caliphate. Political fig-
ures, such as King Fu’âd in Egypt and Sharief Husayn in Ara-
bia, tried to restore Caliphate, with each seeking to be nom-
inated as Caliph of all Muslims.  
It was the Egyptian `Alî `Abd al-Râziq (1888-1966) who de-
fended the abolishment of Caliphate proving that there is no 
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32 Meaning paganism, in reference to the 
pre-Islamic tribal cultural code in Arabia 
translated sometimes as ignorance. Rida 
was very much in favor of the Wahhâbî 
ideology based on the writings of Mu-
hammed b. `Abd al-Wahhâb (d. 
1135/1792) who was himself a follower of 
the most Orthodox Muslim thinker, Ibn 
Taymiyya (d.685/1328). As Rida was a 
traditionalist thinker he inspired Hasan al-
Bannâ that it is possible to establish the 
Caliphate state. The successful example set 
by both M. b. Abdul Wahhâb and Mu-
hammâd b. Su`ûd in establishing a theo-
cratic state to be the kingdom of God was 
alive. The dream of both the ideologist and 
the ambitious Prince became true by em-
bodying the ideology in militant body of 
tribes called ikhwân. Muslim Brotherhood 
Society was formed in order to be the 
embryo of the future Islamic State of Egypt. 
such a specific political system labeled Islamic. The re-
sponse of Muhammad Rashîd Rida (1865-1935) was differ-
ent. He defended Caliphate as an authentic Islamic system 
that should be re-established, failing which Muslims would 
suffer the return to paganism, jâhiliyya.32 As a political re-
sponse the Muslim Brotherhood Society was established in 
Egypt in 1928. Its basic aim was to re-establish Islamic soci-
ety in Egypt as an ideal example to be copied everywhere 
before the re-establishment of Caliphate. Hence re-
islamization became thus the antonym of modernization, 
which was presented as westernization. The modern politi-
cal islamist movements, labeled usually as fundamentalism 
in Western public discourse, are all off-shoots of the Muslim 
Brotherhood Society.  
In such a historical and confusing context, the question of 
the 'nature' of the Qur'ân, its 'structure' as well as its histor-
ical background, was never closely dealt with. As the foun-
dational text of Islam per excellence it was kept above any 
critical investigation; it was the only preserved cardinal and 
fundamental source of inspiration to hold on; it is, first and 
last of all, the verbatim speech of God. Muslims perceived 
the Orientalist's scholarship about the Qur'ân, its history 
and structure as part of the European conspiracy against 
Islam and Muslims. 
9- Rethinking Tradition 
To start with I would like to briefly present the other non-
violent, more open and probably liberal face of modern Is-
lam known only to the sincere and non-biased scholars, a 
face somewhat hidden and a voice quite mute in the mass 
Media of East and West alike. From this presentation, the 
question of 'rethinking the Qur'ân' will, I hope, emerge as 
vital if Muslims really wish to follow up the essential basic 
project of modernization, with more constructive participa-
tion. 
In order to give a brief account of this process one has to 
outline the epistemological principles of Classical Islam as it 
reached the modern age and had to be rethought. Let me 
clarify that the four sources to be outlined here represent 
only one facet of the multi-faceted Islamic culture, i.e., the 
facet of jurisprudence, sharî`a. They present the epistemo-
logical principles called (usûl al-fiqh) from which the norma-
tive law, fiqh, is deduced. All the revivalist movements were 
to a great extent directed by the state of affairs in which 
Islam came to be fixed, that is Islam as law-oriented 
(sharî`a) faith. Scholars of Islam know shari`a is one of the 
multi-facets of the Islamic traditions and cultures, one that  
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can be distinguished from at least other several facets, such 
as philosophy, theology (`ilm al-kalâm), Sufism, etc.  
The reason behind reducing Islam to the paradigm of shari`a 
is the fact that since the fifth century of the Islamic era, i.e. 
the twelfth century, Islamic philosophy and Islamic theology 
as well as the creative philosophy of Sufism have been grad-
ually marginalized. Philosophers and non-orthodox theolo-
gians, such as the well-known Ibn Rushd, suffered various 
degrees of persecution. Indeed, great sufîs, such as al-Hallâj 
(exc. 910) and Suhrawardî (Shihâb al-Dîn Yahya, exc. 1191) 
to mention only two names, were executed. In terms of their 
hierarchal order the sources of knowledge, according to 
major schools of law, are arranged as follow: 
First and foremost, the Qur'ân and its exegesis present the 
foundational treasure of knowledge; it is the Speech of God 
revealed in Arabic to prophet Muhammad in the seventh 
century. Though basically addressing the Arabs, its message 
is meant for all humanity regardless of time and space. This 
is the guidance, the light, and the final divine plan for salva-
tion in this world as well as in the life to come.  
Second to the Qur'ân are the sayings and the actions of the 
prophet Muhammad, including his approval or disapproval 
of sayings or actions of his companions. This is the prophet-
ic tradition known in Arabic as Sunna. It came to be consid-
ered equally divine with the Qur'ân because both are revela-
tions from God. The difference between them was explained 
in terms of differentiating between the 'content' and the 
linguistic expression or the 'form' of both. The Qur'ân is 
God's verbatim speech, so its content and its linguistic ex-
pression (form) are both divine. The content of the Sunna, 
on the other hand, is revealed, meaning divine, but its form 
is human; Muhammad put it into words. Nevertheless, its 
position is not inferior to the Qur'ân; it is equal though sec-
ondary. Muslim jurists even emphasized that the Qur'ân is 
in need of the Sunna more than the Sunna is in need of the 
Qur'ân. The Sunna is not only to explain but more to expli-
cate what is implicit, such as how to perform prayer and 
fasting, or to know the conditions of purification and the 
amount of alms to be paid etc. Without the Sunna the Qur'ân 
is less clear. Even to understand the context of the passages 
and chapters of the Qur'ân, the historical events that sur-
rounded the revelation - a process lasting more than twenty 
years - only the Sunna can provide such (historical) infor-
mation.  
The third epistemological principle or source of knowledge 
is the 'consensus' of the community of scholars, `ulamâ'. As 
there was no consensus among the scholars on the epistemo- 
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33 See, Bernard, M., article ‘Ijmâ`’ in EI, vol. 
111, pp. 1023f.' 
34 See, Bernard, M, article ‘qiyâs’ in EI, vol. 
v, pp. 238.  
logical validity of the doctrine of 'consensus', neither could 
there be an agreement on its definition and the final formu-
lation limited its scope as well as its implication. Its scope 
was narrowed to refer only to what was unanimously 
agreed upon among the first Muslim generation, the Com-
panions of the Prophet, sahâba, on the assumption that such 
consensus should have been grounded on a certain prophet-
ic tradition that was not transmitted to the next generation. 
Consequently, its implication was limited to issues not men-
tioned, either explicitly or implicitly, in the above two 
sources.33  
The fourth and last source of acquiring knowledge is the 
application of rational syllogisms, inferring a rule for a cer-
tain non-mentioned case in the sources above by way of 
making analogy with a similar established rule. The analogy 
is to be based either on similarity, like the similarity be-
tween consuming alcohol and smoking hash, or on the ra-
tionale of the rule mentioned. The second type of analogy 
requires adherence to the theological doctrine of the exist-
ence of 'rational logic' behind God's divine rules, a doctrine 
that was not accepted by all schools of law. Unlike 'consen-
sus' qiyâs, though was not applied by all the jurists, gained 
more support by the majority.34 
10-Rethinking Consensus: the emergence of new `ulamâ' 
It seems that the process of 'rethinking' tradition, which 
started as response to the degeneration position into which 
Muslim societies were falling, took its first step with the 
third principle, namely consensus; it was easy to break 
through by demanding a new type of consensus. Shâh Walî 
Allâh (1702-1762) is considered the godfather of the 're-
vivalist' Islam in India. Due to the specific orientation of the 
Indian Islam, his revivalist formula was a combination of 
'sufism' and shari`a oriented thought. In contrast to the 
Wahabî movement in Arabia, initiated by Muhammad b. 
`Abd al-Wahâb (1703-1792) which took the direction of a 
highly Orthodox reformation, it is possible to explain the 
differences in line with the different historical and cultural 
background of Islam, in both social environments. While 
Islam in India was reshaped by its interaction with the pre-
Islamic Indian tradition, such as Hinduism Buddhism, Islam 
in Arabia was to a great extent rooted in its Bedouin tradi-
tion and customs. 
Shah Walî Allah, heavily influenced by the breakdown of the 
Mugal authority which led to the loss of Muslim power, 
sought to encourage the revival of a strong central authority 
by invoking a concept of two complementary authorities, 
two caliphates, one is political and the other is juridical,  
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both are responsible for the preservation of Islam. For the 
political authority he uses the term zâhir, meaning external, 
and to this he assigns the responsibility for maintaining 
administrative and political order and for applying the Sha-
ri`a. For the juridical he employs the term bâtin, internal, 
and its responsibility is to give guidance to the religious 
leaders of the community, a role that Shah Walî Allah took 
upon himself.35  
The similarity between this approach and that of Ibn `Abd 
al-Wahhâb is obvious, bringing together the political author-
ity and the authority of the jurist, faqîh, to work toward the 
restoration of Islam from its state of decadence. The differ-
ence between the two approaches remains in this sufi tone 
that is characteristic of Indian Islam.  
Within this sufi tone, and in order to establish the position 
of the jurist as partner in the state affair, Shah Walî Allah 
was able to be critical of the Classical structure of shari`a; he 
was able to reject taqlîd, the uncritical adherence to the 
opinions of the `ulamâ' of the Classical schools of law, and a 
revival of interest in the use of personal effort to decide a 
point of law, ijtihâd by employing qiyâs. By such a revival of 
the principle of personal understanding Shah Walî Allah was 
able to bypass the history of stagnation in the field of shari`a 
scholarship.  
He emphasized the spirit of law, which is applicable in all 
times and places, rather than the form of law, which is 
shaped and formulated in accordance with conditions of 
time and place. Not only does he revive the concept of 
maslaha,36 the community interest, from the Mâlikî's school 
of law, but he basically and initially depends on the well-
established Sufi distinction between shari`a and haqîqa, 
where the first is considered historical and limited in time 
and space while the later is the Truth attained by spiritual 
exercise that leads to vision of Reality.  
As a jurist sufi, he tried to cleanse Sunna from any theologi-
cal influence, because theology presents an imposition of 
rational contemplation on matters that are either clearly 
indicated in the Scripture (the Qur'ân and the Tradition of 
the Prophet, Sunna) or matters that are not mentioned in 
any. Sunna, according to him, is, on the contrary, the agreed 
upon practice of the Muslim community. By such a distinc-
tion, he successfully dissociated Sunna from theology which, 
according to him, caused the People of the Qibla (Muslims) 
to become separate sects and destined factions beyond their 
following the essentials of religion.37  
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. 
While, as we shall see, early Indian revivalist discourse pre-
sented by Shah Walî Allah encouraged later development, 
Wahhâbism has never developed away from the basic ideas 
first formulated by the founder. The absolute unity between 
dogma and political regime offered no scope for political 
opposition, but advocated more radical and fundamentalist 
ideologies. Now, in the context of the American pressure to 
reshape the whole Arab world politically and intellectually, 
there are a lot of gatherings, conferences, etc. basically aim-
ing to represent Wahhâbism as a liberal, open and demo-
cratic system. It is an attempt to apply some makeup to the 
same old face. 
In Egypt a similar revivalist, but probably more liberal 
approach, appeared after the first encounter with Europe. 
Shaykh, Refâ`a Râfi` al-Tahtâwî (1801-1873) was sent to act 
as an imâm for the first Egyptian military mission to France 
(to acquire modern military training). He was very much 
inspired by his teacher Hasan al-`Attâr, the rector of al-Azhar 
for five years (1830-1834) who tried to introduce secular 
sciences to the curriculum of the oldest Islamic educational 
institution in Egypt, al-Azhar. Paradoxically, the objection 
came from the French director of the school of medicine in 
Cairo on the grounds that al-Azhar should continue as an 
exclusively religious institution. Shaykh Hasan al-`Attâr, being 
himself well versed in secular sciences including astronomy, 
medicine, chemistry, and engineering, as well as literature and 
music, found no contradiction between religious knowledge 
and secular disciplines.38  
Inspired by such a master, Tahtâwî managed to learn French 
and to read some of the eighteenth century French 
thoughtand literature. Perhaps more importantly he had time 
to see and observe everyday life in Paris and to record his 
observations in a book that was published after his return to 
Egypt, entitled Takhlîs al-Ibrîz fî Talkhîs Pariz (Summary of 
Paris). On his return he was appointed director of the newly 
established School of Languages (Madrasat al-Alsun). A 
bureau of translation was attached to the school in 1841. 
Books were translated to and from various (European) 
languages, covering the fields of geography, history, geometry, 
mathematics, engineering, law, etc. In addition to all these 
duties, he was appointed the chief editor of the first official 
newspaper al-Waqâi` al-Misriyyah.39  
Al-Tahtâwî's contribution to the study of Islam and 
'rethinking tradition', besides being a pioneer in the 
intellectual awakening process, lies in the fact that he gives a 
new turn to the idea of the `ulama'. In his view, they are not 
simply guardians of a fixed and established tradition. Himself 
well versed in the religious law, as Shâfi`î by legal rite, he 
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believed it was necessary to adapt sharî`a to new 
circumstances and that it was legitimate to do so. Very much 
like Shah Walî Allah, he provoked the reopening of the gate of 
'ijtihâd, which had been announced closed. He even went one 
step further to suggest that there was not much difference, , 
between the principles of sharî`a and the principles of 'natural 
law' on which the codes of modern Europe were based. This 
suggestion implied that Islamic law could be reinterpreted in 
the direction of conformity with modern needs, and he 
suggested a principle which could be used to justify this: that 
it is legitimate for a believer, in certain circumstances, to 
accept an interpretation of the law drawn from a legal code 
other than his own. Taken up by later writers, this suggestion 
was used in the creation of a modern and uniform system of 
Islamic law in Egypt and elsewhere.40 
It is worth noting that the Muslim reformists were able to 
break through the principle of consensus by re-invoking the 
principle of rational reasoning, ijtihâd, which was quite 
feasible and successful, by supporting the fourth principle, 
i.e. legal syllogisms, qiyâs. By undermining the principle of 
'consensus', they were able to navigate through the volumes 
of law, fiqh, without limiting themselves to following a 
specific school, which gave them more freedom to choose 
opinions and to build legal syllogisms. This type of 
reformation became instrumental in the field of law 
formulation and sharî`a codification in so many Muslim 
countries. 
The process of breaking 'consensus' continued to present 
the major development throughout the twentieth century. A 
new class of intellectuals started to be engaged, challenging 
the hegemonic authority of the traditional class of `ulamâ' 
across the Muslim World, thanks to the age of print and the 
press, and the introduction of modern educational systems. 
All these were essential elements in the process of building 
the post-independence nation states. Now, with the 
intensive use of Internet, the traditional authority of the 
`ulamâ' and even the authority of modern intellectuals has 
been fragmented. If the traditional `ulamâ' were the ones 
who challenged and rethought the principle of 'consensus', 
thus, opening new space of rational reflection on Tradition, 
it was for the new emerging class of intellectuals to go a step 
further in the process of 'rethinking'.41 
11- Rethinking Sunna, hadith criticism: the emergence of new 
exegesis 
As explained earlier Sunna encompasses the sayings and 
actions of the prophet Muhammad as well as his approval 
and/or disapproval of his companions' sayings and actions. 
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Unlike the Qur'ân that was recorded down in written form 
early, Sunna was orally transmitted before the compellation 
of the collections of Tradition around the end of sec-
ond/eighth century. The fact that all the reports containing 
tradition were orally transmitted with the possibility of fab-
rication for various reasons and motivations, made the early 
scholars of hadîth who were very aware of the possibility,– 
develop certain critical rules to evaluate authenticity, and 
hence what was to be accepted, and to avoid fabrications 
entering the collections. 
This traditional hadîth criticism approach was re-invoked 
and even developed beyond its traditional critical paradigm 
in the modern context of 'rethinking'. Rethinking the Sunna 
was associated with the efforts to reopen the meaning of the 
Qur'ân to address modern issues by way of trying to estab-
lish a new Qur'ânic exegesis, void of the heavy classical reli-
ance on Tradition in the classical commentaries of the 
Qur'ân. In other words, the criticism of Sunna was basically 
one of the results of the Muslim thinkers being involved in 
Qur'ânic exegesis in a rather different way than that of the 
classical exegetes. The strong demand for a new approach in 
dealing with the Qur'ân in order to open its meaning for the 
new challenging circumstances made it essential to distance 
modern Qur'ânic exegesis from the traditional type heavily 
loaded with hadith quotations. 
Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khân of India (1817-1898)42, not a 
traditional `âlim, was the first Indian modernist to introduce 
new themes, hitherto unknown in this interpretation. An 
apologist, he tried to justify the religious dogmas presented 
in the Qur’ân in the light of modern scientific discoveries. 
The perception that the Qur’ân should occupy the central 
place in guiding the behavior of the Muslims, as against the 
dominant role of the Prophetic traditions generally accepted 
by the ‘ulamâ', was apparently gaining popularity among a 
section of Muslim intelligentsia during late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries in India. This was intended 
primarily to create space for the interpretation of the Qur’ân 
in modern terms, and also to eradicate superstitions 
prevalent in Muslim societies. Sayyed Ahmad was the first 
to have raised this issue. He points to anomalies in the 
interpretation of the Qur’ân and suggests that these are void 
of even general principles on which to base an 
understanding of the Holy Scripture. Most of what the 
classical commentators have provided only concern 
derivations from the Qur’ân of canon law, scholastic 
theology, admonitions and similar other matters. Not a few 
parts of the classical commentaries are “worthless and full 
of weak and fabricated (Prophetic) traditions” or comprise 
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baseless stories borrowed from Judaism. 
It is imperative, therefore, for him to free the field of 
Qurânic exegesis from tradition, substituting instead the 
principles of 'reason' and 'nature'. He proposes that the 
Qur'ân stands on its own, requiring only application of a 
dedicated and enlightened mind for its understanding. The 
principles of interpretation, according to Ahmad Khân, 
should not depend on hadîth otherwise the eternal and uni-
versal quality of the Qur'ân will be put at risk. For him, the 
great miracle of the Qur'ân is its universality which makes it 
possible for every generation to find in it the meaning rele-
vant to its situation, despite the constant increase in human 
knowledge. Hadîth-based interpretation tends to limit the 
meaning of the Qur'ân to a particular historical situation, 
thus obscuring its universality.43  
This approach led Ahmad Khân to the critical approach to 
the second source of Islamic knowledge, the Sunna. Under 
the influence of Biblical criticism applied to the transmis-
sion of hadîth's reports by European scholars like Carl 
Pfander (1803-1865) and William Muir (1819-1905) on one 
hand, and in response to the close-minded, Wahhâbî orient-
ed, attitude developed by Ahl-i-Hadîth, on the other hand, 
he"eventually came to reject almost all hadîth as unrelia-
ble".44 But his refutation of hadîth does not mean that he 
rejects Sunna altogether, although hadith is considered to 
the major carrier of Sunna. 
Like Ahmad Khân, the Egyptian Muhammad Abdu (1848-
1905) seems to have a critical, though more cautious, atti-
tude towards the material that had been handed down in 
the canonized collections of Sunna. He did not theoretically 
elaborate on redefining the authentic Tradition; but he oc-
casionally refutes traditions that contradict either the ex-
plicit meaning of a certain Qur'ânic passages or both reason 
and commonsense. This is obviously shown in his rejection 
of the traditions related to magic or the satanic touch, as 
well as those mentioning the angels descending to fight the 
enemy alongside the Muslim warriors. As we will see, his 
semi-rational interpretation of the Qur'an, necessitates a 
critical approach to tradition.45  
The early twentieth century witnessed the emergence of 
Ahl-i-Qur'ân movement in India as a critical response to the 
emphasis laid on the authority of Sunna by Ahl-i-Hadîth 
group, an emphasis which resulted in leaning towards a 
ritualistic version of reformation. The basic challenge pre-
sented by Ahl-i-Qur'ân was not the authenticity of Sunna as 
transmitted through hadîth reports, but it was basically  
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whether the Sunna stands in the same position of the Qur'ân 
as divine revelation. The Classical position holding Sunna 
asa form of revelation equal to the Qur'ân in authority, 
though different in its form, was challenged.  
Similar controversy, though less violent in tone than in In-
dia, was also happening in Egypt. Just as the Indian Ahl-i-
Qur'ân were influenced by Sayyid Ahmad Khân's emphasis 
on the Qur'ânic universalism versus the Sunna historicity, so 
the Egyptian critics of Sunna developed `Abdu's cautious 
attitude toward hadîth literature into a more radical atti-
tude raising the slogan 'Islam is the Qur'ân alone' in a series 
of articles in al-Manâr in 1907.46 There was strong reaction 
against this claim from several Muslim countries including 
one from India.47 One of the more interesting outcomes of 
discussion around the authenticity of hadîth has been the 
emergence of attempts to separate the question of the au-
thority of sunna from the problem of the historical authen-
ticity of hadîth criticism - to accept the results of modern 
hadîth criticism, at least in part, while in principle preserv-
ing the authenticity of sunna.This was the general approach 
to sunna promoted by the Lahore based Institute of Islamic 
Culture.48 A similar but much more sophisticated attempt to 
separate the authority of sunna from the strict authenticity 
of hadîth is found in the work of the Pakistani modernist 
Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988), who served as director of Pa-
kistan's Central Institute for Islamic Research in the 1960s. 
This institute was established by the regime of General 
Ayyûb Khân to help promotion of modernist interpretations 
of Islam compatible with the needs of the regime. Fazlur 
Rahman's works on sunna must be understood against the 
background of religious politics in Pakistan during the 
1960s and, in particular, against the background of the con-
troversy between Ghulâm Ahmad Parwēz (one of Ahli-i-
Qur'ân group) and his opponents among the Pakistani `ula-
mâ'. Parwēz's radical rejection of sunna and his particular 
vision of Islamic state as true heir of Prophetic authority49 
was associated in the minds of his opponents with the ef-
forts of the Ayyûb government to bypass the `ulamâ' in or-
der to promote modernist Islam.  
Opponents of the government suspected, quite correctly, 
that Ayyûb was intent on bypassing the traditional sources 
of religious authority in his formulation of policy. They con-
cluded, probably incorrectly, that Parwēz's ideas were exer-
cising an undue effect on government policy. Thus the de-
bate over the relationship between religion and state and 
the relative rule of the `ulamâ' and the government in for-
mulating policy on religious question became focused on 
Parwēz's ideas, and particularly on the issue of Sunna. At 
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tention was also focused on the regime's major voice in reli-
gious matters, the Central Institute of Islamic Research and 
its director.50  
The story of the institute and its rule in the state structure in 
Pakistân is worth mentioning; it shows how instrumental 
the criticism of Sunna was for the process of formulating 
modern law. It shows also the failure of the reformation 
movement when it is too connected to the pragmatic policy 
of the political regimes. The example of Pakistân could be 
found in different degree in other Muslim countries where 
the state is able to manipulate intellectuals to serve the re-
gime ideology.  
It seems obvious that the structure of the Central Institute 
for Islamic Research was determined to be semi-secular. As 
Masud pointed out51, Fazlur Rahman, who was a graduate of 
Oxford University, and at the time of establishing the Insti-
tute was teaching at McGill University, Montreal, Canada, 
"gathered together a group of scholars who represented not 
only various disciplines but also different Islamic orienta-
tions. This group represented different Islamic schools of 
thought and ethnic and provincial diversity in Pakistan. In 
addition to their training in traditional Islamic learning, all 
had to have a degree in modern discipline, e.g. economy, 
sociology, political science etc. These scholars also had ad-
vanced degrees from renowned universities in the West. 
Several were sent to USA and Canada. 
As the institute acted as an advisory think tank to assist in 
legislation work, it provided research material for the draft-
ing of various laws. It assisted the Islamic Advisory Council, 
which would advise the National Assembly. Pakistan Family 
Laws, legislated in 1962, represented a liberal interpreta-
tion of the Qur'ân and Sunna. 
The conservatives opposed these laws as they restricted 
polygamy and gave rights to women that traditional Islamic 
law did not allow. The institute found itself the target of 
hostile propaganda. Fazlur Rahman was called Abu'l Fazl, 
the notorious Vizir of the Mughal emperor Akbar who sup-
posedly instituted a new religion.  
Fazlur Rahman's book Islam, a general introduction, essen-
tially written as a defense of Islam against Western critics, 
triggered controversy. A population with 25% literacy took 
to the streets protesting against a book that most of them 
could not and had not read. Political opposition to Ayyub 
took advantage of the situation. The `ulamâ' declared Rah-
man a heretic. Agitation started in Dacca, the constituency of 
Mawlana Ihtishamul Haq Thanawi who was leading this  
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protest against Rahman and Ayyub Khân. Countrywide dis-
turbances in 1969 caused Ayyub to resign. Rahman was 
forced to leave the country, and taught at the University of 
Chicago until his death in 1988. 
12-Rethinking Qur'ân 
We can briefly divide the orientation of modern exegesis of 
the Qur'ân into three basic trends, each of which essentially 
addresses one of the challenging questions mentioned 
above, i.e., science, reason and politics, that modernity 
brought to the mind of Muslims.  
a- Islam and Science 
It was the Indian Sayyid Ahmad Khân, whom we have al-
ready encountered, who looked at the question of science in 
his exegesis of the Qur'ân. As we have seen, both the criti-
cism of hadîth and the consideration of the position of Sun-
na were meant to free the Qur'ânic exegesis from the heavy 
impact of tradition in order to facilitate the introduction of a 
rather more modern understanding of God's message.  
Criticizing classical Qur’ânic commentaries in terms of their 
sources and their subjects of interest, Ahmad Khân accepts 
only those parts of the commentaries dealing with the liter-
ary aspects of the Qur'ân. He points to anomalies in the in-
terpretation of the Qur’ân and suggests that these are void 
of even general principles on which to base an understand-
ing of the Holy Scripture.  
Sayyed Ahmad Khân's major interest was to bring the mean-
ing of the Qur'ân into harmony with the modern discoveries 
of the natural sciences. Natural scientific discoveries, he 
asserts, need to be taken into account while explaining the 
meanings of relevant parts of the Qur’ân, since they do not 
contain anything against the “law of nature”.  
Modern scientific discoveries, explains Sayyid Ahmad Khân, 
are the manifestations of God’s promises in reality while the 
Qur'ân presents God's promises in words. On the basis of 
this argument he suggests that Scripture has to come to 
terms with the law of nature, which includes scientific dis-
coveries. He therefore rejects miracles and many Qur’ânic 
descriptions, which he considers “supernatural” in their 
literal sense, and describes them as metaphors and indirect 
expressions of reality.52 
He states that Qur’ânic words and expressions should not be 
understood exclusively in their direct literal meanings; the 
Holy Scripture often uses metaphors, allegories, and other 
indirect expressions. In order to give his claim an authentic  
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(al-i`jâz al-`ilmî), according to an article 
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Muslim intellectual. Reference can be made 
to publications including: 
1- Reveling the illuminating Qur’anic se-
crets Concerning the Celestial and Terres-
trial Bodies, Animals, Plants and Metals 
(Kashf al-Asrâr ’l-Nawrâniyya ’l-Qur’âniyya 
fimâ Yata`laqu b i’l-Ajrâm ’-Samâwiyya wa 
’l-Ardiyyah wa ’l-Haywânat wa ’l-Nabâtât 
wa ’l-Jawâhir ’l-Ma`daniyya) by Mohammed 
b. Ahmed al-Iskandrani, Cairo 1297/1880;  
2- Explaining the Divine Secrets in Plants, 
Metals and the Specific Characteristics of 
Life (Tibyân al-Asrar ’-Rabbâniyya fi ’l-
Nabât wa ’l-Ma`âdin wa ’l-Khawâs ’l-
Haywâniyya), Syria 1300/1883; 
3- Comparing Some of the Astrological 
Discovery with What is mentioned in the 
divine texts (Muqâranat Ba`d Mabâhith al-  
 
traditional support, he explains how the classical `ulamâ’ 
did not always accept literal meanings of many Qur’ânic 
words when such meanings contradict common sense or 
human intellect. The reason they recognized miracles, and, 
therefore, accepted supernatural Qur’ânic descriptions in 
their literal sense is because natural sciences were not suffi-
ciently developed during those periods. But since very little 
is known about pre-Islamic Arabic literature, he concludes 
that it is possible that words and phrases have meanings 
other than those explained by lexicologists. It is therefore 
imperative also to apply other sources and to accept such 
meanings of the Qur’ân as are based on them, although 
these may be absent from dictionaries.53  
Self-evidently the explicit concept of the Qur'ân as a Text, 
which has been the well established concept since its canon-
ization, is uncritically accepted by Sayyid Ahmad Khân. That 
explains his admiration of that part of classical exegesis 
emphasizing the literary aspect. Although skeptical about 
the quantity of the knowledge available of pre-Islamic Cul-
ture, he methodologically emphasizes its importance. He 
concludes that the Qur’ân should, first and foremost, be un-
derstood, explained and interpreted by the Qur’ân itself i.e., 
by understanding its own internal structure. He considers 
such principle to be derived from the Holy Book.54 The sec-
ond methodological principle is that understanding the pre-
Islamic Arabic literature is a pre-requisite to understanding 
the Qur’ân. Methodologically speaking there is nothing new 
in Sayyid Ahmad Khân’s presupposition. The difference be-
tween his interpretation and the classical commentaries, 
however, lays in the domain of meaning - the modern mean-
ing - that considers science, especially natural science the 
new religion of secularism. Fascinated by the new world of 
science and discovery he had to find a way to integrate it 
into his holy scripture. I propose here that Sayyid Ahmad 
Khân's effort to open the meaning of the Qur'ân to accept 
scientific findings is the embryo of the later to be developed 
pair of seemingly opposite directions, namely the emphasis 
on the scientific inimitability of the Qur'ân55, and that of 
islamization of knowledge and science.  
b- Islam and Rationalism 
Although Muhammad `Abdu was neither a theologian nor a 
philosopher, he admired the philosophical and mystical 
knowledge of Jamâl al-Dîn al-Afghânî (1839-1879). But while 
al-Afghânî was more of an activist and provocative teacher56 
`Abdu gave up politics and concentrated his efforts in the 
arena of thought, especially after he was exiled because of 
his participation in `Urabî's affair which ended with the Brit- 
 Levinas Society 
Journal of the Dutch-Flemish Levinas Society 16 (2011) 
 
151 
Hay`a bi ’l-Wârid fi ’Nussûs 'Shar`iyyah) by 
`Abdullah Fikri, who was a Minister of 
Education in Egypt, Cairo 1315/1897); 
4- The Precious Metals in the Interpreta-
tion of the Qur’ân (al-Jawâhir fi Tafsîr al-
Qur’ân) by Tantawi al-Jawhari (d 1940), 26 
vol., first printed unknown, 2ed., Cairo 
1350/1971. It is multi-volumes tafsîr in 
which the author tries his best to find 
everything related to modern science, 
modern technology, or even discoveries in 
the Qur’ân. Six verses, 5:27-32 for example, 
is dealt with in 25 pages including many 
headings starting with ‘linguistic explana-
tion, al-tafsîr al-lafzî’ and ending with ‘the 
iron save boxes' in the Qur’ân, al-khazâ’in 
al-hadîdiyah fi ’l-Qur’ân’. (cf. `Abd al-Majîd 
al-Sharafî, al-Islam wa 'l-Hadâtha (Islam 
and Modernity), Tunisia 1990, pp.69-76.  
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ish occupation of Egypt in 1882. Influenced heavily by Af-
ghânî, who had brought to Egypt the idea of a new, modern 
interpretation of Islam, `Abdu adopted a synthesis of classi-
cal rationalism and modern socio-political awareness. This 
made it possible for him to re-examine the basic sources of 
Islamic knowledge, the Qur'ân and the Sunna as well as the 
structure of Islamic theology, thus, preparing the ground for 
what is known as the islâh, reformation, movement. 
When he was appointed as the religious councellor, muftî, of 
Egypt in 189957, he addressed so many practical social and 
cultural issues that needed to be dealt with from an Islamic 
rational perspective. He set a program for the reform of 
Muslim higher education and for the reform of the 
administration of Muslim law. He tried to carry out these 
practical reforms, first, when he suggested reforms of 
education in general and of al-Azhar in particular in 1892, 
and, second, when he proposed so many plans for the reform 
of the legal system. `Abdu's efforts to introduce some reforms 
to al-Azhar was partly successful, but the resistance from the 
traditional `ulamâ' was so strong that he concentrated more 
on intellectual reformation.  
His confidence in 'reason' is manifest in all his activities, 
although he considers that 'religion' provides the basis to 
protect 'reason' from erring. The question of Islam and 
modern knowledge, which was fundamental to `Abdu’s 
writings, led him to re-examine Islamic heritage, pushing 
more to reopen the ‘door of ijtihâd’ in all aspects of social 
and intellectual life. As religion is an essential part of human 
existence, he argued that the only avenue through which to 
launch real reform was through a reform of Islamic thought.  
He elaborated in his Tafsîr al-Manâr the concept of the 
Qur'ân as a 'text' by, first, emphasizing implicitly its literary 
structure, secondly, placing its style in expressing its mes-
sage in the seventh century in accordance with intellectual 
level of the Arabs’ mentality. Whatever seems irrational or 
contradictory to logic and science in the Qur’ân must, ac-
cordingly, be understood as reflecting the Arabs’ vision of 
the world at that time. All verses referring to superstitions 
like witchcraft and the evil eye are to be explained as ex-
pressions of what the Arabs believed in. And literary figures 
of speech (like ‘metaphor’ and ‘allegory’) appear in Tafsîr al-
Manâr as the basis of a rational explanation for all miracu-
lous events and deeds mentioned in the Qur’ân. The verses 
which speak about sending the angels down from heaven to 
fight against the kuffâr, infidels, are thus explained by `Abdu 
as an expression of encouragement; they were meant to 
provide comfort to the believers, to help enable them to gain 
a victory.58 
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This was precisely the first explicit effort of the re-
contextualization of the Qur'ân against the 7th century cul-
tural background, a method that was developed by later 
Egyptian as well as Arab and Muslim intellectuals. This pro-
cess of re-contextualization led `Abdu to de-mythologize the 
Qurânic narrative as well as to come close to a de-
mystification of the Holy Text.  
While Sayyid Ahmad Khân was trying to harmonize the 
Qur'ân with science, by way of creating equation between 
them - the equation between Divine 'promise in Action' and 
'promise in words' - it was quite enough for `Abdu to place 
the Qur'ân in the seventh century context, thus excluding 
any attempt of comparison between the Qur'ân and science.  
His most important contribution in this area was his insist-
ence that the Qur’ân is not meant to be a book of history 
neither a book of science; it is a book of guidance.  
Consequently, any search of proof for any scientific theory is 
invalid. Qur’anic narratives, on the other hand, should not 
be taken as historical documents. Indeed, historical inci-
dents mentioned in the Qur’anic narratives are presented in 
a literary and narrative style, to convey lessons of admoni-
tion and exhortation.59 `Abdu was very clear about the dif 
ference between ‘historiography’ and the Qur’anic stories. 
Historiography is a scientific field of knowledge based on 
inquiry and critical investigation of available data (reports, 
testimonies, memories, and geographical or material evi-
dences, for example). In contrast, the Qur’anic stories are 
intended to serve ethical, spiritual and religious purposes. 
They might be based on some historical incidents, but the 
purpose is not to provide knowledge about history. This 
explains why names of persons, places and dates are not 
mentioned in these stories. Even if the story is about a 
prophet, or about one of the enemies of a prophet (like 
Pharaoh), many details are omitted. `Abdu is clearly against 
the method of the classical exegetes, which attempted to 
clarify these mubhamât (unmentioned; non-explicit). He 
insisted that the importance of the story does not depend on 
such knowledge; it depends rather on the lesson of ‘admoni-
tion’ that can be deduced from it.60  
It is important here to emphasize the fact that `Abdu’s 
intellectual liberal discourse presents the intellectual side of 
the modernizing project initiated by Muhammad `Ali (1760-
1849) to establish a modern state in Egypt, a project that 
was carried out by his grandson Khedive Ismâ`îl (1863-
1879), who explicitly wanted Egypt to be like any European 
state. The ideas of `Abdu were very influential during the 
twentieth century right across the entire Muslim World, 
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thanks to the journal of al-Manâr (1898-1936) established 
by Rashîd Rida (1865-1935), `Abdu's disciple and partner. 
`Abdu's 'rational' oriented exegesis was not entirely free of 
the issue of modern science where it was implicit, neither 
was the 'science' oriented exegesis of Ahmad Khân free from 
rationalism. Like `Abdu, in his effort to free the field of 
Qurânic exegesis from tradition Ahmad Khân placed the 
principles of 'reason' and 'nature' as a substitute for the 
classical heavy dependence on quotations from tradition. 
His proposal is that the Qur'ân stands on its own, requiring 
only application of a dedicated and enlightened mind for its 
understanding. The principles of interpretation, according 
to Ahmad Khân, should not depend on hadîth or this will 
hazard the eternal and universal quality of the Qur'ân. For 
him, the great miracle of the Qur'ân is its universality which 
makes it possible for every generation to find in it the mean-
ing relevant to its situation despite the constant increase in 
human knowledge. Hadîth-based interpretation tends to 
limit the meaning of the Qur'ân to a particular historical 
situation, thus, obscuring its universality.61  
c- Islâm and Politics 
Political concern is not absent from either the exegesis of 
`Abdu or Ahmad Khân. Neither is it appropriate to suggest 
that 'political' oriented exegesis was started by the Pakistani 
author, journalist, interpreter of the Qur'ân, ideologue and 
political activist Abu 'A`lâ Mawdûdî (1903-1979). But it was 
Abu 'l-A`lâ al-Mawdûdî who gave the political Islamic 
movement its qur'ânic ground that was copied by Sayyid 
Qutb. More than anyone else he shaped and influenced the 
further development of 'orthodox fundamentalism', also 
known as 'Islamism'.62 The leaders of the Shi`ite revolution 
in Iran in 1979 gave as their main sources of inspiration for 
shaping an Islamic state the publications of their Egyptian 
Sunni 'Brethren' Hasan al-Bannâ and Sayyid Qutb, and the 
Pakistani Mawdûdî.  
It goes without saying that it was in the Indian context un-
der the British occupation, where the relationship between 
the Muslims and the Hindus started to deteriorate. Mawdûdî 
started his comprehensive study of the doctrine of jihâd in 
the mid-1920s, in response to Hindu accusations that Islam 
was spread by the sword, after a Muslim assassinated a non- 
Muslim leader. This work, which was first serialized then 
published under the title al-jihâd fi 'l-Islâm, presented the 
basic elements of his later thought. In 1932, and in the 
monthly journal Tarjumân al-Qur'ân, which was to be the 
main vehicle of his ideas for the rest of his life, Mawdûdî’ 
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started to formulate the ideology of political Islam. He set 
forth the objectives of his intellectual mission in the follow-
ing lines: 
The plan of action I had in mind was that I 
should first break the hold which Western cul-
ture and ideas had come to acquire over the 
Muslim intelligentsia, and to instill in them the 
fact that Islam has a code of life of its own, its 
own culture, its own political and economic sys- 
tems and a philosophy and an educational sys-
tem which are all superior to anything that 
Western civilization could offer. I wanted to rid 
them of the wrong notion that they needed to 
borrow from others in the matter of culture and 
civilisation.63 
According to this ideology, where the West and Islam stand 
in dichotomy, the complex human societies are categorized 
in only two kinds, either 'Islamic' or 'Jâhilî'. As long as the 
universe, according to Mawdûdî's Islamic view, is an “orga-
nized state” and a “totalitarian system”, in which all powers 
are vested in Allah, the only ruler, the state of Islam, or the 
Islamic State, should present the earthly manifestation of 
the cosmos.  
If both `Abdu and Ahmad Khân tried, in different way, to 
contextualize the Qur'ân in order to open up its meaning by 
way of allegorization and metaphorization, Mawdûdî ex-
tended the literal meaning of the Qur'ân to address the 
modern world. The verses of chapter 5:42-50, for example, - 
now well known as the verses of hâkimiyya, the absolute 
sovereignty of God - which addressed the people who re-
jected Islam during the time of the Prophet, are taken by 
Mawdûdî to be addressing the Muslims now; its meaning is 
not only to apply the rules prescribed by God but to estab-
lish a theocratic state. 
Studying in detail Mawdûdî's book on jihad Slomp rightly 
comments on his hermeneutics as a hermeneutics that turns 
the decisions taken in certain historical moments into eter-
nal divine law. For its importance I better quote it in its 
length. 
On the basis of Mawdudi's own arguments and ex-
amples the reader concludes, "that all statements on 
jihad in the Qur'ân, Hadith and early Islamic history 
were established in actual situation, and that they 
were formulated on the basis of decisions concern-
ing for example slaves, spoils of war, prisoners, 'the 
hypocrites', traitors, treatment of enemies and  
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minorities as part of a historical process. To declare 
the result of this process sacrosanct, as Maududi does, 
reveals that the Achilles heel of this Islamism is its 
way of dealing with history. For all the events in the 
life of the Prophet and his Companions are given the 
same authority as revelation. Added to this, 
Mawdudi's interpretation of this 'revela tion cum his-
tory' is presented as authoritative for Islam in all 
eras.64  
It could be concluded that Sayyid Ahmad Khân, `Abdu, and 
Mawdûdî have furnished the ground for Muslim intellectu-
als, throughout the twentieth century to open up the mean-
ing of the Qur'ân, and consequently the meaning of Islam, to 
cope with modernity, in different ways. As illustrated Sayyid 
Ahmad was basically busy with the challenge of modern 
science; `Abdu was busy with the issue of 'rationality' in 
general; Mawdûdi was responding to the challenge of West-
ern domination, and consequently the Westernization of the 
Muslim world. If Khân's approach is to be considered the 
embryo of the late 'al-i`jâz al-`ilmî' as well as 'the islamiza-
tion of science and knowledge' trend, `Abdu's approach was 
carried on in what has been known as the 'literary ap-
proach'. Mawdûdî’s approach stands alone as the real 
source of the following political and ideological interpreta-
tion of the Qur'ân. Regardless of their differences in terms of 
methodology and conclusions, all three of them followed the 
classical assumption that the Qur'ân is a text.  
Now, once again the question is which meaning will prevail, 
togetherness or isolation? Related question to be raised is 
whether Muslims are ready to rethink the Qur’ân or not? Is 
it possible to consider the open options presented in the 
Qur’ânic discourse and reconsider the fixed meaning pre-
sented by the classical `ulamâ’? In other words, how far is 
the reformation of Islamic thought going to develop? This 
duly brings the relationship of the West and the Muslim 
World into our discussion. How does this relationship affect 
the way Muslims 'rethink' their own tradition to modernize 
their lives without relinquishing their spiritual power, par-
ticularly in view of America’s colonizing project? I am afraid 
the answer is not positive, especially with the new American 
colonization project. Both the new imperial and colonial 
American project and the building of ghettos in the Middle 
East are likely to support the most exclusive type of dis-
course in contemporary Islamic thought. We have to be alert 
and to join our efforts to fight against that by all possible 
means. 
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Conclusion 
I have argued that the Qur'ân is a living phenomenon. A hu-
manistic hermeneutics of the Qur'ân has to take seriously 
the living phenomenon and stop reducing the Qur'ân to be 
only a text. The Qur'ân was the outcome of dialoguing, de-
bating, augmenting, accepting and rejecting. This horizontal, 
communicative and humanistic dimension is in the 'struc-
ture' of the Qur'ân, not outside it. The invitation to 'rethink 
the Qur'ân' flows from this communicative dimension. This 
invitation is of vital importance for Muslims in general, and 
for Muslims living in Europe in particular. I have argued not 
only for the continuation of this process of rethinking but 
for moving it further toward a constructive method for Mus-
lims, wherever they are, to be actively engaged in formulat-
ing the 'meaning of life' in the world in which they live and 
further develop the spiritual and ethical dimension of their 
tradition.  
But what will prevail: togetherness or isolation? Are 
Muslims ready to rethink the Qur'ân or not? Is it possible to 
consider the open options presented in the Quranic dis-
course and reconsider the fixed meaning presented by the 
classical 'ulamâ'? In other words, how far is the reformation 
of Islamic thought going to develop? This question duly 
brings the relationship of the West and the Muslim World 
into the discussion. How does this relationship affect the 
way Muslims 'rethink' their own tradition to modernize 
their lives without relinquishing their spiritual power? I am  
afraid the answer is not positive, particularly in view of 
America's new colonizing policy. Both the new imperial and 
colonial project of the United States of America and the 
building of ghettos in the Middle East are likely to support 
the most exclusive and isolating type of discourse in con-
temporary Islamic thought. We have to be alert and to join 
our efforts to fight against this development by all possible 
democratic means. 
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